Chachere v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 26 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | 16 C 2401 |
| Parties | MICHAEL CHACHERE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, DANIELLE DEERING, and CORY JUNIOUS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Michael Chachere brought this suit against the City of Chicago and two of its police officers, Danielle Deering and Cory Junious, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, alleging that his home was unlawfully searched, that he was unlawfully detained on groundless charges, and that the personal property taken upon his arrest was unlawfully destroyed. Doc. 1. Defendants answered many of the claims, Doc. 13, but the City moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the property destruction claims, Doc. 14. The motion is granted.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC, 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in Chachere's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 714 F.3d 1017, 1020 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts are set forth as favorably to Chachere as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth those facts, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A., 610 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010).
On October 14, 2014, Deering and Junious conducted a warrantless search of Chachere's home. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 5-7. Asserting that the search turned up guns and that Chachere confessed to owning them, the officers arrested him for unlawful possession of firearms. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9, 11. In fact, the officers had no reason to think any guns found were Chachere's, and they falsified the confession. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 11. As a result, Chachere spent over four months detained at the Cook County Jail on unfounded gun charges, which were ultimately dismissed. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
When Deering and Junious arrested and booked Chachere, they took and placed into storage his wallet, cell phone, and necklace. Id. at ¶ 21. The officers did so pursuant to Chicago Police Department Special Order S07-01-01, which sets forth procedures for inventorying, storing, and returning personal property taken from arrestees. Doc. 18 at 16-19. Adhering to that policy, the City did not send the wallet, cell phone, and necklace along with Chachere to the jail, but instead inventoried and stored them in the police department's "Evidence and Recovered Property Section." Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 17, 21; Doc. 18 at 3-4, 16.
To retrieve inventoried property, an arrestee has two options: (1) go to the police department in person; or (2) designate someone else to do so. Doc. 1 at ¶ 23; Doc. 18 at 4, 16. An arrestee detained at the jail of course cannot go to the department in person, and the City knew from experience that many detainees struggled to secure assistance from others to retrieve their property. Doc. 1 at ¶ 20. Nevertheless, the special order imposes a thirty-day limit on the retention of seized property, after which it may be destroyed. Id. at ¶ 19; Doc. 18 at 21.
Chachere was detained for more than four months after his arrest and was unable to find another person to claim his property. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 12, 23; Doc. 18 at 4. As a result, his wallet, phone, and necklace were destroyed. Doc. 1 at ¶ 24. Although Chicago Municipal Code § 2-84-160(b) obligates the City to make reasonable efforts to give notice of the procedure for retrieving seized property, the City failed do so here. Doc. 18 at 5, 21.
Chachere's property destruction claim invokes the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Doc. 18 at 8-13.
Chachere alleges that the City's destruction of his personal property violated the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable ... seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure of personal property occurs when there is "some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in [his] property." Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original). The initial seizure of Chachere's property upon his arrest was lawful. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (). The question here is whether the City's subsequent destruction of his property violated the Fourth Amendment.
Lee answers this question, holding that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the government's retention or treatment of property following its initial seizure: 330 F.3d at 466. Chachere attempts to distinguish Lee on the ground that it involved property seized as evidence, Doc. 18 at 11, but nothing in Lee suggests that its holding is limited to seizures that have a law enforcement purpose. To the contrary, the Seventh Circuit has made clear that Lee applies no matter the justification (or lack thereof) for the initial seizure. See Gonzalez v. Vill. of W. Milwaukee, 671 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) ( ).
As Lee explained, limiting the Fourth Amendment's scope to the initial property seizure is consistent with the Seventh Circuit's consistent rejection of the concept of a "continuing seizure." 330 F.3d at 463-65. The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed its position in Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2016), holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the City's failure to return a seized vehicle because "the seizure ... is complete when the officer or agent seizes and impounds the vehicle." Id. at 741. Chachere correctly observes that the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the "continuing seizure" theory is before the Supreme Court in Manuel v. City of Joliet, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016). But unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise, this court remains bound by circuit precedent. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Thus, at this juncture, the City's failure to return seized property must be evaluated under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Bell, 835 F.3d at 741 (); Lee, 330 F.3d at 466 (); id. at 466 n.5("Other courts have likened continued retention of evidence as a taking without just compensation.").
Chachere alleges that the destruction of his personal property amounts to a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The City contends that the takings claim should be dismissed as unripe under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), because Chachere has neither sought nor been denied compensation at the state level. Doc. 14 at 4.
In Williamson County, "the Supreme Court articulated a special ripeness doctrine for constitutional property rights claims which precludes federal courts from adjudicating land use disputes until: (1) the regulatory agency has had an opportunity to make a considered definitive decision, and (2) the property owner exhausts available state remedies for compensation." Muscarello v. Ogle Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 610 F.3d 416, 422 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Gamble v. Eau Claire Cnty., 5 F.3d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1993) (). Put another way, Williamson County provides that, "if a state provides adequate procedures for seeking just compensation, a property owner cannot state a takings claim in federal court until she has used these procedures and been denied just compensation." Black Earth Meat Mkt., LLC v. Vill. of Black Earth, 834 F.3d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2016). This doctrine applies with equal force to claims based on takings of personal property. See Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015).
Although he concedes that Williamson County applies to his takings claim and that he has not pursued relief at the state level, Chachere argues that his failure to do so should be excusedbecause any state suit would have been futile. Doc. 18 at 12. The Williamson County doctrine has a futility exception that applies if relief is "inadequate or unavailable" under state law. Sorrentino, 777 F.3d at 414. But the Seventh Circuit has held that Illinois law as a general matter provides remedies when detained persons are deprived of their personal property. See id. at 413 (...
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