Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay

• Decision Date: 18 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 10 CV 2262(DRH)(ARL).,10 CV 2262(DRH)(ARL).
• Citation: 954 F.Supp.2d 127
• Parties: CENTRO DE LA COMUNIDAD HISPANA DE LOCUST VALLEY and the Workplace Project, Plaintiffs, v. TOWN OF OYSTER BAY; John Venditto, Town Supervisor of the Town of Oyster Bay, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

954 F.Supp.2d 127

CENTRO DE LA COMUNIDAD HISPANA DE LOCUST VALLEY and the Workplace Project, Plaintiffs,

v.TOWN OF OYSTER BAY; John Venditto, Town Supervisor of the Town of Oyster Bay, Defendants.

No. 10 CV 2262(DRH)(ARL).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

June 18, 2013.

Latino Justice Prldef, by: Alan Levine, Esq., Elizabeth Joynes, Esq., Laura Huizar, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

New York Civil Liberties Union, by: Corey Stoughton, Esq., Art Eisenberg, Esq., Erin B. Harrist, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

American Civil Liberties Union, by: Lee Gelernt, Esq., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Sinreich Kosakoff & Messina LLP, by: Jonathan Halsby Sinnreich, Esq., Timothy F. Hill, Esq., Central Islip, NY, for Defendants.

Goldberg Segalla LLP, by: Christopher Kendric, Esq., Mineola, NY, for Defendant Town of Oyster Bay.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HURLEY, Senior District Judge:

On May 17, 2010, plaintiffs Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley (“Centro”) and The Workplace Project, two organizations that advocate on behalf of immigrant workers and day laborers commenced this action alleging that the Town of Oyster Bay (“The Town”) and its Town Supervisor John Venditto violated their free speech, due process, and equal protection rights through adoption of a town ordinance (“the Ordinance”) prohibiting day laborers from stopping or attempting to stop vehicles to solicit work. Plaintiff Centro is an unincorporated membership organization primarily consisting of day laborers and their families who live and work in the Town of Oyster Bay, particularly Locust Valley, while The Workplace Project is an incorporated membership organization made up of Latino immigrant workers who live in Nassau County.

On September 29, 2011, plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, the operative pleading in this action, bringing the following claims: (1) violation of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On May 20, 2010, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining enforcement of the Ordinance. Upon consent of the parties, the Court converted the TRO into a Preliminary Injunction on June 1, 2010. Thereafter, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit, and the Second Circuit affirmed this Court's decisionbut emphasized that this Court retained the power to reconsider the preliminary injunction or to leave it in place. After receiving the Second Circuit's ruling, however, the parties agreed to leave the preliminary injunction in place and proceed to trial.

Presently before the Court are two motions and one appeal. First, defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for partial summary judgment dismissing the claims of plaintiff Centro on the grounds that Centro lacks standing. Second, plaintiffs move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss defendants' counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Third, defendants ask that this Court overrule Magistrate Judge Lindsay's decision to issue a protective order regarding defendants' discovery requests. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment is denied, plaintiffs' motion to dismiss is granted, and Judge Lindsay's decision to issue a protective order is affirmed.

BACKGROUND¹

The following material facts are drawn from the parties' Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statements and evidentiary submissions.

Plaintiff Centro is an unincorporated organization formed on March 22, 2010. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 2). Centro was formed to ensure the right to dignified work and the right to work with respect and justice as well as in response to the Town's intention to adopt the Ordinance. (Pls.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18). In furtherance of this mission, Centro runs educational programs for day laborers including ESL (English as a Second Language) classes, safety seminars, and labor rights workshops, and its members also visit sites in Locust Valley where day laborers solicit employment in order to discuss any problems the day laborers might be having and provide laborers with information and available resources. ( Id. ¶¶ 27–28). Luz Torres is the Chairperson of Centro and participates in these initiatives. (Decl. Of Alan Levine in Supp. Of Pls.' Mem. in Opp'n to Summ. J., Ex. B, Decl. of Luz Torres ¶¶ 1, 6 (“Torres Decl. I”)).

Centro includes as members of its organization anyone that ever attended a meeting subsequent to its formation and does not require any application or other criteria for membership. (Defs.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 4). Centro does not maintain any bank accounts and does not receive any funding. ( Id. ¶ 6). Centro does, however, hold bimonthly general membership meetings and retains notes and attendance records from these meetings (Torres Decl. I ¶¶ 4, 8). Centro's members also elect a Steering Committee that meets monthly to discuss activities, plan general meetings, and make executive decisions. ( Id. ¶ 3). At Centro's first meeting on March 22, 2010 more than forty people attended and voted on the organization's name, elected a steering committee, and drafted Centro's mission statement. (Pls.' 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 4, 5)

The Town Board enacted the Ordinance, Chapter 205–32 of the Code of the Town of Oyster Bay, on September 29, 2009. The Ordinance provides as follows:

It shall be unlawful for any person standing within or adjacent to any public right-of-way within the Town of Oyster Bay to stop or attempt to stop any motor vehicle utilizing said public right-of-way for the purpose of soliciting employment of any kind from the occupants of said motor vehicle.

Chapt. 205–32(C).

“Public right-of-way” is defined as “[a]ll of the areas dedicated to public use for public street purposes and shall include roadways, parkways, highways, streets, medians, sidewalks, curbs, slopes and areas of land between the sidewalk and the curb which are also known as utility strips, except for lawful public parking areas.” Chapt. 205–32(B). According to the Ordinance, “solicit” or “solicitation” means:

Any request, offer, enticement, or action which announces the availability for or of employment, or a request, offer, enticement or action which seeks to offer or secure employment. Examples of behavior which constitute solicitation of employment include but are not limited to waving arms, making hand signals, shouting to someone in a vehicle, jumping up and down, waving signs soliciting employment pointed at persons in vehicles, standing in the public right-of-way while facing vehicles in the roadway, or entering the roadway portion of the public right-of-way for purpose of seeking employment. A solicitation shall be deemed complete when made whether or not an employment relationship is created, a transaction is completed or an exchange of money or property takes place.

Chapt. 205–32(F)(1).

The Ordinance specifically excludes solicitation of taxicabs, limousine services, public transportation, towing operations, and ambulances. Chapt. 205–32(E)(1). The penalty for violation of the law is a fine of not more than $250 for each offense. Chapt. 205–32(F).

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is only appropriate where admissible evidence in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or other documentation demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and one party's entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Viola v. Philips Med. Sys. of N. Am., 42 F.3d 712, 716 (2d Cir.1994). The relevant governing law in each case determines which facts are material; “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuinely triable factual issue exists when the moving party demonstrates, on the basis of the pleadings and submitted evidence, and after drawing all inferences and resolving all ambiguities in favor of the non-movant, that no rational jury could find in the non-movant's favor. Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir.1996).

To defeat a summary judgment motion properly supported by affidavits, depositions, or other documentation, the non-movant must offer similar materials setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir.1996). The non-movant must present more than a “scintilla of evidence,” Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505), or “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Aslanidis v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), and cannot rely on the allegations in his or her pleadings, on conclusory statements, or on “mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible.” Gottlieb v. Cnty. of Orange, 84 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir.1996) (citations omitted). “When no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party because the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential...