Central Vermont Medical Center v. Town of Plainfield, 10-70

• Citation: 128 Vt. 557,268 A.2d 788
• Decision Date: 22 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 10-70,10-70
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court
• Parties: CENTRAL VERMONT MEDICAL CENTER v. TOWN OF PLAINFIELD.

Page 788

268 A.2d 788

128 Vt. 557

CENTRAL VERMONT MEDICAL CENTER v. TOWN OF PLAINFIELD.

No. 10-70.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

July 22, 1970.

Free & Bernasconi, Barre, for plaintiff.

Hiram S. Hunn, Town Agent, Plainfield, for defendant.

Before HOLDEN, C. J., and SHANGRAW, BARNEY, SMITH and KEYSER, JJ.

SHANGRAW, Justice.

The Barre City Hospital and Heaton Hospital merged to form the plaintiff, Central Vermont Medical Center. All accounts receivable of these two hospitals were assigned to the plaintiff on August 5, 1968. The plaintiff brought suit in the Washington County Court on October 16, 1969 to recover for hospital care furnished at various times by the Barre City Hospital and Heaton Hospital prior to October 1, 1968, as evidenced by the accounts so assigned.

No. 147 of the Public Acts of 1967, revised the state welfare laws and now charges the Department of Social Welfare with the responsibility to furnish relief to a transient person. This act repealed the statutory municipal requirement for such assistance.

Section 46 of No. 147 reads:

'When a town is obligated to furnish relief to a transient person under subchapter 4 of Chapter 15, of Title 33, and the need for relief continues after October 1, 1968, the town shall notify the department of social welfare. The town shall not be liable for relief furnished to the transient person after October 1, 1968, and the relief shall be chargeable to the department of social welfare.'

Of further importance in this case is section 214 of Title 1 which reads:

'The repeal of an act shall not revive one which has been repealed, nor affect an act done, a right accruing, accrued, acquired or established, or a suit or proceeding had or commenced in a civil cause before the time when the repeal takes effect; nor shall it affect a suit pending at the time of such repeal for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred under the act so repealed.'

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss and assigned several grounds in support thereof. The motion was denied. The defendant requested and was granted permission to appeal before final judgment under the provisions of 12 V.S.A. section 2386. The lower court certified this question:

'Does the enactment of No. 147 of the Acts of 1967 bar plaintiff's recovery in this action brought pursuant to former Chapter 15 of Title 33 V.S.A. when the action was commenced subsequent to the effective date of No. 147 of the Acts of 1967?'

The question is narrow, yet, on this interlocutory appeal the defendant has advanced ten claims in support of its motion to dismiss, which relate to the sufficiency of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. It will be seen that the question certified relates to the force and effect of the 1967 statute. It does not reach or include the sufficiency of the pleadings.

This Court is limited to the question certified and will not consider such other question which might at some other point in the case be properly considered. In re Crescent Beach Association, 126 Vt. 448, 453, 126 A.2d 497; Dresden School District v. Norwich Town School Dist., 124 Vt. 227, 228, 203 A.2d 598. Other than the question certified, the grounds set forth in defendant's motion to dismiss are irrelevant at the present time and cnanot be considered by this Court.

This suit was not commenced until October 16, 1969. By the question certified we are called upon to determine whether plaintiff's right to recover from the defendant town for medical and hospital services provided prior to October 1, 1968 is abolished or barred by No. 147 of the Acts of 1967. Chapter 15 of Title 33 V.S.A. was repealed effective October 1, 1968.

We call attention to the case of Harris v. Town of Townshend, 56 Vt. 716 decided by this Court in 1883. This was a negligence action founded upon a statute authorizing recovery of damages against towns, when...