Cerna v. Prestress Serv. Indus. LLC.
| Decision Date | 18 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 1:10-cv-188 |
| Parties | ALFRED P. CERNA Plaintiff, v. PRESTRESS SERVICES INDUSTRIES LLC Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Alfred P. Cerna filed suit on May 24, 2010, alleging that the Defendant Prestress Services Industries, LLC, discriminated against him on the basis of his Mexican national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 when it terminated his employment on October 6, 2008. (Docket #1.) Prestress answered the complaint on July 29, 2010, and alleged that Cerna's claim is barred by a binding arbitration agreement that requires him to request arbitration of his claim within one year. (Docket # 13.) Prestress also counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that the arbitration agreement is enforceable and for an injunction to prevent Cerna from now belatedly attempting to arbitrate his claim.
Prestress has now moved for summary judgment on Cerna's claim and its own counterclaim. (Docket # 18.)
For the following reasons, Prestress's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.
Cerna was hired as a production laborer for Prestress on May 12, 2008. (Amy Pyne Aff., Ex. A, ¶ 4.) Upon hiring, Prestress provided Cerna (and every new employee) with a copy of the Prestress Services Industries, LLC, Employee Manual. (Ex. A, ¶ 3.)
The Employee Manual contains the Prestress Arbitration Policy. The Arbitration Policy informs employees that: "[B]y accepting employment or continuing employment with the Company, you are agreeing to submit any such dispute arising out of your employment or the termination of your employment (including, but not limited to, claims of unlawful termination based on... national origin...) exclusively to binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C., Section 1." (Prestress Arbitration Policy, Ex. B, p. 7.)
The Arbitration Policy further reiterates that: (Ex. B, p. 7.) Employees are expressly informed, however, that the Arbitration Policy does not prevent them from filing a complaint with a civil rights agency, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").
Cerna was also told that "[b]y accepting or continuing employment with the Company, you are indicating your understanding and agreement that arbitration is the exclusive remedy for all disputes arising out of or related to your employment with the Company and you agree to waive all rights to a civil court action regarding your employment and the termination of youremployment with the Company; only the arbitrator, and not a judge nor a jury, will decide the dispute." (Ex. B, p. 7.)
The Arbitration Policy contains a Common Questions and Answers section (the "FAQ Section"). (Ex. B, pp. 8-10.) The FAQ Section further reiterates the scope of the Arbitration Policy.
(Ex. B, p. 8.)
The FAQ Section also confirms that Prestress must arbitrate any claims it may have against its employees.
Employees are reminded that they will have the same remedies in arbitration as in court.
(Ex. B, p. 9.)
Finally, the FAQ Section confirms that Prestress will bear the cost of the arbitrator's fees.
(Ex. B, p. 10.)
On March 28, 2008, Cerna signed the "Receipt and Acknowledgment of the Prestress Services Industries, LLC Revised Employee Manual," thereby affirming that he had "received and read a copy of the Company Employee Manual." (Receipt and Acknowledgment, Ex. D.) Cerna further acknowledged that "I have read and understand the Arbitration Policy contained in this Employee Manual and I agree to abide by the policy." (Ex. D.)
That same day, Cerna also executed the "Acknowledgment of and Agreement with the Arbitration Policy of Prestress Services Industries, LLC." (Acknowledgment and Agreement, Ex. E.) In the Acknowledgment, Cerna affirmed that:
My signature on this document acknowledges that I understand the Arbitration Policy and agree to abide by its conditions. I also acknowledge that I understand my employment is at-will and may be terminated at any time, with or without reason, by either the Company or me. I further agree that, in accordance with the Company's Arbitration Policy, that I will submit any dispute (including but not limited to my termination) arising under or involving my employment with the Company to binding arbitration within one (1) year from the date the dispute first arose. I agree that arbitration shall be the exclusive forum for resolving all disputes arising out of or involving my employment with the Company or the termination of that employment. The Company recommends that I obtain, and I agree that I will be entitled to legal representation during arbitration, the cost of which I will bear unless the arbitrator awards otherwise. I further understand that I will be responsible for half of the cost of the arbitrator and any incidental costs of arbitration, unless I elect to have the Companypay the full costs for the arbitrator and incidental costs. I understand that the arbitrator may award any relief that a federal court of competent jurisdiction in conformity with applicable law may award. I further understand that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Employee Manual, the Company may not change any of the terms of the current Arbitration Policy as it applies to me without my written agreement.
(Ex. E.)
Less than five months after his hire, Cerna was terminated for insubordination on October 6, 2008. (Ex. A, ¶ 4.) Cerna filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination against Prestress on February 11, 2009, and the EEOC issued him a Notice of Right to Sue letter on February 24, 2010. (Compl. ¶ 3.) On May 24, 2010, Cerna filed suit in state court, alleging that Prestress discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin. (Compl. ¶ 6.)
Prestress removed the case to this Court on June 11, 2010. (Docket # 2.) On July 29, 2010, it filed its Answer and Counterclaim, asserting that Cerna was required to arbitrate his claim. Prestress filed this motion for summary judgment on November 30, 2010, asking the Court to declare the Arbitration Policy enforceable, to dismiss Cerna's claim because he failed to request arbitration within one year, and to enter an injunction preventing him from belatedly attempting to arbitrate his claim. (Docket # 18.)
Summary judgment may be granted only if there are no disputed genuine issues of material fact. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court "may not make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder." Id. The only task in ruling on a motion for summary judgment is "to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial." Waldridge v. Am. HoechstCorp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). If the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. A court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and avoid "the temptation to decide which party's version of the facts is more likely true[,]" as "summary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants." Id. However, "a party opposing summary judgment may not rest on the pleadings, but must affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Id. at 771.
As a preliminary matter, the Court must address what parts of the Arbitration Policy it may rule on itself and what parts, if any, must be referred to the arbitrator. In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Supreme Court reiterated that, absent an agreement between the parties to the contrary, the court, not the arbitrator, should decide substantive questions of arbitrability. 537 U.S. 79, 83-86 (2002). Accordingly, the Court will consider...
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