Cerrillo v. Esparza
| Decision Date | 31 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 77283-5.,77283-5. |
| Citation | 158 Wn.2d 194,142 P.3d 155 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jesse CERRILLO, Guadalupe Solis, Angel Diaz, Alfredo Beltran, and Jose Saucedo, Respondents, v. Cipriano ESPARZA and Jane Doe Esparza, a marital community, and Esparza Trucking, Inc., Petitioners. |
Ryan Mark Edgley, Edgley & Beattle, Yakima, for Petitioner/Appellants.
Blanca E. Rodriguez, NW Justice Project, Yakima, for Appellee/Respondents.
Jay Douglas Geck, Office of Attorney General, Olympia, Amanda J. Goss, Office of Attorney General, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae Department of Labor and Industries.
Kenneth James Pedersen, Seattle, Neil I. Ditchek, Sarah Riger, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae International Brotherhood of Teamsters.
William Joel Rutzick, David N. Mark, Schroeter Goldmark & Bender, Jesse Andrew Wing, MacDonald Hoague & Bayless, Seattle, for Amicus Curiae Washington Employment Lawyers and for Amicus Curiae Washington State Labor Council.
Brendan Victor Monahan, Velikanje Moore & Shore PS, Yakima, for Amicus Curiae Yakima Valley Growers-Shippers Association.
¶ 1 Petitioners, Esparza Truck, Inc., and its owners (Esparza),1 challenge a Court of Appeals decision affirming a grant of partial summary judgment to the respondent truck drivers (truckers) for unpaid overtime wages under the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA), chapter 49.46 RCW. Esparza asserts that the plain language of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii), part of the MWA, exempts the company from the requirement to pay overtime wages because the truckers transport agricultural commodities. Esparza argues that because the plain language of the statute is not ambiguous, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to consider an informal agency interpretation of the statute and to employ other methods of statutory construction in affirming the grant of partial summary judgment. The truckers argue that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) is ambiguous and that deferral to the Department of Labor and Industries' (DLI) interpretation was proper.
¶ 2 We hold that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) is not ambiguous and that the plain language of the statute renders the truckers exempt from the overtime wage requirement. Because the statute is not ambiguous, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to defer to DLI's interpretation of the statute. Therefore, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals and remand this case for further proceedings.
¶ 3 Neither Esparza nor the truckers dispute the material facts of this case. Esparza Truck, Inc., maintained contracts to haul agricultural commodities—potatoes for Twin City Foods and apples and asparagus for Baker Produce. From 1998 until 2001, Esparza employed the truckers to pick up the agricultural commodities from locations in the Columbia Basin and haul them to Twin City Foods and Baker Produce, who packaged and shipped them.2 Esparza admits that the truckers worked more than 40 hours per week and that the company did not pay them overtime. Esparza also admits that the company did not grow the agricultural commodities the truckers transported. In January 2002, DLI issued a policy statement that interpreted RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) as applying only to individuals who work "for an employer who actually produces the products." Br. of Resp'ts, App. 6, at 8.
¶ 4 The truckers filed a claim against Esparza for unpaid overtime wages and breach of contract. The trial court granted the truckers' subsequent motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of unpaid overtime wages and awarded the truckers double damages. Esparza appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, with one judge dissenting. Cerrillo v. Esparza, 126 Wash.App. 723, 109 P.3d 475 (2005). In its decision, the court deferred to DLI's interpretation of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii), which construed the statute to apply only to employees working directly for farmers. Id. at 727-28, 109 P.3d 475. We granted Esparza's subsequent petition for review. Cerrillo v. Esparza, 156 Wash.2d 1010, 132 P.3d 146 (2006).
¶ 5 Whether the plain language of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) exempts the truckers from the overtime wage requirement.
¶ 6 Esparza contends that, under RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii), the truckers were exempt from the overtime wage requirement and that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's order granting the truckers partial summary judgment for unpaid overtime wages. This court reviews issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Agrilink Foods, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 153 Wash.2d 392, 396, 103 P.3d 1226 (2005). We also review orders granting summary judgment de novo. Drinkwitz v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 140 Wash.2d 291, 295, 996 P.2d 582 (2000) (citing Marquis v. City of Spokane, 130 Wash.2d 97, 104-05, 922 P.2d 43 (1996)). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact because Esparza concedes that the truckers worked more than 40 hours per week and that the company did not pay the truckers overtime wages. We need consider only whether the truckers were exempt from the overtime wage requirement as a matter of law.
¶ 7 RCW 49.46.130(1), part of Washington's MWA, outlines the general requirement that employers must pay overtime wages:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees for a work week longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.
RCW 49.46.130(2) contains the exceptions to this general rule, including an exemption for "[a]ny individual employed ... (ii) in packing, packaging, grading, storing, or delivering to storage, or to market or to a carrier for transportation to market, any agricultural or horticultural commodity." RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii).3 Esparza asserts that the truckers fall under this exemption and that, as a result, Esparza was not required to compensate the truckers with overtime wages.
¶ 8 In order to ascertain the meaning of RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii), we look first to its language. If the language is not ambiguous, we give effect to its plain meaning. "If a statute is clear on its face, its meaning is to be derived from the language of the statute alone." Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 20, 50 P.3d 638 (2002) (citing State v. Keller, 143 Wash.2d 267, 276, 19 P.3d 1030 (2001)). If a statute is ambiguous, we employ tools of statutory construction to ascertain its meaning. A statute is ambiguous if it is "`susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,' but `a statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.'" Agrilink, 153 Wash.2d at 396, 103 P.3d 1226 (quoting State v. Hahn, 83 Wash.App. 825, 831, 924 P.2d 392 (1996)). This court does not subject an unambiguous statute to statutory construction and has "declined to add language to an unambiguous statute even if it believes the Legislature intended something else but did not adequately express it." Kilian, 147 Wash.2d at 20, 50 P.3d 638 (citing Keller, 143 Wash.2d at 276, 19 P.3d 1030; Wash. State Coalition for the Homeless v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 133 Wash.2d 894, 904, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997)). "Courts may not read into a statute matters that are not in it and may not create legislation under the guise of interpreting a statute." Kilian, 147 Wash.2d at 21, 50 P.3d 638 (footnote omitted) (citing Associated Gen. Contractors v. King County, 124 Wash.2d 855, 865, 881 P.2d 996 (1994)). Thus, when a statute is not ambiguous, only a plain language analysis of a statute is appropriate.
¶ 9 Esparza argues that RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) is not ambiguous and that this court should consider only whether the plain language of the statute exempts the truckers. As Esparza notes, the Court of Appeals did not first look to the language of the statute to determine whether it was ambiguous. Instead, the court exceeded the bounds of plain language analysis by considering DLI's interpretation to support its conclusion that "merely hauling agricultural commodities to qualify for a RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii) exemption would endlessly broaden the exemptions contrary to the legislative design." Cerrillo, 126 Wash.App. at 729, 109 P.3d 475. The Court of Appeals then concluded by extension that "a person working for a farmer delivering farm products `to market or to a carrier for transportation to market' is exempt under RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii)." Id. at 729, 109 P.3d 475 (quoting RCW 49.46.130(2)(g)(ii)). Esparza contends that the plain language of subsection (ii) does not make this distinction, and instead "expressly exempts `any individual' employed to deliver agricultural commodities to storage." Pet. for Review at 10.
¶ 10 This court has previously recognized that "[e]xemptions from remedial legislation, such as the MWA ... are narrowly construed and applied only to situations which are plainly and unmistakably consistent with the terms and spirit of the legislation." Drinkwitz, 140 Wash.2d at 301, 996 P.2d 582 (citing Knecht v. City of Redwood City, 683 F.Supp. 1307, 1310 (N.D.Cal. 1987)). Additionally, while traditional plain language analysis of statutes focused exclusively on the language of the statute, this court recently has also recognized that "all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes" should be part of plain language analysis. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). However, we also maintained that "resort to aids to...
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