Chabot v. Meredith

• Decision Date: 10 March 1971
• Citation: 93 Cal.Rptr. 543,15 Cal.App.3d 950
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Kathleen CHABOT, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. John Ernest MEREDITH, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 12282.

Page 543

93 Cal.Rptr. 543

15 Cal.App.3d 950

Kathleen CHABOT, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. John Ernest MEREDITH, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 12282.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

March 10, 1971.

Hearing Denied May 6, 1971.

Charles E. Hurley and Newton & Newton by Albert Newton, Jr., Yreka, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Peters, Fuller & Byrne, Chico, Richard G. Logan, Oakland, for defendant and appellant.

REGAN, Associate Justice.

Defendant appeals from the judgment entered after a general jury verdict for plaintiffs, Kathleen Chabot and her mother, Mary Ann Chabot Hillmon. ¹

Defendant, 18 years of age, while a visitor at plaintiffs' residence in Los Angeles County, volunteered to drive plaintiff Kathleen, age 15 years, to the local bus depot so she could take a bus to Medford, Oregon. Kathleen's mother gave her consent and defendant drove Kathleen, her brother Roland and two friends to the depot where Kathleen purchased a bus ticket for the trip from $25 supplied by the mother. While at the bus station, defendant offered to drive Kathleen to Oregon. It was generally agreed that Kathleen would feel better mentally if defendant, Dave Staples and Kathleen's brother drove her to Oregon. Kathleen thought this arrangement was 'all right.'

Defendant offered to make this trip because Kathleen and her brother, Roland, were friends of his and that by doing this it might make her feel better. Defendant denied receiving any money to take her to Oregon, and stated he received no tangible benefit for the trip.

The bus ticket was cashed and the proceeds were pooled with monies the others had. Dave Staples and Roland Chabot had about $5 between them, but defendant had no money. The pooled money was to be used for gas and food on the trip.

The group went back to the Chabot household to talk to Kathleen's mother before they left, but she was not at home. Roland left his mother a note explaining that they were going to drive Kathleen to Oregon. (The mother testified that she would not have given permission for this trip if she had been consulted.) Kathleen didn't think her mother would be upset over the fact that she hadn't caught the bus.

Defendant's automobile, a four-passenger Austin Healey with a fiberglass top, had been purchased for defendant about 36 hours prior to the accident, and he had driven it twice in the Los Angeles area prior to the trip to Medford.

Defendant's plan was to leave Los Angeles on Saturday night and to drive nonstop to Medford, and then return to Los Angeles on Monday. They started the trip about 10 p.m. Saturday night. The three boys took turns driving. Defendant slept some while the others drove. Several stops were made either to buy gas or obtain something to eat. They arrived in Yreka, California, about two o'clock Sunday afternoon.

After stopping in Yreka, defendant took over the driving. It was a warm, bright afternoon and the traffic was normal. Defendant had never driven the road--a state highway--before. The road is what is commonly referred to as a 'mountain road,' with a mountain on one side and a steep drop-off on the other. According to the testimony of the investigating officer, this road is one of the worst stretches of interstate highway in California 'because of the fact that it's so many sharp curves and narrow road and blind curves on it.' The curve on which the accident occurred is probably the worst curve north of Yreka before the Shasta River bridge. There are more accidents on this curve than on others, and the guardrail at this point had been wiped out by truck accidents and a new guardrail had to be installed.

About 400 feet south of the accident scene there was a sweeping-curve warning sign, although in fact the curve, considering the whole roadway, was almost a complete 'U.' There was no speed indicator on the sign. Defendant could recall no warning sign at this curve on which the accident happened.

Defendant had had no problems with previous curves and stated that he was driving about 60 miles per hour on the straight stretches and was slowing down for the curves. He denied having heard plaintiff tell him to slow down.

Defendant testified that as he approached the accident turn, an oncoming car was a little bit on his side which 'startled me and I jarred the wheel to the right' to avoid a collision. The car went off to the right and struck the guardrail. Defendant turned to the left as hard as he could, went across the road despite braking, and hit the mountain on the other side, the car turning over. From the place where the car originally left the paved road, on the right-hand side, until it returned again to the roadway, there were tire marks measuring 120 feet. After returning to the paved surface, the car laid down tire marks measuring 85 feet; the marks indicated the vehicle was in a broadside skid.

The accident occurred approximately seven miles north of Yreka at about 2:30 p.m. There were no independent eyewitnesses to the crash. In the opinion of the investigating officer, the accident was caused by the vehicle traveling too fast for the condition of the roadway. Defendant admitted talking to police officers after the accident, but could not recall what had been said. The investigating officer testified that after the accident defendant 'guessed' that the accident was caused by his excessive speed. Defendant made no mention of any vehicle crowding him off the road. The officer felt that defendant was rational enough to give a statement.

According to the deposition of David Staples, which was read into evidence, from Yreka to the scene of the accident the car was being driven a little above the speed limit. He knew they weren't going at a safe speed. According to Staples, they were going into the turns rather fast. He estimated the car's speed at about 45 to 50 miles per hour. When the car got into the curve, Staples knew they were going too fast.

Roland Chabot, Kathleen's brother, testified that from Yreka northbound defendant was not skidding the car around the road, and he made no protest about how the car was being driven. Roland stated that 'the speed for the whole trip didn't vary much. We stayed roughly around sixty-five, seventy, sometimes seventy-five, depending on the condition of the road.' Roland estimated defendant's speed, upon entering the curve, at between 65 and 70 miles per hour. He saw no car or truck on their side of the road prior to the accident.

Kathleen testified that just before the accident defendant rounded another curve 'pretty fast' and 'I got pretty scared.' She did not recall seeing any vehicle on their side of the roadway. As the group proceeded north out of Yreka, Kathleen told defendant to slow down because he was going too fast, but she could not remember the number of times she told him this.

Roland remembered that Kathleen told defendant to slow down at least once prior to approaching the accident curve. Staples also heard her tell defendant to slow down.

As a result of the accident, Kathleen suffered severe injuries.

Defendant contends that Kathleen was a guest within the meaning of the guest statute ² As a matter of law. He presents a two-pronged argument.

Defendant first contends that Kathleen was capable of accepting and did accept the ride as a guest of defendant without parental consent. Defendant argues that the correct rule is that the rider who is of sufficient age and intelligence to know what he is doing in accepting a ride in an automobile should be deemed a guest within the terms of the statute. (See De Falla v. Tuttle (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 473, 282 P.2d 513.)

In De Falla, a ten-year-old girl injured in an automobile accident was held to be a guest. The evidence showed, however, that the girl was a member of a group of Camp Fire Girls, that her mother gave consent to her attending a series of concerts, signed a written permit to go by school bus and made no objection when she learned her daughter traveled by private car to concerts and was in such other mode of transportation when the accident occurred. De Falla contains the factors of group activity and implied consent.

Here the minor plaintiff maintains, on the other hand, that whether she accepted the ride was a question of fact, not law, ³ that the law is clear the custody of a minor child is in the parents, and that under the facts of this case the evidence precludes a holding, as a matter of law, that the offered ride was 'accepted.'

Kathleen notes that specific permission was requested of her mother prior to the trip to the bus terminal; that after deciding on the trip to Oregon, Kathleen and defendant returned to the Chabot residence, which leads to the inference that the ultimate decision was up to her mother, and that her mother testified at trial that she would not have consented if she had been consulted.

Thus, she concludes the trial court properly refused to hold that she was a guest as a matter of law. Kathleen goes even further, however. She submits that the true rule is that when the plaintiff is an unemancipated minor living under direct parental custody and control, the 'acceptance' as a 'guest' must be through the act of his parent. (Cf. Buckner v. Vetterick (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d 417, 419, 269 P.2d 67; Rocha v. Hulen (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 44 P.2d 478.)

No California case has been cited, and we have found none, which is precisely in point. We hold only that once the issue of acceptance of the ride was raised, it was properly submitted to the jury as a question of fact and there was no error in so doing.

Defendant also contends that the mere sharing of the expenses of the automobile trip did not cause Kathleen to become a passenger rather than a guest. This contention has been adequately answered by recent appellate decisions of this state. In Nevarez v. Carrasco (1969) 1 Cal.3d 518, 522, 82 Cal.Rptr. 721, 723, 462 P.2d 577, 579, the court states: 'If the rider...