Chaffin v. Hull

• Decision Date: 05 March 1892
• Parties: CHAFFIN et al. v. HULL et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

49 F. 524

CHAFFIN et al. v. HULL et al.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

March 5, 1892

In the opinion by BREWER, J., on demurrer to the bill, (39 F. 887,) the facts were stated as follows:

'In 1840, one William Myers was the owner of the property in question. For a consideration of $4,000 paid by Elijah Curtis, a deed was executed by Myers and wife to one Samuel Russell in trust for Mrs. Curtis. The deed, as drawn and executed, vested a life-estate in Mrs. Curtis, and the remainder in her right heirs. It was so drawn and executed through a mistake of the draughtsman; the intent of all the parties being that the fee should be vested, and not a life-estate, and that Russell, who so held the title as trustee for Mrs. Curtis, could, with his cestui que trust convey the fee. After the deed had been so executed and recorded, in 1843, the mistake having been discovered proceedings were had in the circuit court of St. Louis county to correct that deed. A decree was entered that it be reformed so as to express the intent of the parties, and vest a fee instead of a life-estate. To that proceeding Mr and Mrs. Curtis, Mr. Russell, the trustee, and Mr. and Mrs. Myers, the grantors, were parties. The heirs of Mrs. Curtis were not made parties. By subsequent conveyances, the title vested in Mrs. Curtis and Mr. Russell, her trustee, passed to one Edward Chaffin, in 1850. He entered, took possession, and remained in possession until his death, in 1883. Thereafter the present complainants, holding under his will, took possession, and retained it until 1886. Mr. Curtis, the husband of Mrs. Curtis, the party who paid the money, died in 1843; but Mrs. Curtis lived until 1884, when she died, leaving no children. Mr. Chaffin during his possession became aware of the fact that, inasmuch as the heirs of Mrs. Curtis were not made parties to that decree of reformation, they had, at least, an apparent title to the remainder.

During the years of his possession, at least during the last few years of his possession, he himself having removed to Massachusetts, he employed Leon L. Hull, one of the defendants, as his agent to look after the property, to pay taxes and insurance, to rent the property, and have general charge thereof as his agent. During the years of that relationship he communicated to Mr. Hull his doubts as to the completeness of his title as disclosed by the record, and made several efforts, through him, to ascertain the residence and the names of the right heirs of Mrs. Curtis, with a view of obtaining from them releases of their apparent title to the remainder. Mr. Hull was fully possessed of information in this respect from Mr. Chaffin, his principal. On the death of Mr. Chaffin these complainants, finding Mr. Hull in possession as agent, continued him in that position, and he assumed the same confidential relations to them that he had had to Mr. Chaffin. After the death of Mrs. Curtis, in 1884, Mr. Hull, the agent, conspiring with one William Clark and one Samuel Herman, proceeded to hunt up the right heirs of Mrs. Curtis, and obtained deeds from them, the deeds being made to William Clark, one of the conspirators, of their respective interests in the remainder. While apparently continuing as the agent, and representative of these complainants, in pursuance of this conspiracy he caused legal proceedings to be instituted, which, being carried on collusively, terminated in the dispossession by the defendants of these complainants, and the transfer of possession to Clark, one of the conspirators. This was accomplished in 1886. The charge is that these arrangements and transactions between Clark, Hull, and Herman were a part of a conspiracy, and were a breach of the trust relations existing between the complainants and Hull. All these facts being stated in the bill, the prayer is that this court shall decree that the decree of the St. Louis circuit court, reforming that deed, concludes the right heirs of Mrs. Curtis, and operated to vest the full legal title in Mrs. Curtis and her trustee, and these complainants claiming under her; or, if the court cannot so decree, that it now decree a reformation of that deed, correcting the mistake, and making the deed to-day operative as a transfer of the fee, and therefore cutting off all interests in the remainder in the heirs of Mrs. Curtis or their grantees, or, failing that, that the court decree that the transactions by which Leon L. Hull, with his co-conspirators, obtained the legal title to the remainder were in breach of the fiduciary relations existing between Hull and complainants, and therefore that the title which they acquired was acquired in trust for the complainants.'

Cunningham & Eliot, for complainants.

S. N. Taylor and Joseph S. Laurie, for defendants.

THAYER District Judge.

1. The court adheres to the views expressed in its decision overruling the demurrer to the bill, (39 F. 887, 890,) that the contingent remainder-men are not bound by the decree entered in the St. Louis circuit court on September 16, 1843, in the case of Elijah Curtis and Wife v. Wm. Myers et als. That suit was instituted for the express purpose of reforming the deed of Myers and wife, and thereby destroying the estate or expectancy of the contingent remainder-men. The latter persons were entitled to be heard in defense of their rights, but, in point of fact, their interest was not represented. Before the final decree was passed, the trust originally created by the deed of William Meyers and wife to Samuel Russell, trustee, had been executed by the statute of uses. The trust ended when Mrs. Curtis became discovert. Thenceforward she had a legal estate for life. The trustee had no further duties to perform, either as respects the life-tenant or the remainder-men, It was not even necessary for him to execute a conveyance to the remainder-men on the death of Mrs. Curtis, as the statute of uses had already divested him of the legal title. No such conveyance has in fact been made by the trustee since the termination of Mrs. Curtis' life-estate, nor is it pretended that such a conveyance is or was necessary to perfect the title of the remainder-men. Roberts v. Moseley, 51 Mo. 282; Ware v. Richardson, 3 Md. 505; Handy v. McKim, 64 Md. 561, 4 Atl.Rep. 125; Bacon's Appeal, 57 Pa.St. 504, 512; Watkins v. Reynolds, 123 N.Y. 211, 25 N.E. 322; Richardson v. Stodder, 100 Mass. 530; 2 Washb.Real Prop. 499, 500; Perry, Trusts, Sec. 310a, and citations; and see, also, Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458, 471, and Young v. Bradley, 101 U.S. 782.

As there was no person but Mrs. Curtis before the court, at the time the final decree was entered, who had either a legal or equitable estate in the premises to be affected by the decree, and as the issue to be tried was one in which the interest of Mrs. Curtis, the life-tenant, stood opposed to that of the remainder-men, it is evident that the remainder-men were not represented in the suit to extinguish their expectancy. It is also manifest that there was no real controversy in that suit, for the reason, no doubt, that there was no person before the court having an interest in the property identical with that of the remainder-men, (or having any estate, legal or equitable,) who was interested in making a defense in their behalf. A number of cases have been cited by complainants' counsel in support of the proposition that the final decree of September 16, 1843, was binding on the remainder-men, but the court is of the opinion that they do not sustain the contention. In the case of Miller v. Railway Co., 132 U.S. 662, 10 S.Ct. 206, a decree annulling a will was adjudged to be conclusive as against certain persons in whose favor the will created an executory devise, for the reason that the executor of the will, and an infant son of the testator, who was a devisee in fee of the whole estate, had been made parties to the suit. The interests of the executory devisees and the devisee in fee were clearly identical. The former were accordingly well represented by the devisee in fee and the executor. It may also be admitted that a tenant in tail may well represent succeeding tenants in tail or contingent remainder-men in all litigation affecting the estate where the interest of the tenant who is made a party is identical with that of the persons who are to be bound by representation. It may be conceded that an active trustee can represent beneficiaries of the trust, especially if they are very numerous; and it may also be concealed that, in suits to change investments and in suits...