EL Centro Regional Medical Center v. Blinken

• Decision Date: 23 July 2021
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-00361-DMS-BDD
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: EL CENTRO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, and JEFFERSON LAROT SANTOS, Plaintiffs, v. ANTONY BLINKEN, U.S. Secretary of State, Defendant.

EL CENTRO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, and JEFFERSON LAROT SANTOS, Plaintiffs, v. ANTONY BLINKEN, U.S. Secretary of State, Defendant.

No. 3:21-cv-00361-DMS-BDD

United States District Court, S.D. California

July 23, 2021

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT

Hon Dana M. Sabraw United States Chief District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Antony Blinken's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs El Centro Regional Medical Center (“ECRMC”) and Jefferson Larot Santos' Complaint. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the Motion, and Defendant filed a reply. For the reasons discussed below, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On March 2, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint for Mandamus Pursuant to the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. (ECF No. 1.) The Complaint requests that the Court order Defendant to adjudicate Plaintiff Santos' application for an immigrant visa within ten days. (Id.) On May 14, 2021, the government filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the motion on May 28, 2021. (ECF No. 10.) The government filed a reply on June 4, 2021. (ECF No. 11.)

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges as follows: Plaintiff Santos is a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Santos is also licensed as a Registered Nurse by the State of California. (Id. ¶ 3.) ECRMC is a hospital located in El Centro, California. (Id. ¶ 4.) ECRMC has offered employment to Santos, pending the issuance of an appropriate immigrant visa. (Id. ¶ 17.) On December 19, 2019, ECRMC filed an Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (“Form I-140 Petition”) with Plaintiff Santos identified as the beneficiary pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(3)(A)(i). (Id. ¶¶ 6, 21; see also ECF No. 1-2, Ex. A.) United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) approved ECRMC's Form I-140 Petition on December 27, 2019. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 22; see also ECF No. 1-2, Ex. A.) The approval notice informed Plaintiffs that the Petition would be sent to the Department of State National Visa Center (“NVC”) for further processing. (Compl. ¶ 22; see also ECF No. 1-2, Ex. A.) On February 4, 2020, the NVC sent Plaintiffs' Counsel a notice assigning Plaintiff Santos an NVC Case Number and requesting processing fees and various documents from Santos. (Compl. ¶ 23; see also ECF No. 1-2, Ex. C.) Plaintiff Santos paid the requisite fees to the NVC on February 6, 2020 and submitted the required documents later that month. (Compl. ¶¶ 24-25.) On August 4, 2020, Plaintiff Santos was interviewed at the United States Embassy in Manila about his professional qualifications, past travel to the United States, and anticipated entry to the country. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 29.) Santos' application was then placed in administrative processing. (Id. ¶ 8; see also ECF No. 1-2, Ex. B.) Plaintiff Santos contacted the U.S. Embassy numerous times following his interview to inquire about the status of his application. (Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff Santos' visa application currently remains pending. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

The government introduced a declaration by State Department Attorney Adviser Rachel Peterson. (ECF No. 8-1, Declaration of Rachel Ann Peterson [“Peterson Decl.”].) The declaration explains that in March 2020, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) directed the Department of State to minimize in-person interactions in light of the developing COVID-19 pandemic. (Id. ¶ 4.) In response to this directive, the State Department suspended all routine visa services, such as immigrant and nonimmigrant visa interviews and the scheduling of such interviews, at consular posts worldwide as of March 20, 2020. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a complaint based on a court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Eggert, 953 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989)). Under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992); Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

Rule 12(b)(1) motions can challenge a court's subject matter jurisdiction on either facial or factual grounds. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 1039. A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging a court's subject matter jurisdiction on factual grounds may “rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993 (1989); see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 (1947) (“[W]hen a question of the District Court's jurisdiction is raised, either by a party or by the court on its own motion, ... the court may inquire, by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”).

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all material factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996). A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff's complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). Typically, if a party submits evidence from outside the pleadings in support of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and a court relies on that evidence, the motion must be converted into a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996). However, “[a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.'” Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Mandamus

Plaintiffs' first claim arises under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Mandamus Act provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has stated:

“Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is available to compel a federal official to perform a duty only if: (1) the individual's claim is clear and certain; (2) the official's duty is nondiscretionary, ministerial, and so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt, and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.”

Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Patel v. Reno, 134 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 1998)). In addition to providing the substantive requirements for mandamus relief, these requirements also provide the test for jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act. See Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers v. Brown, 656 F.2d 564, 567 (10th Cir. 1981) (“The test for jurisdiction is whether mandamus would be an appropriate means of relief.”) (quoting Jones v. Alexander, 609 F.2d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 1980)); see also 15A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 105.42 (“Section 1361 is clearly a jurisdictional statute. Mandamus is an original process, jurisdictional in itself.”).

Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot meet the requirements for jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act. A claim is “clear and certain” if the plaintiff has a legal entitlement to the relief sought. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003). The government asserts that Plaintiffs' claim is neither clear nor certain because Plaintiffs have no right to the adjudication of the Form I-140 Petition under a congressionally specified nondiscretionary timeline. But even if there is no specific time limit for adjudicating these types of applications, this does not mean the government can withhold a decision in perpetuity. Federal regulations require the Department of State to either issue or refuse a visa once an application has been properly completed. 22 C.F.R. § 42.81(a). Furthermore, under the APA, the government must act on visa applications “within a reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). “Where the agency in charge of the adjudication fails to render a decision within a reasonable period of time, as required by [5. U.S.C.] § 555(b), the Court has the power...