Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 94-755
| Citation | 655 So.2d 172 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-755,94-755 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1188 Donna CERNIGLIA, Appellant, v. Joseph M. CERNIGLIA, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Kozyak Tropin Throckmorton & Humphreys and Paul C. Huck and Harley S. Tropin, for appellant.
Bluestein and Wayne; A.J. Barranco & Associates and Sam Daniels, for appellee.
Before COPE, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
This appeal arises from two consolidated cases: a dissolution of marriage case and a civil case. In the civil case, the wife, Donna Cerniglia, appeals from the entry of an adverse summary judgment as to all five counts of her complaint and from the denial of her motion to amend Count V. In the dissolution of marriage case, the wife appeals from the denial of her motion for relief pursuant to the 1993 amendment to rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm all of the orders appealed.
The parties were married in 1970. On July 11, 1990, the husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and on that same day, the parties signed a marital settlement agreement. On August 20, 1990, at the dissolution proceeding, the trial court asked the wife whether she had voluntarily entered into the agreement, whether she had received advice from her attorney, and whether she was satisfied with the husband's financial disclosure. To all of these questions, the wife answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, the trial court entered final judgment dissolving the parties' marriage and incorporating the July 11th settlement agreement.
Three years later, on November 17, 1993, the wife brought a five-count civil action against the husband. Counts I through IV were damage claims for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, common-law fraud, and breach of contract. Count V was an independent action alleging "extrinsic fraud," or "fraud on the court," and seeking to set aside the marital settlement agreement. Contemporaneously, in the dissolution action, the wife filed a motion for relief pursuant to the 1993 amendment to rule 1.540(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife based her Count V claim and her rule 1.540(b) motion on the husband's wrongful acts that were pled in Counts I through IV of the civil complaint.
In the civil complaint, the wife alleged that during the marriage, she had been physically and mentally abused and that the marital settlement agreement had been obtained by duress, coercion, and threats. The wife also alleged that the husband had enticed her to enter into the agreement by making oral promises to pay her additional sums and that the husband had failed to make complete financial disclosure. The wife sought to recover damages on these grounds or, in the alternative, to have the agreement set aside. The husband answered the complaint, denied the material allegations of physical abuse, and asserted several affirmative defenses. The husband then moved for summary judgment.
While this motion was pending, the trial court denied the wife's motion for rule 1.540(b) relief on the basis that the 1993 amendment to the rule does not have retroactive application. For this same reason, the trial court denied the wife's motion for leave to amend Count V of the civil suit to assert a claim based on the filing of false financial affidavits. Subsequently, the trial court entered summary judgment for the husband and denied rehearing. This appeal follows.
The wife raises several points on appeal that merit discussion. First, the wife contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment as to Counts I through IV of the civil complaint. Specifically, she alleges that the court incorrectly applied the rules of construction to the release in the marital settlement agreement and improperly found that the release relieved the husband from liability for claims based on tort and contract theories. She argues that the application of the release was limited solely to those claims dealing with the distribution of assets in conjunction with the dissolution of marriage. We disagree.
Commercial Trading Co. v. Zero Food Storage, Inc., 199 So.2d 109, 112 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 204 So.2d 332 (Fla.1967) (citations omitted).
In this case, the settlement agreement stated in pertinent part:
12. FULL AGREEMENT: This agreement constitutes a full and complete settlement of the alimony, support, equitable distribution and property rights of the parties and claims of any nature whatsoever that each may have against the other, and all of the terms and provisions herein being interrelated and dependant covenants and that such constituting a complete Property Settlement Agreement....
....
18. RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS: The Husband and Wife mutually forever renounce and relinquish all claims of whatever nature each may have had in or to any assets/property or estate of whatever kind, now or hereafter owned or possessed by the other, it being the intention of the parties hereto that this paragraph shall constitute a complete, general, and mutual release of all claims whatsoever including dower, courtesy, distributive share of which either may have in the estate of the other excepting as set forth herein.
Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage dated August 20, 1990 (emphasis added).
We find that the trial court properly examined the settlement agreement as a whole to determine the intent of the parties and the purpose of the release. Since there were no genuine issues of material fact, the trial court properly construed the release and found, as a matter of law, that the release was intended by the parties to serve as a complete bar to all claims arising from the marriage. RCA Invs., Inc. v. Amerivend, Corp., 581 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Therefore, the wife's tort and contract claims were barred by the release in the marital settlement agreement, and summary judgment was proper as to those counts.
Second, the wife contends that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment as to Count V of her civil complaint. She claims that the court incorrectly found, as a matter of law, that her allegations of coercion, duress, and fraud constituted intrinsic fraud, rather than extrinsic fraud. She cites DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla.1984), and further argues that her husband's wrongful conduct, that occurred outside the dissolution proceedings, constituted extrinsic fraud and thereby, effectively prevented her "from fully exhibiting [her] case." We disagree.
In DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So.2d 375 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court clarified the situations where a trial court can find, as a matter of law, that there has been "fraud on the court" and properly grant relief from judgment:
At the outset we must distinguish between extrinsic fraud and intrinsic fraud because only extrinsic fraud may constitute fraud on the court. Extrinsic fraud is collateral to the issues tried in a case....
Consistent with this general rule, this Court has defined extrinsic fraud as the
prevention of an unsuccessful party [from] presenting his case, by fraud or deception practiced by his adversary; keeping the opponent away from the court; falsely promising a compromise; ignorance of the adversary about the existence of a suit or the acts of the plaintiff; fraudulent representation of a party without his consent and connivance in his defeat; and so on.
In other words, extrinsic fraud occurs where a defendant has somehow been prevented from participating in a cause.
Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, applies to fraudulent conduct that arises within a proceeding and pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could have been tried. This Court, consistent with the general rule, has...
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