Cerrone v. Cahill
| Decision Date | 28 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-CV-241.,95-CV-241. |
| Citation | 84 F.Supp.2d 330 |
| Parties | Thomas C. CERRONE, Plaintiff, v. Michael F. CAHILL, Francis A. Defrancesco, Salvatore S. Valvo, Thomas M. Fresenius, Scott L. Brown, Richard G. Morse, Deborah L. Komar, Jonathan Z. Friedman and Gerald W. Connolly, Individually, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Hinman, Straub, Pigors & Manning, P.C., Albany, NY (Paul M. Collins, Lawrence H. Schaefer, of Counsel), for Plaintiff.
Chamberlain & Kaufman, Albany, NY (Alan S. Kaufman, Jeffrey Chamberlain, of Counsel), for Defendants.
This action arises from Defendants' investigation of an alleged cover-up by Plaintiff, among others, of a hit and run accident that occurred on April 3, 1993 when an automobile operated by an individual later identified as Rory Knapp struck an automobile operated by Maureen Hunt. Rory Knapp fled the scene of the accident.
New York State Trooper Robert Gregory, of the Peeskill barracks, responded to the accident scene first. Plaintiff Thomas Cerrone ("Cerrone"), a New York State Police Sergeant and commander of the Peeskill Barracks in Troop K, also responded to the scene.1 A witness, Ms. Sharon Hunt-Ryder, informed Cerrone that she had witnessed the accident, observed a car leaving the scene, and followed that car. After obtaining a general description of the vehicle from the witness Cerrone left the scene and commenced an unsuccessful search for it.2 According to Defendants, their subsequent investigation revealed that the car involved in the accident was parked in the area Cerrone claims to have searched. One witness stated that the car was "hidden" behind the Annsville Texaco Station. See Nov. 10, 1994 Statement of Dawn Brissett, p. 2, annexed to Brown Dec. at Ex. F.
Trooper Gregory prepared an accident report (the "Report") that was reviewed and signed by Cerrone.3 Defendants allege that the Report contained details of a facially insufficient investigation and allegedly false information. Trooper Gregory testified that the information in the Report was true and complete. See Gregory Dep. p. 44, annexed to Collins Aff. as Ex. C.
On or about September 27, 1993, Defendants received a letter signed by "Ed Scott" alleging that Rory Knapp, the brother of State Trooper Timothy Knapp, left the scene of an accident on April 3, 1993. The letter further stated that the facts of the accident were covered up by Timothy Knapp and other members of the state police at the Peeskill station. Defendants followed up on the letter and identified one person named Ed Scott who denied writing the letter. Defendants never identified the source of the letter.
Despite their failure to positively identify the source of the letter, Defendants initiated an investigation into the allegations. Defendant Cahill was in charge of the investigation and Defendants Brown, Komar, and Morse were assigned to the investigation. At some time after the investigation began, Jonathan Friedman and Gerald Connolly, members of the Westchester County District Attorney's Office, began working with the investigators with respect to possible criminal prosecutions.
The investigation revealed that Rory Knapp likely was the driver of the car in the April 3, 1993 hit and run accident; that he drove to a gas station after the accident; that he called the police department from the station and spoke to Zone Sergeant Welsh; and that there likely was some sort of cover-up of the accident involving at least Zone Sergeant Welsh and Timothy Knapp.
On January 17, 1995, the investigative team met to discuss a possible criminal case arising out of the alleged cover-up. Defendants decided to stop Cerrone on his way home from work, question him in connection with the April 3 accident, and determine if he would cooperate with the investigation.
Prior to stopping Cerrone, Lieutenant John Edward Grant, a Bureau of Criminal Investigation Agent, constructed a psychological profile of Cerrone to assist in the planned interview. See Grant Dep. at 21, annexed to Collins Aff. as Ex. L. Grant also arranged for rooms at a hotel, where the questioning was to be done, to "convey to [Cerrone] in a nonverbal manner that there had been an intense investigation with respect to [him]." Id. at 41-42.
Using an unmarked police car, Defendants stopped Cerrone on January 19, 1995. Defendants asked Cerrone if he was carrying a weapon, allegedly placed him in the felony position, placed him in the back of an unmarked police car (where he was guarded), transported him to a hotel room, read him his Miranda rights, informed him that he was the target of a criminal investigation, and questioned him for approximately six hours. Cerrone was told he could leave after he agreed to take a polygraph examination, which he took the next day.
Cerrone brought this action on February 23, 1995. On May 26, 1995, Defendants Cahill, DeFrancesco, Valvo, Fresenius, Brown, Morse, and Komar moved to stay the proceedings and dismiss portions of the Complaint. On August 17, 1995, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities and denied the motion to stay the proceedings. See Order, Dkt. No. 21. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on February 7, 1997 and on May 14, 1997, Defendants Friedman and Connolly moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, on the grounds of absolute or qualified immunity. The Court heard oral argument on this motion June 10, 1997 and denied the motion in its entirety. See Order, Dkt. No. 62.
Presently before the Court is Defendants Brown and Fresenius's motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 seeking to dismiss the Amended Complaint against them in its entirety. On January 10, 2000, the Court heard oral argument on this motion.4
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled and need not be restated here. This Court has set forth the appropriate standard to be applied in numerous published decisions, see, e.g., Roman v. Cornell Univ., 53 F.Supp.2d 223, 232-33 (N.D.N.Y.1999); Phipps v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 53 F.Supp.2d 551 (N.D.N.Y.1999), and will apply the same standard discussed in these cases to Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because: (1) Cerrone cannot establish a Fourth Amendment violation because they were not required to have a warrant, probable cause, or any particular level of individualized suspicion to stop and question him in connection with a work-related investigation of misconduct; (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the law requiring individualized suspicion was not clearly established; (3) Defendants had the requisite level of suspicion to seize Plaintiff in the context of the investigation; and (4) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because reasonable police officers could disagree whether there was a sufficient basis for individualized suspicion.
To succeed on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Defendants clearly were acting under the color of state law, the Court must determine whether Cerrone was deprived of a constitutional right.
Defendants first contend that they are entitled to summary judgment because Cerrone cannot establish that their conduct on January 19, 1995 violated his Fourth Amendment rights and, thus, there is no constitutional violation to support Cerrone's Section 1983 claim.
"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). For the purposes of this motion, Defendants concede that the January 1995 interview constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.5 See Mem. of law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 4, n. 1. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the seizure, and alleged arrest, of Cerrone were reasonable. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).
The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures generally requires the police to secure a warrant based on probable cause prior to a search or seizure. The Supreme Court has consistently held that searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions." See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (internal citations omitted). Defendants contend that the facts of this case fall squarely within one of the recognized exceptions — that for work-related investigations — and that, as a result, they were not required to have a warrant, probable cause or any other level of individualized suspicion.
In making this argument, Defendants rely on cases involving work-related investigations of misconduct and place great emphasis on the Second Circuit's decision in Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932, 91 S.Ct. 2256, 29 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). Cerrone contends that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Biehunik because the purpose behind Defendants' investigation and thus, Cerrone's alleged seizure and arrest, was criminal rather than work-related.
The manner of the alleged seizure and arrest support Cerrone's position that this investigation was criminal in...
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