Chadwick v. United States, 1,446.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
Citation141 F. 225
Docket Number1,446.
Decision Date17 November 1905
PartiesCHADWICK v. UNITED STATES.

141 F. 225

CHADWICK
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 1,446.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

November 17, 1905


Francis J. Wing, S. Q. Kerruish, and Jay P. Dawley, for plaintiff in error.

John J. Sullivan, U.S. Atty., and Thos. H. Garry, Asst. U.S. Atty. [141 F. 226]

The following is the full charge given by Taylor, District Judge, to the jury:

The testimony in this case having been completed, it now becomes my duty to define the law applicable to the facts given in evidence, and to instruct you as to the rules of law which you are to consider, and by which you are to be controlled, in weighing and construing the testimony. If is for you, and for you alone, to determine what the facts are. It is for the court, and the court alone, to define the law by which these facts are to be applied to the indictment in this case. If it should seem to you, at any time during this charge, that the court has an opinion respecting what may or may not be a fact in this case, you will still remember that the court's conclusion is in no sense to weigh with you, or control you, in your finding and determination of what the facts are. The Congress of the United States, from time to time has seen fit to enact certain laws intended to aid in the honest and efficient administration of national banks. While it is not necessary that I should say anything to you respecting the need or the merit of any particular law passed for that purpose, yet I ought to say to you, and do say, that legislation of that general character is highly meritorious, and manifestly needful. We are so accustomed to repose confidence in banks, especially in those banks organized under federal laws, and, to a certain extent, supervised by federal officials, that, if stringent legislation looking to the protection of stockholders and depositors was not enacted and enforced, the property of innocent persons would be put in great jeopardy, and the confidence of the public in such institutions would be greatly impaired. No less important than this is the regard which the law has for the safety and liberty of individuals; and this is manifest when we consider the safeguards which it throws around those who are charged with crime. It is your duty to consider at once the necessity of enforcing the laws of the country and of giving full protection to persons charged with offenses against those laws. These considerations should cause [141 F. 227] you to give most careful attention to your duties in this case, to the end that, on the one hand, if the defendant be guilty as charged, these salutary laws may be enforced; and, on the other hand, that she be not found guilty unless, by proof satisfactory to the law, you shall so find her.

The defendant in this case is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved; and this presumption, you will bear in mind, remains with the defendant as her right, until, upon all the testimony which satisfies you, beyond a reasonable doubt that she is so guilty. I will define further on in my charge what is meant by reasonable doubt. In the effort by Congress to bring about an honest administration of the laws regulating national banks, two acts, which now concern us, have been passed; and upon them, and what is known as the 'conspiracy statute,' this indictment has been based. These acts are section 5208, the act of July 12, 1882, and section 5440.

Section 5208 is as follows: 'It shall be unlawful for any officer, clerk or agent of any national banking association to certify any check drawn upon the association unless the person or company drawing the check has on deposit with the association, at the time such check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount specified in such check,' etc. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3497.)

Act July 12, 1882, c. 290, Sec. 13, 22 Stat. 166 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3497), is as follows: 'That any officer, clerk or agent of any national-banking association who shall willfully violate the provisions of an act entitled 'An act in reference to certifying checks by national banks,' approved March third, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine, being section fifty-two hundred and eight of the Revised Statutes of the United States, or who shall resort to any device, or receive any fictitious obligation, direct or collateral, in order to evade the provisions thereof, or who shall certify checks before the amount thereof shall have been regularly entered to the credit of the dealer upon the books of the banking association, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction thereof,' etc.

Section 5440 is as follows: 'If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a penalty,' etc. (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676.)

The indictment in this case charges the defendant, in 16 counts, with violating section 5440, which I call the 'conspiracy statute,' and charges this violation in two different forms-- that is to say, 8 different checks are the subjects of this indictment, and as to each check conspiracy is charged against the defendant, first, in unlawfully conspiring with another to certify a check, by an officer of the bank, when an amount of money equal to the amount specified in the check was not on deposit to the credit of the person drawing the check; and, second, in unlawfully conspiring with another to certify a check, by an officer of the bank, before the amount of the check had been regularly entered upon the books of the bank to the credit of the drawer of the check. Counts numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, and 15 make this charge respecting eight different checks that they were certified when funds were not on deposit; and the remaining counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, and 16 based upon the charge that the amount of the check had not been regularly entered upon the books of the bank to the credit of the maker. We thus see that the odd-numbered counts relate to the deposit of funds to the credit of the drawer, and the even-numbered counts relate to the regular entry, on the books of the bank, of the amounts of such deposits, to the credit of the drawer. To put it otherwise, the odd-numbered counts charge a conspiracy to commit the crime defined by the law which forbids the certification of a check unless the person drawing the check has on deposit with the bank, at the time the check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount of the check; and the even-numbered counts charge a conspiracy to commit the crime defined in the act of July 12, 1882, which forbids the certification of a check unless the person drawing the check has on deposit with the bank, at the time the check is certified, an amount of money equal to the amount of the check; and the even-numbered counts charge a conspiracy to commit the crime defined in the act of July 12, 1882, which forbids the certification of a check before the amount thereof shall have been regularly entered to the credit of the drawer of the check.

I trust, gentlemen of the jury, that you will not handicap your free consideration [141 F. 228] of this case by any apprehension that it will be difficult for you to understand it, or to apply the facts as you find them to the law as I shall give it to you. I think that you understand the case, and, if you do not, I am sure that it will be clear to you when such additional light as is needed is given to you by this charge. You must remember that you are to look at the facts, and apply the law to them as given you by the court, exactly as you would look at other important concerns affecting yourselves. You should approach the consideration of the whole case with a confidence that you will arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to your judgment and your conscience, precisely as you are satisfied that you will arrive at a like conclusion in any important matter of your own, after you have given to it full and careful consideration.

There are no distinctions to be drawn in this case so fine that the ordinary mind cannot apprehend them, nor are there any mysterious processes, either of reasoning or of legal procedure, which you need fear will cloud your inquiry, or interfere with your arriving at a perfectly intelligent conclusion. The questions here are practical questions for you to decide, and all that is needed is that you give your very best attention to their consideration. Let me impress upon you, at the outset, that the defendant in this case is presumed to be innocent until her guilt is established by proof which satisfies you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she is guilty. This presumption abides with her all through the case, until it is, as I have said, removed by the proof; and every material element necessary to make up the crime of conspiracy in this case must be established by like proof, satisfying you, beyond a reasonable doubt, of its existence.

A reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs, and depending upon moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after full consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in such a condition that they cannot say that they fell an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. Every person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If, upon such proof, there is reasonable doubt remaining, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of it by acquittal. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than otherwise, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty-- a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding,...

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97 practice notes
  • United States v. Bobo, No. 71-2077
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • April 23, 1973
    ...Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. New York Central & R. R. Co., 146 F. 298 (Cir.Ct.S.D.N.Y 1906); United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 659 (Cir.Ct.D......
  • United States v. Tager, No. 78-20052-01
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • June 22, 1979
    ...1926); Grace v. United States, 4 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1925); Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. American Medical Ass'n., 26 F.Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939). These cases provide insight only into the scope of th......
  • Stassi v. United States, No. 9086.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 8, 1931
    ...be a reasonable latitude for the arguments of an advocate. Green v. United States, 266 F. 779, 784 (8 C. C. A.); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 245 (6 C. C. A.); Diggs v. United States, 220 F. 545, 555, 556 (9 C. C. A.); Remus v. United States, 291 F. 501, 511 (6 C. C. A.); Di Carlo......
  • Diggs v. United States, 2404
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 18, 1915
    ...the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.' In Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 245, 72 C.C.A. 343, 363, language was employed by the district attorney more inflammatory and more subject to objection, we think, than the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
97 cases
  • United States v. Bobo, No. 71-2077
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • April 23, 1973
    ...Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945); Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. New York Central & R. R. Co., 146 F. 298 (Cir.Ct.S.D.N.Y 1906); United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 659 (Cir.Ct.D......
  • United States v. Tager, No. 78-20052-01
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • June 22, 1979
    ...1926); Grace v. United States, 4 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1925); Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97 (4th Cir. 1908); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225 (6th Cir. 1905); United States v. American Medical Ass'n., 26 F.Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939). These cases provide insight only into the scope of th......
  • Stassi v. United States, No. 9086.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • June 8, 1931
    ...be a reasonable latitude for the arguments of an advocate. Green v. United States, 266 F. 779, 784 (8 C. C. A.); Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 245 (6 C. C. A.); Diggs v. United States, 220 F. 545, 555, 556 (9 C. C. A.); Remus v. United States, 291 F. 501, 511 (6 C. C. A.); Di Carlo......
  • Diggs v. United States, 2404
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • March 18, 1915
    ...the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally carried away by this temptation.' In Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 245, 72 C.C.A. 343, 363, language was employed by the district attorney more inflammatory and more subject to objection, we think, than the......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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