Chaffin v. Nicosia

• Decision Date: 14 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 574S95,574S95
• Citation: 310 N.E.2d 867,261 Ind. 698
• Parties: Ronald E. CHAFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John B. NICOSIA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 867

310 N.E.2d 867

261 Ind. 698

Ronald E. CHAFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John B. NICOSIA, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 574S95.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 14, 1974.

Martin H. Kinney, Nick Katich, Addison, Stiles, Greenwald & Kinney, Gary, David F. McNamar, Steers, Klee, Sullivan & Lemay, Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellant.

Richard J. Lesniak, Given, Dawson & Cappas, East Chicago, Richard L. Fairchild, Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, Indianapolis, for defendant-appellee.

OPINION ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

HUNTER, Justice.

This cause arises upon petition to transfer and presents two issues for our determination:

(1) Whether a statute allowing medical practitioners the special privilege of a two-year time period within which they may be sued is violative of Article 1, § 23 of the Constitution of Indiana;

(2) Whether the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice is an exception to, or in irreconcilable conflict with, a statute allowing minors to sue within two years after reaching majority.

Appellant's complaint alleged medical malpractice on the part of appellee arising from appellee's treatment of appellant's mother during her pregnancy and during appellant's birth. More specifically, the complaint alleged the following:

'During 1941, Marjory Chaffin became pregnant and employed Nicosia to care for her through the pregnancy and the birth of her child. She had suffered a prior miscarriage of which Nicosia was aware. He advised her that she would also have trouble carrying this child.

'Approximately four days prior to August 28, 1942, Marjory Chaffin began to have labor pains. Nicosia advised her that he would not do anything until he took x-rays to determine Ronald's position in the womb. Nicosia, however, failed to take the x-rays, failed to prescribe medication, and failed to take any other positive action.

'Marjory Chaffin remained in labor for approximately seventy-two hours, and Ronald was finally born on August 28, 1942. During the delivery process, Nicosia used forceps on both sides of Ronald's head, near his eyes. There were large areas of discoloration on both sides of Ronald's head for several days after birth. For more than one year, he also had dents on both sides of the head. As a result of the way Nicosia used the forceps, Ronald's optic nerve controlling his right eye was severely damages, resulting in an almost complete loss of eyesight in his right eye. This loss of eyesight continues to the present.'

The instant action was filed on August 27, 1965, within two years of appellant's reaching majority, in reliance upon IC 1971, 34--1--2--5:

'Any person being under legal disabilities when the cause of action accrues may bring his action within two years after the disability is removed.'

In response, appellee moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that appellant's action was barred by IC 1971, 34--4--19--1:

'No action of any kind for damages, whether brought in contract or tort, based upon professional services rendered or which should have been rendered, shall be brought, commenced or maintained, in any of the courts of this state against physicians, dentists, surgeons, hospital, sanitariums, or others, unless said action is filed within two years from the date of the act, omission or neglect complained of.'

The trial court sustained appellee's motion since the transaction at issue had occurred twenty-two years prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court of Appeals, Third District, affirmed. Ind.App., 297 N.E.2d 904.

Appellant urges here that the medical malpractice statute is unconstitutional on its face in that it grants special privileges and immunities to medical professionals which do not equally belong to all citizens. Article 1, § 23 of our Constitution reads as follows:

' § 23. Privileges equal.--The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.'

The question of classification under the above section is primarily a question for the legislature. Legislative classification becomes a judicial question only where the lines drawn appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. So long as the classification is based upon substantial distinctions with reference to the subject matter, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislature; nor will we inquire into the legislative motives prompting such classification:

'Laws which impose burdens and liabilities, or which grant privileges and immunities must be general in their nature, and not special; but a law is not necessarily special because it applies only to one class of persons to the exclusion of others. If the situation, conditions, and circumstances of the persons included within the class to which the law is made to apply so differ from those of others not so included as to indicate the necessity or propriety of making the law applicable only to those included within its terms, and if the law is so framed as to apply to all to whom the reason applies and to exclude all whom the reason excludes, it will be deemed a general law. Such an act does not conflict with either * * * (the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution or Art. 1, § 23 of the Constitution of Indiana). Natural and reasonable classification is permitted; arbitrary selection is forbidden.

'The power of the Legislature is not without limitations but, necessarily, this power must have a wide range of discretion. There is no precise rule of reasonableness of classification, and the rule of equality permits many practical inequalities. A classification having some reasonable basis is not to be condemned merely because it is not framed with such mathematical nicety as to include all within the reason of the classification and to exclude all others. Exact exclusion and inclusion is impractical in legislation. It is almost impossible to provide for every exceptional and imaginary case, and a Legislature ought not to be required to do so at the risk of having its legislation declared void, even though appropriate and proper as applied to the general subject upon which the law is intended to operate.'

Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McCullom (1915), 183 Ind. 556, 561, 109 N.E. 206, 208 (citations omitted).

The classification at issue does not appear unconstitutional per se. There exists a reasonable basis for distinguishing between those rendering medical services and those who do not. Appellant has failed in his burden of showing in what way the two-year limitation period unduly discriminates in favor of medical practitioners. The presumption is in favor of a statute's validity until rebutted by proof of its irrationality.

However, the determination that a statute is constitutionally valid on its face does not end judicial inquiry into its application to particular facts. The limitation statute before us admits of no exceptions: An action is barred unless brought within two years of the act complained of. This statute's application to a given case must not be allowed to produce an absurd result, which the legislature, as a reasonably minded body, could not have possibly intended:

'With so wholesomely logical and...