CH Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Rev.

Decision Date28 August 1939
Docket NumberNo. 4469.,4469.
Citation106 F.2d 388
PartiesC. H. MEAD COAL CO. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Edgar J. Goodrich, of Washington, D. C. (Guggenheimer & Untermyer, of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for petitioner.

Ellis N. Slack, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen. (Sewall Key, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., on the brief), for respondent.

Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and H. H. WATKINS, District Judge.

NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review a decision of the United States Board of Tax Appeals involving a deficiency in income taxes of the petitioner, C. H. Mead Coal Company, a West Virginia corporation, for the year 1934 in the amount of $1,475.16. 38 B. T. A. 1163, 1164.

After the Commissioner determined a deficiency the taxpayer applied to the Board for a redetermination. After a hearing the Board made findings of fact and rendered an opinion upholding the action of the Commissioner, two members of the Board dissenting. On December 30, 1938, a decision was entered in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Board.

There is no dispute as to the facts and as found by the Board they are as follows:

"Petitioner is a West Virginia corporation, with its office in Beckley, West Virginia, and is engaged in the business of mining and selling coal. It filed its income tax return for 1933 on March 15, 1934, with the collector of internal revenue at Parkersburg, West Virginia. A net loss of $88,098.94 was reported but no claim for a depletion deduction was made. Attached to the return was the following statement signed by J. P. Nowlin as treasurer for the petitioner:

"`This Tax-payer elects to have a depletion allowance for succeeding taxable years, computed with reference to percentage depletion in the case of the following properties:

"`Western Pocahontas Corporation Property (2 tracts)

"`Thompson-Davis property (1 tract)

"`Piney Coking Coal Land Company (2 tracts)

"`This tax-payer elects to have depletion computed without reference to percentage depletion in the case of the following property:

"`Stone Coal Land Company Tract.

"`No percentage depletion deducted for 1933 because this tax-payer has no net income for this year.'

"Petitioner filed its income tax return for 1934 on March 15, 1935. The return showed net taxable income in the amount of $66,276.89 and a tax in the amount of $9,113.07. No depletion deduction was claimed. Neither did the return contain a statement showing any election to have a depletion allowance in respect of any of its properties computed with or without regard to percentage depletion for the taxable year or subsequent years. Petitioner's officers discussed the matter of filing a notice of election similar to that filed with its 1933 return, but, because of advice of counsel to the effect that it had nothing to deplete and was accordingly entitled to no deduction therefor, it claimed no depletion deduction on its 1934 return and filed no statement of election to take or to compute depletion on the percentage basis.

"In January 1936, as the result of a conversation between its officers and an internal revenue agent, petitioner concluded that the advice of its counsel in respect of its right to take a depletion deduction was erroneous and that it should have claimed depletion for 1934 on the percentage basis. On February 6 following petitioner filed an amended return for 1934 with the collector of internal revenue at Huntington, West Virginia. In addition to the schedules attached to the 1934 return when filed on March 15, 1935, the amended return filed on February 6, 1936, carried a depletion schedule which reflected a claimed depletion allowance computed on the percentage basis in the amount of $33,138.44. At the foot of this schedule the following statement appears:

"`Depletion allowance is computed on the percentage basis in accordance with our election previously made and stated on prior return.

"`Through inadvertence no depletion allowance was deducted from income upon our original 1934 return. To correct that error this amended return for 1934 is filed, together with claim for refund of tax overpaid in consequence of our failure to deduct proper depletion allowance.'

"The respondent has refused to accept the amended return for 1934 filed by the petitioner on February 6, 1936, or the statements contained therein as a proper election under section 114 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1934, to take depletion on the percentage basis.

"The parties have agreed that for 1934 petitioner is not entitled to a depletion deduction computed on the unit basis, and further that if it is entitled to a depletion deduction computed on the percentage basis the amount of the deduction is $15,632.09."

The only question presented for our consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to percentage depletion for the year 1934.

The pertinent statutes are:

Sec. 23 (m) Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (m).

Sec. 114 (b) (4) Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A. § 114 note.

Sec. 114 (b) (4) Revenue Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C.A. § 114(b) (4).

The contention on behalf of the petitioner is first, that the election of percentage depletion made in its tax return for the year 1933 held good for "all succeeding taxable years" and therefore entitled it to percentage depletion for the year 1934 and, second, that if another election was required by the Revenue Act of 1934, in making its amended return for the year 1934, which amendment the Commissioner should have allowed, it had complied with the requirement.

It is clear that if the petitioner has made the election required by the Act of 1934, what it did in its return for the year 1933 is immaterial. We will therefore first consider whether the Act of 1934 has been complied with by the taxpayer. We are of the opinion that it has.

Section 114 (b) (4) of the Revenue Act of 1934 reads as follows:

"* * * A taxpayer making his first return under this title chapter in respect of a property shall state whether he elects to have the depletion allowance for such property for the taxable year for which the return is made computed with or without regard to percentage depletion, and the depletion allowance in respect of such property for such year shall be computed according to the election thus made. If the taxpayer fails to make such statement in the return, the depletion allowance for such property for such year shall be computed without reference to percentage depletion. * * *."

In using the words "first return" Congress evidently intended to include a completed first return or a first return as properly amended and did not intend to limit the taxpayer's right of election to the first form filed. Any other construction would, in fairness to the taxpayer, be too narrow and restricted. A first return is no less a first return because amended, provided the amendment be timely and is made to correct a mistake, made without any intent on the part of the taxpayer to take any undue advantage as to its tax payments, and without any bad faith. A different construction would, as said in the case of Glenn v. Oertel Co., 6 Cir., 97 F.2d 495, 496, permit the government to lay a tax upon the taxpayer's errors rather than its income. In that case the court discussed what constituted a "first return" and said: "We think that the correct view, which accords with the principle that `in construing tax laws all doubt must be decided in favor of the taxpayer' (Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S.Ct. 53, 62 L.Ed. 211), is, that the incorrect, invalid return springing from an honest mistake would not support any fair levy or assessment and that the Congress did not intend to prohibit its correction within the permitted period; that `the taxpayer should be permitted to do what he had the right to do in the first instance' (Lucas v. Sterling Oil & Gas Co., 6 Cir., 62 F.2d 951, 952); and that the corrected return of September 1 be adjudged the `first return under this section' as distinguished from returns of subsequent years which were to be based thereon. * * * This neither penalizes appellee nor takes away from appellant any substantial right. It places appellee upon an equal footing with all similar taxpayers who file a single corrected return within the permissible limit. * * *."

Here the taxpayer, being badly advised, failed to claim depletion on a percentage basis in the first form of the return it made but immediately upon learning of its mistake, and before the time for filing its return for the next succeeding year, filed an amendment claiming the depletion to which it was admittedly entitled.

When we consider the fact that in its return for the year 1933 the...

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13 cases
  • Haggar Co v. Helvering
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • January 2, 1940
    ...return' under § 114(b)(4) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 680, 710, 26 U.S.C.A. Int.Rev.Acts, page 702; C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 106 F.2d 388, 390; cf. Pacific National Co. v. Welch, 304 U.S. 191, 194, 58 S.Ct. 857, 858, 82 L.Ed. 1282. Thus read the statute gives fu......
  • Richardson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 183
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • March 20, 1942
    ...held to a choice made under a misapprehension of his legal liability. There are cases squinting in this direction. C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 106 F.2d 388 (bad advice, but error corrected before subsequent return filed); Momsen-Dunnegan-Ryan case, supra (dictum, as to igno......
  • Bookwalter v. Mayer
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • April 30, 1965
    ...Revenue, 311 U.S. 55, 58, 61 S.Ct. 95, 85 L.Ed. 36; Klinghamer v. Brodrick, 10 Cir., 242 F.2d 563; C. H. Mead Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 4 Cir., 106 F.2d 388, 391; Morrow, Becker & Ewing, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 57 F.2d 1, 2; Stewart v. United St......
  • Woodward v. United States, Civ. A. No. 67-C-16-C.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • February 2, 1971
    ...made on their original return. Under Welch, they are entitled to no more than this. Finally, the decision in C. H. Mead Coal Company v. C.I.R., 106 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1939), cited by plaintiffs, is no longer controlling. There, the question was whether a depletion allowance statute, which r......
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