Centro Medico Del Turabo v. Feliciano De Melecio

• Decision Date: 28 May 2004
• Docket Number: No. CIV. 99-2277(SEC).,CIV. 99-2277(SEC).
• Citation: 321 F.Supp.2d 285
• Parties: CENTRO MEDICO DEL TURABO, INC., et al. Plaintiffs v. Hon. Carmen FELICIANO DE MELECIO Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

321 F.Supp.2d 285

CENTRO MEDICO DEL TURABO, INC., et al. Plaintiffs v. Hon. Carmen FELICIANO DE MELECIO Defendant

No. CIV. 99-2277(SEC).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

May 28, 2004.

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Fernando E. Agrait-Betancourt, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Miguel A. Fernandez-Torres, U.S. Attorney's Office, Torre Chardon, San Juan, PR, P.T., for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

Pending before this court is the Defendant's motion to dismiss arguing that this action is time barred, that res judicata precludes Plaintiffs' claim, that the Plaintiffs have failed to assert a Fourteenth Amendment violation, that the Defendant is shielded by qualified immunity, and that Co-plaintiff Joaquin Rodriguez Garcia, as chairman and stockholder, lacks standing to sue (Docket # 6). Plaintiffs have opposed Defendant's motion (Docket # 8) and Defendant, in turn, has replied (Docket # 15).

Background

The plaintiffs, Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. ("CMT"), Turabo Medical Center Partnership ("TMCP"), HIMA en Humacao, Inc. ("HIMA"), and Joaquin Rodriguez Garcia ("Plaintiffs"), filed this action for injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages against the Hon. Carmen Feliciano de Melecio, Secretary of Health, for alleged constitutional violations under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to the complaint, the acts of discrimination and constitutional violation consist of Defendant's reiterated denial to grant to several medical facilities owned and/or operated by the Plaintiffs the Certificates of Necessity and Convenience (CNC) requested by them and of not allowing them to participate in the processes of privatization and administration of public health facilities. Plaintiffs also allege that there has been a pattern of retaliation, harassment, and coercion against them and that they have had to repeatedly validate their rights in the state courts. As a result of such actions, Plaintiffs have allegedly been harmed and unconstitutionally punished for exercising their rights to engage in free speech and to petition the government for the redress of grievances, and to be protected from discrimination.

In her motion to dismiss, Defendant has raised several defenses and arguments for dismissal.¹ Since the statute of limitations issue is dispositive of most of Plaintiffs' claims, we will address this issue first. Essentially, Defendant asserts that all the acts mentioned in the complaint are in excess of the applicable one year limitations period. Plaintiffs counter arguing that the alleged acts of discrimination and retaliation are of a continuous nature and hence, the complaint is not time barred.

Standard of Review

In assessing whether dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate, "the trial court, must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiff's favor, and determine whether the complaint, so read, limns facts sufficient to justify recovery on any cognizable theory." LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 508 (1st Cir.1998) (citations omitted). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), quoted in Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999). See also Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 52 (1st Cir.1990) (dismissal for failure to state a claim is warranted "only if it clearly appears, according to the facts alleged, that the plaintiff cannot recover on any viable theory.").

But "[a]lthough this standard is diaphanous, it is not a virtual mirage." Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir.1988)). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must set forth `factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.'" Id.

In judging the sufficiency of a complaint, courts must "differentiate between well-pleaded facts, on the one hand, and `bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocution, and the like,' on the other hand; the former must be credited, but the latter can safely be ignored." LaChapelle, 142 F.3d at 508 (quoting Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996)). See also Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.1999). Moreover, Courts "will not accept a complainant's unsupported conclusions or interpretations of law." Wash. Legal Found.v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 971 (1st Cir.1993).

Applicable Law and Analysis

Section 1983 provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). However, it does not contain a statute of limitations to govern those claims filed under it. It is well-settled law that state-law statute of limitations governs suits in federal courts arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 109 S.Ct. 573, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989). For such purposes, federal courts are to borrow the state law limitations period for personal injury suits. Id. Puerto Rico law imposes a one-year statute of limitations for tort actions arising out of the fault or negligence of a defendant. Art. 1868(2) of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, 31 P.R. Laws Ann. § 5298. Hence, actions brought in this district under § 1983 are subject to Article's 1868(2) one-year statute of limitations. See Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir.1977); Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir.1997); Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1996) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985)); Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir.1994). The one year statutory period begins one day after the date of accrual. Benitez-Pons v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (citing Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174).

Although courts resort to state law to determine the length of the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, federal law will determine the date of accrual. See Muniz-Cabrero v. Ruiz, 23 F.3d 607, 610 (1st Cir.1994). Under federal law, "Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff `knows or has reason to know, of the injury on which is the basis of the action.'" Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 3 (quoting Torres v. Superintendent of the Police, 893 F.2d 404, 407(1st Cir.1990)) (citation omitted). In a § 1983 case concerning the unlawful taking of property, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the wrongful appropriation. Schaefer v. Stack, 641 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.1981); Kittrell v. City of Rockwall, 526 F.2d 715 (5th Cir.1976); Lai v. City of Honolulu, 575 F.Supp. 1510 (D.Haw.1983) rev'd on other grounds, 749 F.2d 588 (9th Cir.1984) (limitations period for bringing suit alleging deprivation by zoning commission begins on the date of the commission's order denying a land use permit); Altair Corp. v. Pesquera De Busquets, 769 F.2d 30 at 32-33 (1st Cir.1985). The doctrine is premised on the equitable notion that the statute of limitations should not begin to run until a reasonable person would be aware that his or her rights have been violated. See Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1432 (5th Cir.1993).

The crux of this case is precisely from what date or act must we compute the statute of limitations to determine whether vel non Plaintiffs' action is timely. Defendant asserts that each and all the individual acts of alleged discrimination and constitutional violation asserted in the complaint occurred more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint.² Defendant's calculations are based on the dates in which she issued the administrative decisions that Plaintiffs challenged in state courts, — e.g. the dates of the denials of the CNCs, — and not on the dates that Plaintiffs challenged those actions before the state courts.

In contrast, Plaintiffs attempt to maintain their claims alive by seeking refuge under the continuing violation theory. On that vein, they claim that Defendant continues to discriminate against them. Specifically, they refer to a Notice of Bid Adjudication issued after the filing of the complaint which relates to a prior impugnation process that they filed in state court and to a Petition for Mandamus, also filed after the complaint, wherein they seek to enjoin the Secretary to comply with a prior state court order issued in one of the administrative revision cases mentioned in the complaint. Finally, Plaintiffs invoke the equitable doctrine of tolling in further support of their assertion that their claims are not time barred.

Continuing Violation Theory

Although the continuing violation theory had its genesis in decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it has been applied to other contexts. See Velazquez v. Chardon, 736 F.2d 831, 833 (1st Cir.1984). The continuing violation doctrine "is often invoked in cases involving a pattern or policy of employment discrimination in which there has been no single act of discrimination sufficient to trigger the running of the limitations period." Id. In general terms, the doctrine creates an equitable exception to the statute of limitations because it allows recovery for claims filed outside of the statutory period when the unlawful behavior is deemed ongoing. See Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. Of Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir.1998). To establish a continuing violation, the plaintiff "must allege...