Chacon v. Sperry Corp.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1986
• Docket Number: 15899,Nos. 15898,s. 15898
• Citation: 111 Idaho 270,723 P.2d 814
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Hipolito J. CHACON and Martha Chacon, husband and wife, Plaintiff-respondents, v. SPERRY CORPORATION, a corporation, dba Sperry New Holland Division, Defendant- appellant, and Thomas O. Bingham and Marjorie Bingham, husband and wife; Koch Lumber & Implement Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants. Hipolito J. CHACON and Martha Chacon, husband and wife, Plaintiff-respondents, v. KOCH LUMBER & IMPLEMENT, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-appellant, and Thomas O. Bingham and Marjorie Bingham, husband and wife; Sperry Corporation, a corporation dba Sperry New Holland Division, Defendants.

Page 814

723 P.2d 814

111 Idaho 270

Hipolito J. CHACON and Martha Chacon, husband and wife, Plaintiff-respondents, v. SPERRY CORPORATION, a corporation, dba Sperry New Holland Division, Defendant- appellant and Thomas O. Bingham and Marjorie Bingham, husband and wife; Koch Lumber & Implement Co., Inc., an Idaho corporation, Defendants Hipolito J. CHACON and Martha Chacon, husband and wife, Plaintiff-respondents, v. KOCH LUMBER & IMPLEMENT, INC., an Idaho corporation, Defendant-appellant and Thomas O. Bingham and Marjorie Bingham, husband and wife; Sperry Corporation, a corporation dba Sperry New Holland Division, Defendants.

Nos. 15898, 15899.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 3, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 28, 1986.

Bobbi K. Dominick of Elam, Burke & Boyd, Boise, for appellant Koch Lumber & Implement.

Mary S. Hobson of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & Gillespie, Boise, for appellant Sperry Corp.

Curtis Webb of Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine, Twin Falls, for respondents.

BAKES, Justice.

Defendants Koch Lumber & Implement Co., Inc., and Sperry Corporation bring this certified appeal from the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint. Plaintiffs' amended complaint, filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations, substituted defendants' names in place of two fictitious names contained in the original complaint.

I

Hipolito Chacon's right foot was injured August 1, 1981, while Chacon was operating a forklift. Chacon filed this action on July 28, 1983, near the end of the two-year limitation period of I.C. § 5-219, naming as defendants Thomas Bingham, his employer; Marjorie Bingham, the employer's spouse; and two fictitious parties, ABC Implement Company and XYZ Manufacturing Company.

In April of 1984, Chacon determined that Koch Lumber & Implement Co. was the implement company which sold, and Sperry Corporation the manufacturing company which manufactured the forklift. On June 4, 1984, Chacon amended his complaint, deleting the fictitious names and inserting the names of Koch Lumber & Implement, Inc., and Sperry Corporation.

On June 12, 1984, Koch Lumber & Implement was served with summons and a copy of the amended complaint, and on June 14, 1984, Sperry Corporation was served. The record is uncontroverted that, prior to receiving service, neither Koch Lumber & Implement nor Sperry Corporation had any knowledge of this action or the claim of Chacon.

Koch Lumber & Implement and Sperry Corporation moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging that the amended complaint had not been filed within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in I.C. § 5-219, which is applicable to this action. The district court denied this motion, ruling that the amendment did not bring in new defendants but merely correctly identified party defendants already before the court, reserving for later determination whether plaintiffs had used diligence in attempting to discover the identity of the true parties. The defendants' motions for reconsideration were denied. This interlocutory appeal followed.

II

I.R.C.P. 10(a)(4) permits a plaintiff to use a fictitious name in the pleadings when the adverse party's true name is unknown and to later amend the pleadings to reflect the party's true name. The central issue raised in this appeal is whether I.R.C.P. 15(c) permits the amended pleading, adding the name of a party for the first time, to relate back to the date of the original pleading and thereby avoid dismissal of the amended pleading for failure to comply with the two year statute of limitations.

In 1959, when this Court by order adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the rules of procedure in Idaho, the then existing Federal Rule 15(c), which the Idaho rules adopted, read as follows:

"Rule 15(c). Relation back of amendments.--Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading."

In 1966, Federal Rule 15(c) was amended by adding the underlined language in the amended rule as follows:

"Rule 15(c). Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.

"The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant." (Underlining added.)

The federal cases interpreting Rule 15(c) as it appeared prior to the 1966 amendment generally held that amendments to a complaint made after the running of statute of limitations did not relate back to the time of the original filing of the complaint for statute of limitations purposes. See, e.g., Robbins v. Esso Shipping Co., 190 F.Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y.1960); Athas v. Day, 161 F.Supp. 916 (D.Colo.1958). However, after the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) adding the above italicized language, the federal cases have consistently held that, for purposes of statutes of limitations, the amended complaint designating the true name of a party previously pleaded by a fictitious name relates back only if the notice requirements of amended Rule 15(c) are met. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1498 (1971). See also Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir.1978); Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.1969), cert.den. 396 U.S. 987, 90 S.Ct. 483, 24 L.Ed.2d 451; Bufalino v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 404 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir.1968), cert.den 394 U.S. 987, 89 S.Ct. 1468, 22 L.Ed.2d 763 (1969).

The notice requirements articulated in the second sentence of F.R.C.P. 15(c) are intended to ensure that:

"any party who is to be added by amendment after the limitations period has expired had adequate notice of the action and of plaintiff's mistake in failing to name him at the outset. Otherwise, the deprivation of the new party's right to invoke a statute of limitations defense might raise a question of procedural due process. To guard against this possibility, Rule 15(c) provides that within the period prescribed for commencing an action against him, 'the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits and (2) knew or should have known that, but for the mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.' If these prerequisites are satisfied and if the amended claim arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, then any amendment 'changing' a party against whom a claim is asserted will relate back." Wright & Miller, supra.

In 1975, when Idaho made its first major revision of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and incorporated the changes which had been made in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after their adoption in Idaho in 1959, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee recommended the Court adopt the 1966 amended Federal Rule 15(c), including the following language:

"An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him."

The general rule of construction which this Court has adhered to regarding the adoption of statutory language from another jurisdiction is that the adoption of that language is presumed to be with that jurisdiction's prior interpretation upon it. Odenwalt v. Zaring, 102 Idaho 1, 4, 624 P.2d 383, 387 (1981). See also Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 367, 659 P.2d 111, 121 (1983). In our recent case of Leliefeld v. Panorama Contractors, Inc., (January 16, 1986) (petition for rehearing granted, March 26, 1986), we reaffirmed the following rule from Odenwalt :

"This court has consistently held that '[a] statute which is adopted from another jurisdiction will be presumed to be adopted with the prior construction placed upon it by the courts of such other jurisdiction.' Nixon v. Triber, 100 Idaho 198, 200, 595 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1979); State v. Miles, 97 Idaho 396, 545 P.2d 484 (1976); Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, 93 Idaho 26, 454 P.2d 63 (1969)." quoting from Odenwalt, 102 Idaho at 5, 624 P.2d at 387.

We see no difference between the adoption of a statute by the legislature or a rule by this Court. Thus, our adoption in 1975 of the above referenced language in post-1966 Federal Rule 15(c) is presumably with the interpretation placed upon that language by the federal courts. ¹ The federal court's interpretation of Rule 15(c) after the 1966 amendment has...