CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., In re
| Decision Date | 29 November 1993 |
| Citation | 107 F.3d 20 |
| Parties | Bankr. L. Rep. P 77,304, 97 CJ C.A.R. 317 NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Submitted on the briefs: **
Steven T. Waterman, Cameron M. Hancock, and Valerie A. Longmire of Ray, Quincey & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant.
Dolores B. Kopel, Denver, Colorado, and L.R. Curtis, Jr. of Holme Roberts & Owen, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellees.
Before BRORBY, HENRYand MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Reorganized debtor CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. appeals the district court's finding the notice of appeal to that court from the bankruptcy court was adequate. After finding the notice of appeal adequate, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and remanded to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. Because the district court's order is not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988), 1 and no exceptions to the finality rule are applicable, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The Appellees are a group of former employees of the debtor. They filed an application for payment of administrative expenses with the bankruptcy court, seeking severance benefits. After the bankruptcy court disallowed the application, the Appellees filed a "Motion for Reconsideration, to Reopen Record for Admission of Newly Discovered Evidence, and to Deposit Funds in Escrow Account." Upon the bankruptcy court's denial of that motion, they filed an appeal with the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
CF & I Fabricators filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, contending the former employees' notice of appeal did not comply with the requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a), therefore rendering the district court without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a) explicitly requires a notice of appeal from a bankruptcy court to a district court to "contain the names of all parties to the judgment, order, or decree appealed from." However, the notice of appeal did not contain the names of the individual former employees appealing the bankruptcy court decision; rather, it simply stated the appellants to be "Certain Former Employees of CF & I Steel Corporation [the debtor corporation prior to reorganization]." Failure to specifically name a party in the notice of appeal of a bankruptcy court decision is a jurisdictional bar to that party's appeal. Storage Technology Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir.1991).
However, relying on Fed. R.App. P. 3(c), 2 which has more lenient requirements for filing a notice of appeal than those of Bankruptcy Rule 8001(a), Storage Technology, 934 F.2d at 247, the district court denied CF & I Fabricators' motion to dismiss, holding the notice of appeal was sufficient to provide jurisdiction. Proceeding to the merits of the appeal, the court restated its finding of jurisdiction and reversed the bankruptcy court's holding that the former employees' failure to file timely administrative claims for severance benefits did not constitute excusable neglect. It then remanded the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions to (1) fix a time within which the former employees may file claims, (2) deny any claim filed by a former employee who knew or has stated he or she knew a claim for severance benefits was not going to be filed on his or her behalf by CF & I Steel, and (3) only permit those former employees who make a specific showing of detrimental reliance to file claims.
Upon CF & I Fabricators' appeal to this court of the district court's decision regarding the sufficiency of the notice of appeal, we sua sponte requested the parties to submit briefs addressing the question whether the district court's order is final, which is generally a prerequisite to this court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). CF & I Fabricators asserts three alternative grounds on which to premise jurisdiction: (1) the district court's order was a final order, (2) the district court's order is final in the practical or pragmatic sense, and (3) the district court's order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. However, after thorough review, we conclude we are without jurisdiction to hear CF & I Fabricators' appeal.
Generally, 28 U.S.C. § 158 governs the jurisdiction of bankruptcy appeals. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 252 (1992). It provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals
(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees;
....
and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases and proceedings referred to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title....
....
(d) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 3 decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsection[ ] (a) ... of this section.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d). Accordingly, with certain limited exceptions discussed subsequently in this opinion, "when jurisdiction in the court of appeals is based on § 158(d), we have jurisdiction only when the district court decision appealed from is 'final.' " Farmers Home Admin. v. Buckner (In re Buckner), 66 F.3d 263, 265 (10th Cir.1995). " '[T]o be final and appealable, the district court's order must end the litigation and leave nothing to be done except execute the judgment.' " Id. (quoting Magic Circle Energy 1981-A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle Energy Corp.), 889 F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir.1989)). The oft-stated rationale underlying this finality rule is the need to control piecemeal adjudication and eliminate delays caused by interlocutory appeals. E.g., In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 889 F.2d at 953 (citing Homa Ltd. v. Stone (In re Commercial Contractors, Inc.), 771 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir.1985)).
A district court order that includes a remand back to the bankruptcy court for "significant further proceedings" is not final and appealable. Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks (In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp.), 956 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir.1992). " 'Significant further proceedings' occur when the bankruptcy court undertakes more than mere 'ministerial' computations involving little judicial discretion." Rubner & Kutner, P.C. v. United States Trustee (In re Lederman Enters., Inc.), 997 F.2d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting State Bank v. Anderson (In re Bucyrus Grain Co.), 905 F.2d 1362, 1366 (10th Cir.1990)). Here, the district court remanded for additional factual findings on whether any of the claimant employees knew CF & I Steel was not going to file a claim on their behalf and whether the former employees could make specific showings of detrimental reliance. Such activities will involve more than minimal judicial discretion and thus are significant further proceedings rather than mere ministerial tasks. See Jones v. Jones (In re Jones), 9 F.3d 878, 879 n. 2 (10th Cir.1993); In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. Partnership, 988 F.2d at 1013 (). Therefore, the district court's order is not final. 4
CF & I Fabricators contends the part of the district court's order refusing to grant its motion to dismiss is a separate and distinct dispute from the remand to the bankruptcy court. It claims that discrete decision is final because the order ends the litigation with respect to the sufficiency of the notice of appeal. However, this argument is flawed. It is true that in the bankruptcy context courts have recognized the appropriate "judicial unit" for purposes of the finality requirement as something less than the resolution of the overall bankruptcy case; in bankruptcy, the "judicial unit" for purposes of finality refers to the individual or discrete adversarial proceeding or controversy within the larger case. E.g., Adelman v. Fourth Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Durability, Inc.), 893 F.2d 264, 266 (10th Cir.1990). Accordingly, we look to the district court order as a whole to determine whether it has resolved the individual adversarial proceeding. Here, the district court's order finding the notice of appeal sufficient did not resolve the adversarial proceeding. Rather, it allowed the case as a whole to continue. We refuse CF & I Fabricators' invitation to separate as discrete the notice of appeal's sufficiency. To do so would drastically undercut the policies underlying the finality doctrine. See In re Bucyrus Grain Co., Inc., 905 F.2d at 1366 (). Therefore, we will not consider the district court's refusal to dismiss the former employees' appeal for lack of jurisdiction as a final order with regard to a discrete judicial unit.
Indeed, even were we to look solely to the district court's holding on the jurisdictional issue, we have repeatedly held that denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is not immediately reviewable. John E. Burns Drilling Co. v. Central Bank of Denver, 739 F.2d 1489, 1491 (10th Cir.1984) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 236 (1945)); see also In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 956 F.2d at 937; In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 889 F.2d at 954 (citing Catlin ). Such decisions lack finality, John E. Burns Drilling, 739 F.2d...
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