Central Valley: Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene

• Citation: 529 F.Supp.2d 1151
• Decision Date: 11 December 2007
• Docket Number: No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO.,CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO.
• Parties: CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLERJEEP, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. James GOLDSTENE, in his official capacity as Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board, Defendant, The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense, Blue Water Network, Global Exchange, and Rainforest Action Network, Defendant-Intervenors.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

529 F.Supp.2d 1151

CENTRAL VALLEY CHRYSLERJEEP, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. James GOLDSTENE, in his official capacity as Executive Officer of the California Air Resources Board, Defendant The Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Plaintiff-Intervenor Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense, Blue Water Network, Global Exchange, and Rainforest Action Network, Defendant-Intervenors.

No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

December 11, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Andrew Brian Clubok, PHV, Derek Sterling Bentsen, Lucas Rames Blocher, PHV, Stuart A. C. Drake, PHV, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, DC, John P. Kinsey, Sagaser, Jones & Helsley, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Matthew B. Byrne, PHV, Gravel & Shea, Burlington, VT, Michael Edward Scoville—Pro Hac Vice, Stacey L. Bennett, PHV, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Raymond B. Ludwiszewski, Gibson Dunn and Crutcher, Washington, DC, Timothy Jones, Sagaser, Jones & Helsley, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of the State of California, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Ellen M. Peter, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, Gavin A. McCabe, Marc N. Melnick, Mark W. Poole, Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Attorneys. General, Oakland, CA, for Defendants.

David D. Doniger, Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, Matthew F. Pawa, Benjamin Krass, Law Of fices of Matthew F. Pawa, P.C., Newton Centre, MA, David Bookbinder, Sierra Club, Washington, DC, James. T.B. Tripp, Environmental Defense, New York, NY, for Defendant-Intervenors Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Environmental Defense.

Danielle R. Fugere, Bluewater Network, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Intervenors Bluewater Network, Global Exchange, and Rainforest Action Network.

ORDER ON MOTIONS AND COUTER-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ON EPCA PREEMPTION AND FOREIGN POLICY PREEMPTION

ANTHONY W. ISHII, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

This is an action for injunctive and declaratory relief by plaintiffs Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc., et al. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") and Plaintiff-intervenor Association of International Automobile Manufacturers ("AIAM") against defendant James Goldstene,¹ in his official capacity as Executive Director of the California Air Resources Control Board ("CARB") and defendant-intervenors Sierra Club, et al. (collectively "Defendants"). In an order filed January 16, 2007 (the. "January 16 Order"), the court granted Defendants' motion for a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. Pending in this court at the time the stay was imposed were a number of motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. Both AIAM and Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim that the Energy Policy and Conservation Act ("EPCA") preempts regulations promulgated by CARB that aim to regulate greenhouse gas emissions of greenhouse gasses, principally carbon dioxide, by motor vehicles. Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim that CARB's proposed regulations are preempted by the foreign policy of the United States.

The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007), was announced on April 2, 2007. The court requested briefing by the parties as to the impact of the decision in Massachusetts on the motions before this court. Briefing by the parties commenced on July 20, 2007, and was completed by September 28, 2007. During the period this case was stayed, the District Court for the District of Vermont filed an opinion and order in the consolidated case of Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth, et al. v. Crombie, 508 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.Vt.2007) (hereinafter "Green Mountain")², in which AIAM and a group of auto dealers and manufacturers challenged the State of Vermont's proposed adoption of the same regulations adopted by CARB on grounds identical to the grounds asserted by Plaintiffs in this case. Both parties have submitted briefing on the potential impact of Green Mountain on the motions now before this court. The court now lifts the previously imposed stay to consider the parties' motions for summary judgment in light of all the supplementary briefings filed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed this action on December 7, 2004. The first amended complaint ("FAC") alleged five claims for relief; preemption under EPCA, preemption under section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act, preemption under United States foreign policy, violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause, and violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on. June 1, 2006. On September 25, 2006, the court filed a memorandum opinion and order (the "September 25 Order") granting Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiffs' claims under the Sherman Act and under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Doc. # 363. Judgment on the pleadings was denied with respect to Plaintiffs' claims for EPCA preemption, Clean Air Act preemption, and foreign policy preemption.

On October 27, 2006, Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remainder of Plaintiffs' claim on the ground of ripeness. During the pendency of that motion, Defendants moved for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claims under EPCA preemption and under foreign policy preemption. Defendants also moved to dismiss AIAM on the ground AIAM lacked associational standing to intervene.³ On January 16, 2007, the court issued a memorandum opinion and order (the "January 16 Order") denying Defendants motions on the ground of ripeness and granting Defendants' motion to stay further proceedings until the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Massachusetts.

The January 16 Order also declared that "California's program to regulate green-house gas emissions pursuant to California Health and Safety Code, Section 43018.5(b)(1), is PREEMPTED by section 209(a) of the Federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)." Doc. 606 at 22:26-28. The January 16 Order also enjoined the State of California from any enforcement of the proposed greenhouse gas emission regulations, such injunction to remain in effect until the earlier of either a grant of waiver of federal preemption by EPA, or enactment of federal legislation otherwise enabling the implementation of the regulations. Thus, the combination of the court's Orders of September 25 and January 16, resulted in the resolution of three of five of Plaintiffs' claims in the FAC, leaving undecided Plaintiffs' claims of EPCA preemption and foreign policy preemption.

On November 8, 2006, AIAM filed its motion for summary judgment on the EPCA preemption claim. Briefing on AIAM's motion for summary judgment on its EPCA claim was completed as of December 12, 2006. Also, on November 8, 2006, Defendants filed their motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs' claim for EPCA preemption. Briefing on Defendants' motion appears to have been completed as of December 4, 2006. On November 22, 2006, Defendants filed a document titled "Defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication," Doc. # 517 (the "517 cross-motion").⁴ On November 22, 2007, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to AIAM's motion for summary judgement on Plaintiffs' EPCA claim. Plaintiffs' opposition to AIAM's motion for summary judgment is based on Plaintiffs' contention that their case should be decided on facts that would be best adduced at trial, and that summary judgment should therefore be denied. On December 1, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the 517 cross-motion. On December 4, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an opposition on the merits of the 517 cross-motion. Briefing on the 517 cross-motion appears to have been completed by December 13, 2006.

The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts, was announced on April 2, 2007. The memorandum opinion and order by the District of Vermont in Green Mountain, is dated September 12, 2007. The parties have completed supplemental briefing on the impact of Massachusetts as of September 28, 2007, including opening and responsive briefing in response to the opposing sides' briefs. In total, the parties have submitted a total of twelve briefs and requests for judicial notice in response to this court's request for further briefing. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants addressed issues raised in Green Mountain in their reply briefs that were both filed on September 28, 2007.

REGULATORY BACKGROUND AND PROPOSED UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The statutory enactments that form the legal backdrop of this action have been extensively summarized in the court's September 25 Order. The court summarizes here the portion of the background presented in the September 25 Order that is pertinent to this discussion.

I. California Regulatory Background

In 2002, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1493 ("AB 1493"), codified at California Health and Safety Code, section 43018.5. Section 43018.5(a) required CARB to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles" not later than January 1, 2005. The regulations directed by AB 1493 are to be applied to motor vehicles beginning with the 2009 model year. AB 1493 required CARB to develop its regulations taking into account the technical feasability of implementing the regulations within the time frames provided and to take into account "environmental, economic, social, and technological factors." The regulations to be set by CARB were also to be "[e]conomical to an owner or operator of a vehicle, taking into account the full lifecycle costs of the vehicle." Cal. Health & Safety Code, § 43018.5(i)(2).

In 2004, CARB completed the...