Cervantes v. Mattson
Jurisdiction | Oregon |
Parties | Lorenzo CERVANTES, Appellant, v. Robert MATTSON, Respondent. L83-2802; CA A41628. |
Citation | 752 P.2d 1293,90 Or.App. 574 |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Decision Date | 20 April 1988 |
Dean Heiling, Roseburg, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Heiling & Morrison, P.C., Roseburg.
Rod Carter, Eugene, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Louis L. Kurtz and Luvaas, Cobb, Richards & Fraser, P.C., Eugene.
Before RICHARDSON, P.J., and NEWMAN and DEITS, JJ.
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he was a passenger collided with a vehicle driven by defendant. Both vehicles were traveling southbound on Highway 99. Defendant attempted to pass the automobile in which plaintiff was riding by pulling into the northbound lane and increasing speed to approximately 55 miles per hour. The accident occurred in an intersection when plaintiff's driver attempted to turn left. At trial, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability. He contends that defendant violated former ORS 487.205(1)(c), 1 which prohibited driving on the left side of the center of a two-way road "[a]t any intersection or railroad grade crossing." Plaintiff argues that defendant was therefore guilty of statutory negligence and that, because he offered no evidence from which it could be found that he was acting "as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances," a directed verdict was appropriate. Barnum v. Williams, 264 Or. 71, 78, 504 P.2d 122 (1972). The trial court denied the motion, and the jury found, by special interrogatory, that defendant was not negligent. Plaintiff appeals and assigns as error the denial of his directed verdict motion. We reverse.
Defendant relies, inter alia, on Barnum v. Williams, supra, where the court said
See also Mariman v. Hultberg, 82 Or.App. 535, 728 P.2d 919 (1986).
We agree with defendant that plaintiff...
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MAQUIEL v. Adkins
...an emergency or other circumstance that made compliance with the statute unreasonable, difficult, or dangerous. Cervantes v. Mattson, 90 Or.App. 574, 577, 752 P.2d 1293 (1988). The Supreme Court's essential holding in Barnum was that, despite a motor vehicle code violation, fault is for the......
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§33.3 Liability Per Se
...courts also use the term statutory negligence to describe such a negligence count. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Mattson, 90 Or App 574, 576, 752 P2d 1293 (1988); Maquiel v. Adkins, 175 Or App 43, 55, 27 P3d 1050 (2001). See also UCJI No. 20.03. NOTE: The Oregon Supreme Court has not expressly ad......
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§33.2 Commonalities
...use a focused federal or state statute as the basis of a count of liability per se. See, e.g., Cervantes v. Mattson, 90 Or App 574, 577, 752 P2d 1293 (1988) (negligence per se). Courts may also use a focused statute that broadens duties to expand the scope of common-law torts. See Cain v. R......
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§13.2 Common Law, Statutory Liability, and Negligence Per Se
...that no harm would result from his [or her] uncompelled, deliberate violation of the statute." Cervantes v. Mattson, 90 Or App 574, 577, 752 P2d 1293 (1988). §13.2-3 Statutory Liability A statute may be the basis for liability if it is intended to protect a person of a specified class from ......