Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hosp.

• Decision Date: 15 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 17029.,17029.
• Citation: 272 Conn. 776,865 A.2d 1163
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Mohinder P. CHADHA v. CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL et al.

865 A.2d 1163

272 Conn. 776

Mohinder P. CHADHA v. CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL et al.

No. 17029.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 22, 2004.

Decided February 15, 2005.

Jeffrey R. Babbin, New Haven, for the appellants (named defendant et al.).

Mohinder P. Chadha, pro se, the appellee (plaintiff).

Michael D. Neubert and Maureen Sullivan Dinnan, New Haven, filed a brief for the American Medical Association et al. as amici curiae.

Jennifer A. Osowiecki, Hartford, and Patrick J. Monahan II filed a brief for the Connecticut Hospital Association as amicus curiae.

BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.

PALMER, J.

At common law, statements made in connection with judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged. The principal issue raised by this certified appeal is whether General Statutes §§ 19a-17b(b)¹ and 19a-20,² which provide qualified immunity to persons who give information to the medical examining board (board) of the department of public health, abrogate the common-law privilege applicable to quasijudicial proceedings of the board. The plaintiff, Mohinder P. Chadha, commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the named defendant, Charlotte Hungerford Hospital (hospital), submitted a false report to the National Practitioner Data Bank³ and that defendants Samuel Langer, Michael Kovalchik, Justin Schechter and Robert Stine⁴ knowingly and maliciously had made false and defamatory statements about the plaintiff to the board. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment insofar as it was predicated on the claim that §§ 19a-17b(b) and 19a-20 do not abrogate the common-law rule of absolute immunity. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's partial denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 77 Conn.App. 104, 122, 822 A.2d 303 (2003). We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal; Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 265 Conn. 902, 829 A.2d 419 (2003); and now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The following relevant facts and procedural history are set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court: "In February, 1997, the plaintiff ... [was a licensed physician with full clinical privileges in the department of psychiatry at the defendant hospital]. On March 3, 1997, the hospital contacted the impaired physician program of the Connecticut State Medical Society⁵ ... regarding its concerns about the plaintiff's ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety. The department of public health filed a `statement of charges,' dated May 13, 1997, against the plaintiff with the [board] requesting that it `revoke or take any other action ... against the medical license of [the plaintiff] as it deems appropriate and consistent with law.' On [or about] May 14, 1997, Langer, Kovalchik, Schechter and ... Stine,⁶ physicians licensed to practice [medicine] in the state of Connecticut, submitted affidavits to the department of public health expressing concerns about the plaintiff's ability to practice psychiatry safely. [The affidavits were forwarded to and considered by the board in connection with its proceedings concerning the suspension of the plaintiff's license to practice medicine in Connecticut.] On May 20, 1997, the board ordered the summary suspension of the plaintiff's license to practice medicine pending a final determination by the board. On November 27, 1997, the hospital submitted a report to the National Practitioner Data Bank⁷ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a).⁸ In January, 1998, the board issued a final decision ordering the immediate suspension of the plaintiff's license to practice [medicine] because he had written ten prescriptions for controlled substances while his license was under suspension.⁹

"In July, 2000, the plaintiff filed a twenty-one count amended complaint against the hospital, Langer, Kovalchik, Schechter and Stine. Thereafter, the court struck or dismissed all but five of the counts. The first of the remaining counts sounded in defamation and claimed that the hospital had submitted a false report to the National Practitioner Data Bank. The other four counts alleged that Langer, Kovalchik, Schechter and Stine maliciously had submitted false affidavits to the department of public health. The defendants answered the remaining portions of the plaintiff's amended complaint and asserted several special defenses, including absolute immunity for statements made in connection with quasi-judicial proceedings¹⁰ and qualified immunity pursuant to General Statutes §§ 19a-20 and 19a-17b.

"On February 7, 2001, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On July 31, 2001, the [trial] court granted [the defendants' motion with respect to] the claim that the hospital maliciously had submitted a false report to the National Practitioner Data Bank.¹¹ The court denied [the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's] claims that the physicians maliciously had submitted false affidavits to the department of public health. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the defendants were protected by qualified immunity, pursuant to §§ 19a-20 and 19a-17b, and that qualified immunity and not absolute immunity applied to the defendants' submission of affidavits to the department of public health because the qualified immunity statutes, §§ 19a-20 and 19a-17b, abrogate the common-law absolute immunity provided to persons who make statements in connection with quasi-judicial proceedings.

"Although the [trial] court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to present any proof of actual malice, which is necessary to overcome the qualified immunity provided by §§ 19a-20 and 19a-17b, it nevertheless denied the defendants' motion because it found that they had failed to meet their burden pursuant to Practice Book § 17-45 et seq.¹² More particularly, the court stated that there were no documents submitted with the defendants' motion that addressed the physicians' affidavits and that, by not submitting any proof countering the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants had acted with malice, the defendants failed to meet their burden of submitting supporting documentation establishing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of malice." Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 77 Conn.App. at 106-109, 822 A.2d 303. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had determined that they were not entitled to absolute immunity for the statements contained in the affidavits that they had submitted to the department of public health. The Appellate Court noted, preliminarily, that "the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not, ordinarily, an appealable final judgment." Id., at 110, 822 A.2d 303. The Appellate Court further observed, however, that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, which has been filed on the basis of a colorable claim of absolute immunity, is, for final judgment purposes, substantially similar to the denial of a motion to dismiss that has been filed on the basis of a colorable claim of sovereign immunity. Id. The Appellate Court concluded that because the latter is an immediately appealable final judgment; see Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 167, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 828 A.2d 549 (2003); so, too, is the former. See Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 77 Conn.App. at 110, 822 A.2d 303.

The Appellate Court then proceeded to address the merits of the trial court's determination that the defendants were not entitled to judgment on the ground of absolute immunity. The Appellate Court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the trial court's denial of the defendants' summary judgment motion on the ground of absolute immunity, concluding that the language and legislative history of §§ 19a-17b and 19a-20 supported the trial court's determination that, in enacting those two provisions, the legislature had abrogated the common-law absolute immunity that otherwise would have shielded the defendants from liability.¹³ Id., at 113-14, 822 A.2d 303. We granted the defendants' petition for certification to appeal limited to the following two issues: "Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) a denial of a motion for summary judgment, filed on the basis of absolute immunity, is a final judgment for purposes of appeal; and (2) the trial court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment?" Chadha v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 265 Conn. 902, 829 A.2d 419. We answer both questions in the affirmative and, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I

We first consider whether the Appellate Court properly determined that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, which has been filed on the basis of absolute immunity, constitutes an appealable final judgment.¹⁴ As a general rule, an interlocutory ruling may not be appealed pending the final disposition of a case. See, e.g., Doublewal Corp. v. Toffolon, 195 Conn. 384, 388, 488 A.2d 444 (1985); see also State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30, 463 A.2d 566 (1983) (right of appeal is purely statutory and "is limited to appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments"). The denial of a motion for summary judgment ordinarily is an interlocutory ruling and, accordingly, not a final judgment for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 34, 694 A.2d 1246 (1997). "We previously have determined [however] that certain interlocutory orders have the attributes of a final judgment and consequently are appealable under [General Statutes] § 52-263.¹⁵... In State v. Curcio, [supra, at 31, 463 A.2d 566], we explicated two situations in which a party can appeal an otherwise interlocutory order: (1) where the order or...