Chaffin v. Lynch

• Decision Date: 10 May 1888
• Citation: 6 S.E. 474,84 Va. 884
• Parties: Chaffin v. Lynch.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

6 S.E. 474

(84 Va. 884)

Chaffin

v.Lynch.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

May 10, 1888.

1. Libel and Slander—Libel—Privilege.

Code Va. c. 172, § 50, permitting the defendant in any action for defamation to justify by proving the truth of the words complained of, applies as well to actions brought under Code Va. c. 145, § 2, which provides that all insulting words shall be actionable, as to common-law actions of slander and libel, and the same rule as tl privileged communications applies to one case as to the other.

2. Same—Privilege—Province op Jury.

Where, in an action for defamation, the defense is that of privileged communication, the question for the jury is not whether the language used was true, nor whether the defendant had reasonable ground to believe it to be true, but whether he honestly believed it to be true, and used it without malice, in the reasonable protection of his own interests, or in the proper defense of an attack upon his character. Provided the language used is a necessary part of his defense, and fairly arises from the charges made against him, and is not unnecessarily defamatory, nor more extensively circulated than the circumstances of the case require, and plaintiff fails to show that defendant did not so believe and properly use the statements complained of, —that is, fails to show actual malice in the defendant, —the verdict should be for defendant, whether the charge be true or false.

8. Trial—After Appeal from Former Judgment—Duty of Trial Court.

A case having been before the supreme court of appeals, which for certain errors reversed the same, and granted a new trial, for reasons stated in the opinion of the court, and therein laid down certain principles of law applicable to and governing the case, it was the duty of the circuit court on the second trial to have followed and adopted the views expressed in said opinion, and to instruct the jury in accordance therewith; the defendant requesting such instructions, and the facts proved being substantially the same as on the former trial.

Error to circuit court of city of Richmond; B. R. Wellford, Jr., Judge.

Action on the case for insulting words, by D. H. Lynch against R. B. Chaffin. Judgment for plaintiff, which was reversed in this court, and case remanded for new trial. Trial by jury. Verdict for plaintiff for $1,200, and judgment thereon. Defendant obtained this writ of error. For opinion on former writ of error, see 1 S. E. Rep. 803.

Guy & Gilliam and Kean & Guy, for plaintiff in error.

Thos. G. Jackson, J. Samuel Parrish, and Edgar Allen, for defendant in error.

Lewis, F. When this case was before this court at its March term, 1887, (1 S. E. Rep. 803,) the judgment was reversed, and the case remanded to the circuit court for a new trial to be had in conformity with the views of this court expressed in a written opinion filed with the record. The case is again before us on a writ of error to a judgment of the circuit court rendered on the 13th day of June, 1887, and the record discloses the fact that the new trial ordered by this court was not had in conformity with the views contained in the opinion filed as aforesaid. Indeed, instructions framed in the very language of that opinion in laying down certain general principles applicable to the case, and which the defendant moved the court to give to the jury, were refused, and we are unable to discover in the record any ground for such refusal. The case was carefully considered by the court when formerly here, and the opinion delivered on that occasion embodied the deliberate sentiments of the court upon every point arising in the case; and it was supposed that they were expressed with sufficient clearness to prevent any doubt misapprehension respecting them. Effect, however, has not been given to them, and the case is here a second time.

Among other things, the court in its opinion declared (what, indeed, is an elementary principle, fully supported by the cases cited) that, to establish a privileged communication, it must appear—First, that the occasion was privileged; and, secondly, that the occasion was used in a privileged way; that is to say, that it was used bona fide, and without malice. It was also said that the first of these questions was for the court, and the second for the jury; and, upon the undisputed facts as they appeared in the record, the court had no hesitation in declaring that the occasion of the publication declared on was privileged. Yet, notwithstanding the facts on the second trial, as the record shows, were substantially the same as on the first, —certainly they are not less favorable for the defendant, —the circuit court refused to instruct the jury that the occasion was privileged; and, moreover, of its own motion instructed them, in substance, that if they believed the language of the publication was not true, and that the defendant did not have reasonable ground for believing it to be true, and published the cause from a motive of ill will, etc., theyshould find for the plaintiff. This was erroneous. The question for the jury was not whether the language used was true, or whether the defendant had reasonable ground to believe it to be true, but whether, in point of fact, he honestly believed it to be true, and published it without malice, in fair self-defense, or in the reasonable protection of his own interests; and if the jury believed, from the evidence, that such was the fact, or, rather, if the plaintiff failed to show that such was not the fact, (i. e., if he failed to show malice in fact, or actual malice,) then the communication was protected, and the defendant was entitled to a verdict no matter whether the imputations contained in the publication were true or false.

In Todd v. Hawkins, 8 Car. & P. 88, 34 E. C L. 624, a case often referred to, Baron Aldebson, in summing up to the jury, said: "The question you have to try is not whether the plaintiff was guilty of the charges laid against him, but whether, although the defendant may have...