Cerqueira v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 April 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-11652-WGY.
• Citation: 484 F.Supp.2d 241
• Parties: John D. CERQUEIRA, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Page 241

484 F.Supp.2d 241

John D. CERQUEIRA, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-11652-WGY.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

April 12, 2007.

Alec Bramlett, Fort Worth, TX, Michael A. Fitzhugh, Anne-Marie H. Gerber, Amy Cashore Mariani, Fitzhugh, Parker & Alvaro, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

Darleen F. Cantelo, David S. Godkin, Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, Boston, MA, Michael T. Kirkpatrick, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

This motion for attorneys' fees follows a trial between the plaintiff John D. Cerqueira ("Cerqueira") and American Airlines ("American"). Pl. Mot. for Atty's Fees and Costs [Doc. No. 111]. A jury having returned a verdict in his favor, Cerqueira now seeks an award of $593,792.25 in fees, plus any enhancements awarded by this Court, and $20,517.56 in costs. Pl. Mem. in Supp. of Atty's Fees [Doc. No. 112] ("Pl.Mem."); Pl. Supp. Mem. in Supp. of Atty's Fees [Doc. No. 141] ("Pl.Supp.Mem."). Cerqueira also moves separately for taxable costs set forth in a Bill of Costs totaling $10,526.32. Pl. Amend. Bill of Costs [Doc. No. 138].

In response, American asks this Court to reduce that amount substantially, arguing that the requested amount results from overstaffing, inflated hourly rates, and duplicative, unnecessary, or insufficiently detailed billable hours. Def. Opp'n to Pl. Mot. for Atty's Fees and Costs [Doc. No. 129] ("Def. Opp'n Mem.").

I. INTRODUCTION

This action arose from Cerqueira's allegations of racial discrimination stemming from his removal from an American Airlines flight and his subsequent denial of service. Pl. Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 3] ("Compl."). Cerqueira initiated his complaint in this Court on August 9, 2005 and, after amending his complaint on September 20, 2005, asserted violations of law under three counts: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (2) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and (3) Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 98. Prior to initiating this federal action, Cerqueira filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") alleging racial discrimination in a place of public accommodation. Am. Compl. ¶ 46. The MCAD found that Cerqueira had established a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.

After this Court denied a motion for summary judgment by American, this case went to a trial before a jury. The trial commenced on January 3, 2007 — less than 17 months after the filing of the complaint. On January 12, 2007, the jury returned a verdict for Cerqueira both on the section 1981 claim and the Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 98 claim.¹ The jury assessed $130,000 in compensatory damages and $270,000 in punitive damages. Cerqueira now seeks attorneys' fees and costs related to this litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, section 9, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).

II. DISCUSSION

Parties who prevail under claims that include 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 272, section 98 are expressly authorized to seek reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, section 9 respectively. Because it is undisputed that Cerqueira constitutes a "prevailing party"² with respect to both the federal and state claims, Cerqueira properly moves for this Court to determine the amount of fees and costs that ought be awarded. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9.

The standard that this Court must apply to make such a determination is much the same whether analyzed under the federal or state statute. Fontaine v. Ebtec Corp., 415 Mass. 309, 325, 613 N.E.2d 881 (1993); see also Freeman v. Package Machinery Co., 865 F.2d 1331 1349-50 (1st Cir.1988); Dixon v. International Bhd. of Police Officers, 434 F.Supp.2d 73, 77-78 (D.Mass.2006) (appeal pending). Where the law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts provides a greater recovery under its vindication of civil rights statute, the plaintiff is entitled to seek recovery under the state law. Fontaine, 415 Mass. at 324 n. 13, 613 N.E.2d 881.

To determine the proper amount of attorneys' fees under these fee-shifting statutes, a trial judge must first apply the "lodestar approach." Gay Officers Action League v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 247 F.3d 288, 295 (1st Cir.2001). Under the lodestar approach, the trial judge calculates the total number of hours that counsel spent on the case and subtracts "duplicative, unproductive, or excessive hours ...." Id. This total number of reasonable hours spent on the case is then multiplied by the "prevailing [hourly billable] rates in the community (taking into account the qualifications, experience, and specialized competence of the attorneys involved)." Id.

In reaching this lodestar, the trial judge has broad discretion.³ See Phetosomphone v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 984 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1993) (reviewing a district court's determination of attorneys' fees under the analogous Title VII standard). The Court may exercise such discretion to find that the "absence of detailed contemporaneous time records, except in extraordinary circumstances, will call for a substantial reduction in any award or, in egregious cases, disallowance." Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984); see also Lipsett v. Blanco, 975 F.2d 934, 938 (1st Cir.1992). Such general entries fail to allow the party on whom the fees are to be shifted sufficient detail to challenge the calculations. See Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 938. Discretion is also properly applied to challenges of overstaffing. "[T] he time for two or three lawyers in a courtroom or conference, when one would do, `may obviously be discounted.'" Hart v. Bourque, 798 F.2d 519, 523 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir.1977)). Discretion in such cases is guided by the purpose behind fee-shifting statutes, which are designed to "ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal citation omitted), and are "not to serve as full employment or continuing education programs for lawyers and paralegals," Lipsett, 975 F.2d at 938; see also Pearson v. Fair, 980 F.2d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 1992).

Finally, the prevailing party is permitted to recover for hours reasonably expended in the preparation of fee petitions. McDonald v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 884 F.2d 1468, 1480 (1st Cir. 1989). The inclusion of billable hours accrued to recover such fees is consistent with the general purpose behind fee-shifting statutes that seek to vindicate a plaintiffs rights and to ease the path to such vindication. See id.; Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 191 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir.1999) (warning that recovery of attorneys' fees ought not rehash the grounds for litigation).

Once the lodestar amount is determined, the trial judge will consider whether an enhancement or departure from this determination is warranted based on the special circumstances of the instant case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Factors that may influence an enhancement or departure from the lodestar determination include whether the "plaintiff fail[ed] to prevail on claims that were unrelated to the claims on which he succeeded," id., whether the plaintiff achieved a level of success sufficient to justify a large fee award, see id., and the "societal importance of the right which has been vindicated," Coutin v. Young & Rubicam Puerto Rico, Inc., 124 F.3d 331, 338 (1st Cir.1997).

A. Cerqueira's Claim Calculation

Cerqueira summarizes its request for attorneys' fees with the following chart delineated by attorney or legal professional, requested hours, requested billable rate, and total fee.

                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Requested Requested
                Individual Hours Rate Total
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                Michael T. Kirkpatrick     889.55       $375            $333,581.25
                David S. Godkin               384       $390            $149,760.00
                Darleen Cantelo            314.25       $150            $ 47,137.50
                Erica Abate Recht             200       $205            $ 41,000.00
                David Becker                42.50       $120            $  5,100.00
                Jessica Edgerton               41       $130            $  5,330.00
                G. Brian Vogler             21.50       $100            $  2,150.00
                Dawn Perlman                   15       $205            $  3,075.00
                Kimberly Nuzum                6.5       $205            $  1,332.50
                Philip Longo                    6       $205            $    720.00
                Adina Rosenbaum               4.8       $245            $  1,176.00
                Allison Zieve                 2.8       $375            $  1,050,00
                Brian Wolfman                 5.6       $425            $  2,380.00
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                       TOTAL             1,933.50                       $593,792.25
                -------------------------------------------------------------------
                

In support of this request and these calculations, Cerqueira submitted the billable fee charts that were maintained by Godkin's former law firm of Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP and his current law firm Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, as well as Kirkpatrick's employer, the Public Citizen Litigation Group ("PCLG"). The Testa, Hurwitz & Thibeault, LLP fee chart is referred to as "Testa Fees." Godkin Affidavit [Doc. No. 113] ("Godkin Aff."), Ex. A. The first fee chart for Birnbaum & Godkin, LLP, is referred to as "Birnbaum Fees." Id., Ex. B. The supplemental fee chart for the firm will be referenced as "Birnbaum Supp. Fees." Godkin Supplemental Affidavit [Doc. No. 142] ("Godkin Supp. Aff."), Ex. A. The PCLG fee chart will be...