Cerniglia v. Price

Decision Date27 October 2017
Docket NumberCase No. 1:17-cv-00753-AWI-JLT (PC)
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
PartiesSTEVEN ROBERT CERNIGLIA, Plaintiff, v. BRANDON PRICE, et al., Defendants.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS ACTION WITH PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE/INABILITY TO STATE A CLAIM

FINDINGS

Steven Robert Cerniglia alleges that his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when hospital officers searched his room, confiscated a number of items, and subsequently did not return his laptop computer. (Doc. 1.) Because Plaintiff has neither a right to access the internet nor a right to possess electronic devices which are capable of accessing the internet, this action should be DISMISSED with prejudice.

A. Screening Requirement

"Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss [a case brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983] at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

B. Pleading RequirementsFed. R. Civ. Pro 8(a)

When screening, the court applies the requirements found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). "Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). "Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557.

While "plaintiffs face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ," Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners (and detainees) are still construed liberally and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff must identify specific facts supporting the existence of substantively plausible claims for relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S.Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

C. Summary of Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital ("CSH") pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predator Act contained within Welfare & Institution Code sections 6600 et seq. ("SVPA"). One so detained is a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP") which is statutorily defined as an individual with "a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a).1 The SVPA authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person who has completed a prison term, but has been given a "full evaluation" and found to be a sexually violent predator. Reilly v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.4th 641, 646 (2013); People v. McKee, 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1185 (2010).

Plaintiff names the Executive Director of CSH, Brandon Price and six CSH police officers as the defendants in this action. Plaintiff alleges that on November 16, 2016, Officers Moreno, Barraza, Vang, Espinoza, Gonzalez, and Munoz arrived at Plaintiff's dorm room to search it. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9.) Plaintiff was informed that they were looking for an "online device" and when Plaintiff asked if they had a warrant, he was told none was required. (Id.) Those officers allegedly made a mess of Plaintiff's bed area and did not find an "online device." (Id.) However, the officers confiscated Plaintiff's laptop computer, a "boom-box radio," a DVD player, and a "Micca media player." (Id.) Plaintiff was informed that the items would be returned to him in one hour. (Id.) Approximately an hour later, Officer Barraza returned all of the items except Plaintiff's laptop, indicating that they were "gonna (sic) hold on to that for awhile" without providing any justification for doing so. (Id.)

The next day, Officers Munoz and Gonzalez arrived at Plaintiff's dorm room and asked for the password to his laptop. (Id.) Plaintiff asked if they had a warrant and they replied in the negative. (Id.) Plaintiff refused to give them the password without a warrant, indicating that he did not want them going through his personal files. (Id.) They responded that they did not desireto go through his personal files, but that they wanted to make sure he had not been on the internet. (Id.) Plaintiff declined to give them the laptop's password, and, though unclear, it appears his laptop has not been returned to him. (Id.)

As discussed in detail below, this action should be dismissed without leave to amend because the defects in Plaintiff's pleadings are not curable via amendment. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012).

D. Civil Confinement Conditions Are Governed By Fourteenth Amendment

To determine whether conditions of confinement of civilly committed individuals have been violated, courts look to the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). States are thus required "to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released," Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)), via "'more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.'" Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)).

Although SVPs must be afforded more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals, where specific standards are lacking, courts may look to decisions defining the constitutional rights of prisoners, to establish a floor for the constitutional rights of persons detained under a civil commitment scheme, Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds by 556 U.S. 1256 (2009), and may borrow Eighth Amendment standards to do so, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

1. Plaintiff's Alleged Deprivations

Plaintiff alleges that the events of November 16th and 17th violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff is civilly detained at CSH. Plaintiff mistakenly contends that, as a civil detainee, he "enjoys all the same constitutional rights as everyother citizen of the Unites States and the State of California with the exception of the 'right to bear arms' and the 'right to his actual freedom.'" (Doc. 1, p. 5.) However, as a civil detainee, some curtailment of Plaintiff's rights (beyond bearing arms and his actual freedom) is to be expected. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). Within the context of civil commitment, patients' substantive rights include: adequate food, shelter, clothing, medical care, safety and freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint, as well as "minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue [physical] restraint." Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 319 (1982). Plaintiff's objection to the confiscation of his property to ascertain whether Plaintiff had been accessing the internet, particularly his laptop computer, far exceeds his substantive rights as a SVP. Further, Plaintiff's mere desire to be free from the "hardship and exorbitant cost" of contacting his family via collect call, conducting his financial affairs, communicating with financial institutions, obtaining information on the world and his community from the new outlet of his choice, and conducting his legal affairs with his attorney and the courts does not rise to the level of a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.

No court has found that prisoners have a constitutional right to possess personal computers or items that are similar to personal computers which are capable of accessing the internet in their cells. See Endsley v. Luna, 2008 WL 3890382 at *3 (C.D.Cal. May 23, 2008) (unpub.) (citing Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir.1989) (prisoners do not have a constitutional right to have memory typewriters in cells), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55...

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