Chafin v. Chafin

Decision Date02 July 1998
Docket Number No. 24502., No. 24501
Citation505 S.E.2d 679,202 W.Va. 616
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
PartiesGretchen Lewis CHAFIN, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. H. Truman CHAFIN, Defendant Below, Appellant. Gretchen Lewis CHAFIN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. H. Truman CHAFIN, Defendant Below, Appellee.

Scott S. Segal, John F. Dascoli, The Segal Law Firm, Charleston, for Gretchen Lewis Chafin.

Carrie Coombs, Morgantown, Jeaneen Legato Whitley, Welch, Thomas W. Smith, Charleston, for H. Truman Chafin.

PER CURIAM:1

This action is before this Court upon the appeal of H. Truman Chafin and the appeal of Gretchen Lewis Chafin from the final order of the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, West Virginia, entered on December 5, 1996.2 The two appeals have been consolidated for purposes of this opinion. At issue before this Court is the distribution of the parties' property following their divorce upon the ground of living separate and apart for one year. W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) [1981].

This Court has before it the petitions for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel. As reflected in the August 9, 1996, recommended order of the family law master, adopted by the circuit court, Mr. Chafin was directed to: (1) pay Ms. Lewis the sum of $232,233 in equitable distribution of the parties' property, with prejudgment interest thereon at the rate of 10% accruing from the date the divorce action was filed, (2) pay Lewis the sum of $54,000 as reimbursement for her contribution of separate funds to the parties' Williamson, West Virginia, house, which house was awarded to Chafin, (3) deliver to Lewis title to the parties' Charleston, West Virginia, house and (4) pay Lewis the sum of $127,413 for attorney fees and litigation expenses.

Upon a careful review of the record, and for the reasons stated below, this Court concludes that the adoption by the circuit court of the above recommended order was "protected by the parameters of sound discretion" Parker v. Knowlton Construction Company, 158 W.Va. 314, 329, 210 S.E.2d 918, 927 (1975), and should be affirmed with the exception of two matters. First, this Court is of the opinion that the circuit court committed error in awarding Ms. Lewis the house in Charleston. Second, this Court is of the opinion that the circuit court committed error in failing to afford Lewis an opportunity to present evidence concerning the date of the parties' separation. In the latter regard, the parties are both attorneys, and the separation date is important to a determination of marital property subject to equitable distribution concerning the parties' practice of law.

Accordingly, the final order is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this action is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

To say the least, this action has a long and convoluted history. The parties have been in court substantially longer than they cohabited as husband and wife. The record consists of hundreds of pages of orders, pleadings, transcripts and exhibits, and the memoranda of law before this Court are lengthy.3 For purposes of this opinion, a brief chronology of events is set forth below. Prior to their marriage in 1990, the parties lived in Williamson, in Mingo County, and practiced law there in an office previously established by Mr. Chafin. Moreover, Chafin was a Senator in the West Virginia Legislature and was, thus, required to spend substantial amounts of time in Charleston attending legislative sessions.

On April 29, 1989, Chafin purchased a house in Charleston and made a down payment thereon in the amount of $32,000. Chafin, however, was not listed as the grantee upon the deed. Rather, Ms. Lewis was named as the purchaser "as trustee" for Chafin. Nevertheless, Chafin was solely obligated upon the note and trust deed concerning the property. As discussed below, Lewis contends that the Charleston property was purchased in contemplation of marriage and that she contributed $10,000 of her own money to remodel the house. According to Ms. Lewis, therefore, the Charleston house constituted marital property. Chafin, however, asserts that the house was purchased merely to accommodate his duties in Charleston as a member of the Legislature. Specifically, Chafin asserts that he purchased the property through Lewis, as trustee, for political reasons, i.e., so that his residency in Mingo County as a member of the Legislature would not be questioned. In fact, for reasons unexplained in the record, Lewis later, but prior to the parties' divorce, deeded her interest as trustee in the Charleston property to Chafin.

Subsequently, on October 11, 1990, the parties were married. They continued to practice law and began the construction of a house in Williamson upon a parcel of land purchased by Chafin prior to the marriage. Although the record indicates that Chafin was primarily responsible for the cost of construction, Lewis contributed $54,000 of her separate funds to complete the project. The parties cohabited in the Williamson house until their separation in 1993. The sole child of the marriage, a daughter, was born in 1992. Custody of the child was awarded to Ms. Lewis and is not an issue before this Court.

In late March 1993, Mr. Chafin was allegedly discovered by Ms. Lewis in an adulterous relationship. According to Chafin, the parties permanently separated at that time. However, on August 29, 1993, Chafin was allegedly again discovered by Ms. Lewis in an adulterous relationship. According to Lewis, August 29, 1993, was the true separation date of the parties.4 In any event, after August 29, 1993, Lewis had moved to the Charleston house with her daughter. Chafin was in Williamson, and the parties never again cohabited or practiced law together.5 In October 1993, Lewis filed an action for divorce in the Circuit Court of Mingo County. Following the recusals of both the circuit court judge and the family law master in that county, however, the action was transferred to Putnam County.6 While in Putnam County, proceedings were conducted by family law master Diana L. Johnson. Upon the resignation of Ms. Johnson as family law master, the action was transferred to Monongalia County. Following the subsequent, final evidentiary hearings in the action, family law master Robert F. Gallagher, on August 9, 1996, submitted the recommended order which was adopted by the Circuit Court of Monongalia County pursuant to the final order of December 5, 1996. The Hon. Robert C. Halbritter, appointed by this Court in 1993 to preside in this action in the circuit court, has served in that capacity in all three counties.

In November 1994, while the action was pending in Putnam County, Chafin filed a motion to bifurcate the complaint seeking a divorce from the issues concerning the distribution of the parties' property. The motion included the following comment: "Although the parties disagree as to the date of separation, for purposes of this motion the date of separation will be considered as August 29, 1993, when [Lewis] abandoned the marital home in Williamson, West Virginia, and moved to Charleston." However, during the hearing upon the motion conducted by family law master Johnson, Chafin testified that the parties separated in March 1993. He was not cross-examined upon that point. Recognizing during the hearing that the date of separation was in dispute, family law master Johnson, nevertheless, concluded that bifurcation should be granted and that an order divorcing the parties should be entered.

On December 28, 1994, an order was entered in the Circuit Court of Putnam County divorcing the parties upon the ground of living separate and apart for one year. W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) [1981]. Included in the order was a statement that "[t]he parties last lived together and cohabited together as husband and wife in Mingo County, West Virginia, and were separated on or about March, 1993." The order also stated, however: (1) that "[s]ubstantial property issues have arisen between the parties with regard to equitable distribution of property," (2) that bifurcation would "not prejudice either party" and (3) that "all other unresolved issues, including but not limited to equitable distribution," were to be held in abeyance.7

After the action was transferred to Monongalia County, final evidentiary hearings were conducted by family law master Gallagher. Gallagher, however, refused to permit Lewis to present evidence that the parties had separated on August 29, 1993. Instead, family law master Gallagher relied upon the order of December 28, 1994, which indicated that March 31, 1993, was the true separation date.8 Lewis proffered the record with evidence to the effect that the parties "lived together, traveled together, vacationed together and worked together through August 1993."

Following the evidentiary hearings, family law master Gallagher, on August 9, 1996, submitted a recommended order which was adopted by the circuit court in the final order of December 5, 1996. Pursuant to the final order, Mr. Chafin was directed to: (1) pay Ms. Lewis the sum of $232,233 in equitable distribution of the parties' property, with prejudgment interest thereon at the rate of 10% accruing from the date the divorce action was filed,9 (2) pay Lewis the sum of $54,000 as reimbursement for her contribution of separate funds to the parties' Williamson house, which house was awarded to Chafin, (3) deliver to Lewis title to the parties' Charleston house and (4) pay Lewis the sum of $127,413 for attorney fees and litigation expenses.10 In addition, the final order awarded custody of the parties' daughter to Lewis, and Mr. Chafin was directed to pay rehabilitative alimony and child support.

Although Ms. Lewis was awarded the Charleston house, the record indicates that, subsequent to the entry of the final order, Lewis and her daughter moved to the ...

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    ...F.Supp., at 880 (under West Virginia law, award of compensatory damages includes award of prejudgment interest); Chafin v. Chafin, 202 W.Va. 616, 595 S.E.2d 679, 690 (1998) (losses "capable of being rendered certain by reasonable calculation" may be subject to prejudgment interest); Beard v......
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