Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 95-CV-1013

• Decision Date: 12 February 1998
• Docket Number: 96-CV-391.,95-CV-1137,95-CV-1448,No. 95-CV-1013,95-CV-1013
• Citation: 707 A.2d 768
• Parties: James R. CEVENINI, Richard Brenner, and Bertell L. Nelson, Appellants, v. ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, Appellee. ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. Bertell L. NELSON, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

707 A.2d 768

James R. CEVENINI, Richard Brenner, and Bertell L. Nelson, Appellants, v. ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, Appellee.

ARCHBISHOP OF WASHINGTON, Appellant, v. Bertell L. NELSON, Appellee.

Nos. 95-CV-1013, 95-CV-1137, 95-CV-1448, 96-CV-391.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued October 3, 1996.

Decided February 12, 1998.

Gregory L. Murphy, with whom David C. Schroeder and J. Chapman Petersen, Alexandria, VA, were on the briefs, for James Cevenini, Richard Brenner, and Bertell Nelson.

Kevin T. Baine, with whom Philip A. Sechler, Washington, DC, was on the briefs, for Archbishop of Washington.

Before TERRY, KING and REID, Associate Judges.

TERRY, Associate Judge:

We consolidated these four appeals because they present common questions of law involving the potential liability of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Washington for the misconduct of one of its priests, Rev. Thomas Schaefer. Appellants Cevenini, Brenner, and Nelson each filed suit in 1995¹ against the Archbishop of Washington,² seeking damages for the negligent hiring and supervision of Father Schaefer, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Archbishop filed separate motions to dismiss their complaints based on the statute of limitations and forum non conveniens. Judge von Kann dismissed Mr. Cevenini's complaint on statute of limitations grounds and denied as moot the forum non conveniens motion. With respect to Messrs. Brenner and Nelson, Judges Winfield and Alprin, respectively, denied the motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, but granted the motions to dismiss based on forum non conveniens. The three plaintiffs noted separate appeals, and — in Nelson's case only — the Archbishop noted a cross-appeal.

We hold that, as a matter of law, the statute of limitations expired before any of the three appellants filed suit. Accordingly, we affirm on that ground the dismissal of all three complaints, and thus do not reach the forum non conveniens issue as to any of the three appellants.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts of these cases are virtually identical. While they were teenagers, the three appellants served as altar boys and volunteers at the Church of St. John the Evangelist ("St. John's") in Clinton, Maryland. The church operates under the immediate control of the Archdiocese, which includes 143 parishes in Maryland and the District of Columbia.

In 1975 the Archdiocese assigned Father Schaefer to serve as pastor at St. John's, where he remained for seven years. Each appellant alleged in his complaint that during those years Father Schaefer sexually abused him on various occasions at the church. In 1982 Father Schaefer was reassigned to another parish, and in 1986 the Archdiocese removed him from the parish ministry altogether and assigned him to work as a chaplain in a nursing home. He was later directed to cease all ministerial functions. In February 1995 the Washington Post published a series of articles disclosing that the Archdiocese knew of Father Schaefer's pedophilic tendencies long before he assumed his pastoral duties at St. John's. These disclosures were attributed to and confirmed by Monsignor William Lori, the Chancellor of the Archdiocese. Each appellant alleged that it was not until the publication of these articles that he had reason to suspect independent wrongdoing by the Archdiocese with respect to the hiring and supervision of Father Schaefer.

Cevenini stated that he was sexually abused by Father Schaefer on two occasions in 1976 and 1977, when he was thirteen years old. His complaint alleged that, because of the trauma of the molestation, he repressed his memory of the abuse until 1991, when he began to recall what had happened. Nevertheless, he stated that he remained incapable of realizing the "impact" of Father Schaefer's abuse until 1993, when its effects were made clear to him through psychotherapy.

Brenner alleged that he was sexually abused by Father Schaefer on "many occasions" between 1981 and 1983, when he was thirteen or fourteen years old. Nelson alleged that he was sexually abused by Father Schaefer on "many occasions" between 1978 and 1982, when he was between thirteen and sixteen years old. Neither Brenner nor Nelson claimed to have suffered any memory loss or repression following the alleged incidents of abuse.

II. THE ACCRUAL OF APPELLANTS' CLAIMS

When a motion to dismiss based upon the statute of limitations relies on matters beyond the four corners of the pleadings, as in these cases,³ it is treated as a motion for summary judgment. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b); see Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1233 (D.C.1989). Such a motion may not be granted if there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). To defeat a summary judgment motion, therefore, "the opposing party need only show that there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980).

The applicable statute of limitations in these cases provides that an action must be brought within three years "from the time the right to maintain the action accrues." D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (1995). When the potential plaintiff is a minor at the time of accrual, he may bring the action within three years of his eighteenth birthday. D.C.Code § 12-302(a)(1) (1995). What constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law; the actual date of accrual, however, is a question of fact. Diamond v. Davis, 680 A.2d 364, 370 (D.C.1996); see also Bussineau v. President & Directors of Georgetown College, 518 A.2d 423, 425 (D.C.1986); Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C.1984). Thus we must ascertain whether there is a "genuine issue as to any material fact" concerning the date on which appellants' claims accrued; if not, and if the date of accrual was more than three years before they filed their respective complaints, then the Archbishop is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c).

The parties disagree as to the legal standard to be applied in determining the date of accrual of appellants' claims. Appellants argue that the so-called "discovery rule" is applicable to their claims and that the Archdiocese's fraudulent concealment of its wrongdoing delayed accrual until the publication of the Washington Post articles in 1995. The Archbishop contends that the discovery rule is inapplicable and that, in any event, appellants have not alleged facts that would support a tolling of the limitations period under the discovery rule. We need not resolve this dispute, because the outcome of these cases would be the same regardless of whether the discovery rule is or is not applicable. Under both the general rule of claim accrual and the discovery rule exception, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff either has actual knowledge of a cause of action or is charged with knowledge of that cause of action. Diamond v. Davis, supra, 680 A.2d at 372; see also Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614, 615 (D.C.1979) ("where the fact of injury is readily discernible, the cause of action accrues when the injury occurs").

Our recent decision in Diamond v. Davis "used the term `notice' to refer to the quantum of knowledge required to commence the running of the statute of limitations in a particular case." 680 A.2d at 372. We then divided notice into two categories: actual notice and inquiry notice. "`Actual notice' is that notice which a plaintiff actually possesses; `inquiry notice' is that notice which a plaintiff would have possessed after due investigation." Id. (citation omitted). We made clear in Diamond that either actual notice or inquiry notice will be sufficient to start the clock running under the statute of limitations. Since there is no assertion here that any of these appellants had actual notice of a claim against the Archdiocese at any time prior to 1995, we must determine when they were placed on inquiry notice of their several claims.

Appellants contend that a plaintiff must have knowledge of each essential element of any cause of action in order to be charged with inquiry notice, and that fraudulent concealment by the defendant will toll the accrual of his claims. The Archbishop disagrees, arguing that the threshold level of knowledge required of a plaintiff is something less than the "each element" test suggested by appellants. We agree with the Archbishop.

In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff can be charged with inquiry notice of his claims even if he is not actually aware of each essential element of his cause of action. This court has repeatedly held that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of (1) an injury, (2) its cause, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. Diamond, supra, 680 A.2d at 379-380; Knight, supra, 553 A.2d at 1236; Bussineau, supra, 518 A.2d at 425. Appellants' assertion of an "each element" or "all elements" test of accrual is without support in the case law:

The fact that the plaintiff did not initially comprehend the full extent of all possible sequelae does not matter, for the law of limitations requires only that she have inquiry notice of the existence of a cause of action for personal injury.

Baker v. A.H. Robins Co., 613 F.Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C.1985) (emphasis in original; citations omitted), cited with approval in Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 473 (D.C.1994) (en banc).

For the reasons that follow, we hold that appellant Cevenini was on inquiry notice of his claims against Father Schaefer no later than 1991, and that appellants Nelson and Brenner were similarly charged with inquiry notice in 1983, when they turned eighteen.⁴ We further hold that appellants' claims against the...