Chaffin v. Bloomin' Brands, Inc.

Decision Date06 March 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 5:21-cv-00267-TES
PartiesAMY LEIGH CHAFFIN, Plaintiff, v. BLOOMIN' BRANDS, INC.[1], and OUTBACK STEAKHOUSE OF FLORIDA, LLC, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

TILMAN E. SELF, III, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is Defendant Outback Steakhouse of Florida LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 28].

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff Amy Leigh Chaffin fell in the restroom at the Outback Steakhouse in Macon, Georgia. [Doc 28-2, ¶ 1].[2] The relevant facts precede that date though. In 1994, Plaintiff experienced a back injury at work which necessitated spinal surgeries, including a multi-level fusion. [Id. at ¶ 3]. Then in 2008, Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident, after which she underwent several spinal fusions, was paralyzed, and confined to a wheelchair. [Id. at ¶ 4]. Again, in 2011, Plaintiff tripped and fell at work, which led to a commercial shelving unit falling on her. [Id. at ¶ 5]. Those injuries caused ruptures in three discs in her neck. [Id.]. After those injuries, Plaintiff underwent several surgeries on her right arm and shoulder. [Id.]. Because Plaintiff is paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, she has two options when transferring to a toilet. First, Plaintiff's preferred method is to maneuver to the side of the toilet and slide over onto the toilet seat. [Doc. 28-6, A. Chaffin Depo., p. 70:15-21]. If her preferred method isn't possible, Plaintiff parks her wheelchair in front of the toilet and uses pull bars to stand up, rotate her body, and sit down on the toilet. [Id. at p. 70:6-14].

On the day of the incident underlying this action, Plaintiff and her wife, Candi Chaffin, entered the Outback Steakhouse and were led to a table. [Doc. 28-2, at ¶ 13]. Plaintiff immediately went to the restroom to “freshen up.” [Id. at ¶ 14]. Plaintiff's wife did not accompany her to the restroom. [Id.]. Upon entering the handicap stall in the restroom, Plaintiff discovered a large trash can blocking the path to the toilet. [Id. at ¶ 15]. Plaintiff drug the trash can out of the stall so she could properly maneuver her wheelchair near the toilet. [Id. at ¶ 16]. Plaintiff parked her wheelchair directly in front of the toilet and needed to turn 180 degrees to be able to sit on the toilet. [Id. at ¶ 18]. While maneuvering between her wheelchair and the toilet, Plaintiff's feet “shot out” from beneath her and she fell to the ground. [Id. at ¶ 21]. Once on the floor, Plaintiff noticed her clothes were wet. [Id. at ¶ 33]. Plaintiff looked around her and discovered a “large amount of water on the floor.” [Doc. 28-6, A. Chaffin Depo., p. 79:10-20].

Plaintiff then texted her wife to come help her. [Doc. 28-2, ¶ 31]. Candi then entered the restroom to assist Plaintiff back into her wheelchair. [Id. at ¶ 32]. One of the managers also came into the restroom to check on Plaintiff. [Doc. 28-6, A. Chaffin Depo., p. 62:17-23]. While talking with Plaintiff and her wife, the manager said “I've been trying to get them to fix this floor for months. And they wouldn't . . . they've not fixed it.” [Id. at pp. 62:24-63:3]. The manager told Plaintiff and her wife that the “sink has been leaking across the floor for months.” [Id. at p. 66:1-5]. The manager then set up-at Plaintiff's feet-a “wet floor” sign that was stored under the sink. [Id. at p. 63:410].

Plaintiff then left the restaurant in an ambulance. [Id. at p. 63:5-7]. Once at the hospital, medical staff ordered an MRI with contrast and other tests on Plaintiff's back and head. [Id. at p. 40:8-11]. Plaintiff's sole injury from this incident is to her T11-T12 level in her spine, which caused radiating pain into her hips. [Doc. 28-2, ¶ 34]. As a result of that injury, Plaintiff's doctor-Dr. Osborn-performed a laminectomy infusion surgery. [Doc. 28-6, A. Chaffin Depo., p. 48:1-13]. Even after the surgery, though, Plaintiff still experiences pain and tingling in her groin and hip areas. [Id. at pp. 51:17- 52:22].

On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action in Bibb County Superior Court. [Doc. 5-2, p. 3]. On July 30, 2021, Outback removed the action to this Court. [Doc. 5]. Outback filed its summary-judgment motion on January 6, 2023. [Doc. 28].

LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.' Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion.” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437. The movant may cite to particular parts of materials in the record, including, ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A).[3] “When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim[]' in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.' Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). Rather, “the moving party simply may show-that is, point out to the district court- that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324) (cleaned up). Alternatively, the movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id.

If this initial burden is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must rebut the movant's showing “by producing . . . relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The nonmoving party does not satisfy its burden “if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable or[] is not significantly probative' of a disputed fact.” Josendis, 662 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). “A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the [nonmoving] party's position will not suffice.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court may consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

Succinctly put,

[s]ummary judgment is not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved for trial. Rather, on summary judgment, the district court must accept as fact all allegations the [nonmoving] party makes, provided they are sufficiently supported by evidence of record. So[,] when competing narratives emerge on key events, courts are not at liberty to pick which side they think is more credible. Indeed, if “the only issue is one of credibility,” the issue is factual, and a court cannot grant summary judgment.

Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). Stated differently, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “The evidence of the [nonmovant] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. And “if a reasonable jury could make more than one inference from the facts, and one of those permissible inferences creates a genuine issue of material fact, a court cannot grant summary judgment”; it “must hold a trial to get to the bottom of the matter.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263.

DISCUSSION

In its summary-judgment motion, Outback asserts four arguments: (1) Plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety; (2) Plaintiff assumed the risk by maneuvering to the toilet in the manner she chose; (3) Plaintiff had superior knowledge of the water on the floor; and (4) Plaintiff cannot prove causation based on her preexisting conditions. See generally [Doc. 28-1]. The Court addresses each in turn.

I. Ordinary Care

First, Outback asserts that [a]s an individual who cannot use her legs, Plaintiff needs to take certain safety precautions each and every time she gets into or out of her wheelchair[.] [Doc. 28-1, p. 8]. Because of that, Outback argues that Plaintiff fell because she did not take the necessary actions to protect herself, rather than due to any alleged negligence of [Outback].” [Id.]. The underlying premise of this argument is that Plaintiff (1) went to the restroom alone,[4] and (2) parked her wheelchair in a different spot than usual, which required her to do a full 180-degree rotation to get onto the toilet. [Id.].

Georgia law requires an invitee to [exercise] ordinary care for personal safety and [use] ordinary care to avoid the effect of the owner/occupier's negligence after that negligence becomes apparent to the invitee or in the...

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