Chadwick v. Nielsen

Decision Date02 November 1988
Docket NumberNo. 880196-CA,880196-CA
Citation763 P.2d 817
PartiesRebecca Jane CHADWICK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Talmage NIELSEN, M.D., Defendant and Respondent.
CourtUtah Court of Appeals

David R. Daines, Daines & Plowman, Logan, for plaintiff and appellant.

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Francis J. Carney, Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, JJ.

OPINION

ORME, Judge:

Chadwick appeals from the trial court's directed verdict terminating her medical malpractice action against Nielsen. Chadwick claims she established a prima facie case of medical malpractice and thus the trial court abused its discretion in granting the directed verdict. She also claims the trial court's denial, on the morning of trial, of her motion to amend her complaint was an abuse of discretion. We find no reversible error in either action and affirm the trial court's disposition of the case.

FACTS

On September 13, 1979, plaintiff Rebecca Chadwick contacted defendant Dr. Talmage Nielsen, a vascular surgeon, to discuss potential medical treatment to alleviate pain she was experiencing in her left leg. Nielsen examined Chadwick and concluded a varicose vein was causing her pain. He suggested a saphenous phlebectomy, which would entail the surgical removal of the vein from Chadwick's leg. Chadwick insisted on having a phleborheogram ("PRG"), a test used to determine if one's veins and circulatory system are functioning properly, before she agreed to the proposed surgery. Chadwick insisted on the PRG because she believed extensive surgery she had undergone as an infant might have damaged the inner vein system in her left leg. Chadwick felt such damage would detract from the feasibility of surgically removing the varicose vein.

Chadwick informed Nielsen of her previous surgery and he obtained and reviewed her medical records. Nielsen then sent a letter to Dr. John Daines, Chadwick's uncle, indicating that "to be certain that there is no obstruction [in the vein system] a phleborheogram will be obtained" and "a standard saphenous phlebectomy ... will be planned if the deep system is normal as anticipated."

The PRG was performed on September 14, 1979 and Nielsen immediately obtained the written PRG report. The technician who prepared the PRG report had placed a checkmark in the column indicating the circulation in Chadwick's left leg was "abnormal." Nielsen discussed the written results with the technician and concluded that only a minor circulatory problem existed which did not alter his professional opinion that the phlebectomy should be performed. Nielsen informed Chadwick that the PRG results were "good" and he performed the surgery on September 19, 1979. Chadwick consented to the surgery without asking for the written test results.

The leg continued to bother Chadwick after the surgery and the pain became debilitating. She filed a medical malpractice action against Nielsen on May 4, 1984, nearly five years after the surgery. Nielsen prepared his defense through the usual discovery procedures. He took Chadwick's deposition, requested production of documents, and served requests for admission. Chadwick apparently conducted no discovery whatsoever. While she complied with Nielsen's discovery requests, she did not take Nielsen's deposition, serve any interrogatories, nor request any documents.

Nielsen filed a Certification of Readiness for Trial on February 5, 1985. Chadwick did not object. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-47 (1987), a bifurcated trial began on March 26, 1985, to first consider if Chadwick's action was barred by the four-year medical malpractice statute of limitation, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987), 1 with a trial on the merits to follow if necessary. Having not asked for a copy of the PRG report while contemplating surgery, during the several year period following surgery, or in the course of discovery, Chadwick saw the written PRG report for the first time at the statute of limitation trial when Nielsen referred to it in the course of his testimony. Chadwick subsequently moved to amend her complaint to allege, among other things, "intentional concealment" by Nielsen of the risks related to the surgery. The motion to amend was heard by the trial court on April 16, 1985, the morning of the trial on the merits, and was denied as being untimely. Chadwick then proceeded to try the merits of her case under her original complaint.

Despite previous suggestion by the trial court that she engage an expert, Chadwick did not call a medical expert to testify in support of her claims, although she did question Nielsen as a hostile witness. At the conclusion of Chadwick's case, the trial court directed a verdict for Nielsen. The trial court reasoned that expert medical testimony was necessary for Chadwick to establish a prima facie case based on the claims in her complaint. Alternatively, the trial court held that Chadwick's claims were barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitation Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987). 2

Chadwick appeals the denial of her motion to amend her complaint and the directed verdict.

DENIAL OF CHADWICK'S MOTION TO AMEND

Leave to amend a pleading is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court and we do not disturb its ruling unless appellant establishes an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). See Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). Generally, leave to amend is liberally allowed in the interest of justice, but justice is often uninterested in amendments alleging new and different causes of action on the eve of trial. See Staker, 664 P.2d at 1190; Girard, 660 P.2d at 248; Utah R.Civ.P. 15(a). The amendment of pleadings on the eve of trial causes great disruption to the legal process and is unfair to an opponent who has conducted discovery, fully prepared the case, and scheduled trial time based on the moving party's prior pleadings.

Nonetheless, there are certainly occasions where justice excuses untimeliness. A motion to amend raised shortly before or at trial, in response to facts discovered subsequent to the prior pleading, should be allowed if there is a reasonable explanation for the delay in discovering the facts and the amendment is not unduly prejudicial to the opposing party. Girard, 660 P.2d at 248.

In this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Chadwick's motion to amend her complaint on the morning of trial. Although Chadwick's proposed amendment was not a model of clarity--it consisted of only 11 numbered paragraphs without delineating specific causes of action--given a generous reading, it makes these allegations beyond those of the original complaint: (1) Chadwick was not informed of the substantial and significant risks of the surgery and (2) Nielsen knowingly concealed those risks from Chadwick. Chadwick argues that the belated amendment to add new causes of action was justified due to the recent discovery of the written PRG results.

It was, however, Chadwick's failure to conduct even rudimentary discovery which caused the written PRG results to go unnoticed until Nielsen produced them during his testimony. The untimeliness of Chadwick's motion to amend could have been avoided had she undertaken even the most fundamental discovery. "Boilerplate" requests for all documents in Nielsen's possession concerning her treatment would have turned up the report early in the proceeding. An untimely motion to amend is inappropriate where the only excuse for its untimeliness is the moving party's failure to conduct discovery. 3 See Girard, 660 P.2d at 248 (a party seeking to amend a pleading the morning of trial must have an adequate reason for the motion's untimeliness or it will be denied); Svoboda v. Trane Co., 495 F.Supp. 367, 373 (E.D.Mo.1980), aff'd 655 F.2d 898 (8th Cir.1981) (motion for leave to amend will be denied where moving party has conducted no discovery and opponent has completed discovery and case is ready for trial); Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n v. Inland Marine Prod. Corp., 542 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.1976) (a "leisurely approach to discovery" caused the deficiency in the pleadings and it is not an abuse of discretion to deny amendment on those grounds); Span East Airlines, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 486 F.Supp. 831, 835 (D.Mass.1980) (leave to amend will be denied where moving party conducted no previous discovery, opponent had completed discovery based on original pleadings, and motion to amend was filed one day before opponent's motion for summary judgment was to be argued).

Having concluded the denial of Chadwick's motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion, we address the propriety of the directed verdict in light of Chadwick's original complaint and the evidence she presented. We review the record on appeal in a light most favorable to Chadwick to determine whether a prima facie case was established. Wilderness Bldg. Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985).

THE DIRECTED VERDICT

Chadwick's original complaint against Nielsen asserted claims for medical malpractice relating to the surgery and treatment following surgery, and the failure of Nielsen to achieve the "guaranteed" results. (The latter claim was dismissed on Nielsen's motion for summary judgment, an action which is not assailed on appeal.) We affirm the trial court's directed verdict due to Chadwick's failure to present expert medical testimony. 4

In order to sustain a medical malpractice prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: (1) the standard of care by which the doctor's conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that standard by the doctor, and (3) injury proximately caused by the doctor's negligence. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah 1981)....

To continue reading

Request your trial
29 cases
  • Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • August 29, 1989
    ...of care. For instance, expert testimony has been required to establish the standard of care for medical doctors, Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct.App.1988); architects, Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Assocs., 24 Utah 2d 172, 467 P.2d 610, 615 (1970); engineers, National Housin......
  • Coroles v. Sabey, 20020407-CA.
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 17, 2003
    ...answer, Utah courts have held that the appropriate remedy is to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the Complaint. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App.1988); Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). See also Luce [v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1986)] (holding "[c]o......
  • DeBry v. Valley Mortg. Co.
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • August 3, 1992
    ...We will not disturb a trial court's disposition on a motion to amend pleadings absent an abuse of discretion. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App.1988). The trial court should consider such motion "in light of all the circumstances and...
  • Staley v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Utah
    • April 5, 2022
    ...knowledge and experience of the layman.'” Jensen, 82 P.3d at 1096 (quoting Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah 1982)); Chadwick, 763 P.2d at 821. Staley is not a medical doctor or mental health professional. The court has already determined that his dental expertise does not qualify......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT