Chafin v. Chafin, 11–1347.
| Citation | 133 S.Ct. 1017,81 USLW 4059,185 L.Ed.2d 1 |
| Decision Date | 19 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11–1347.,11–1347. |
| Parties | Jeffrey Lee CHAFIN, Petitioner v. Lynne Hales CHAFIN. |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction requires the judicial or administrative authority of a Contracting State to order a child returned to her country of habitual residence if the authority finds that the child has been wrongfully removed to or retained in the Contracting State. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) implements the Convention in the United States, granting federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over Convention actions and directing those courts to decide cases in accordance with the Convention. ICARA also requires defendants to pay various expenses incurred by plaintiffs associated with the return of children.
Petitioner Mr. Chafin, a United States citizen and member of the military, married respondent Ms. Chafin, a United Kingdom citizen, in Germany, where they later had a daughter, E.C. When Mr. Chafin was deployed to Afghanistan, Ms. Chafin took E.C. to Scotland. Mr. Chafin was later transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, and Ms. Chafin eventually traveled there with E.C. Soon after Ms. Chafin's arrival, Mr. Chafin filed for divorce and child custody in Alabama. Ms. Chafin was subsequently deported, but E.C. remained in Alabama with Mr. Chafin. Several months later, Ms. Chafin filed a petition under the Convention and ICARA, seeking E.C.'s return to Scotland. The District Court concluded that E.C.'s country of habitual residence was Scotland and granted the petition for return. Ms. Chafin immediately departed for Scotland with E.C. Ms. Chafin then initiated custody proceedings in Scotland and was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Mr. Chafin from removing E.C. from Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed the District Court's order, but the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, on the ground that once a child has been returned to a foreign country, a U.S. court becomes powerless to grant relief. On remand, the District Court ordered Mr. Chafin to reimburse Ms. Chafin for court costs, attorney's fees, and travel expenses.
Held : The return of a child to a foreign country pursuant to a Convention return order does not render an appeal of that order moot. Pp. 1023 – 1028.
(a) Article III restricts the power of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies,” and this “requirement subsists through all stages of [the] proceedings,” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400. No case or controversy exists, and a suit becomes moot, “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 721, 726, 184 L.Ed.2d 553. But a case “becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.S. ––––, ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L.Ed.2d 281. As “long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot,” ibid. P. 1023.
(b) Because the Chafins continue to vigorously contest the question of where their daughter will be raised, this dispute is very much alive. This case does not address “a hypothetical state of facts,” Lewis, supra, at 477, 110 S.Ct. 1249, and there continues to exist between the parties “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2029, 179 L.Ed.2d 1118. P. 1024.
(1) Mr. Chafin seeks typical appellate relief: reversal of the District Court determination that E.C.'s habitual residence was Scotland and, upon reversal, an order that E.C. be returned to the United States. The question is whether such relief would be effectual. In arguing that this case is moot because the District Court has no authority to issue a re-return order either under the Convention or pursuant to its inherent equitable powers, Ms. Chafin confuses mootness with the merits. See, e.g.,Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 500, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491. Mr. Chafin's claim for re-return cannot be dismissed as so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction, and his prospects of success are therefore not pertinent to the mootness inquiry. As to the effectiveness of any relief, even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return order, this case would not be moot. The U.S. courts continue to have personal jurisdiction over Ms. Chafin and may command her to take action under threat of sanctions. She could decide to comply with an order against her and return E.C. to the United States. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms. Chafin chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot. Pp. 1024 – 1026.
(2) Mr. Chafin also seeks, if he prevails, vacatur of the District Court's expense orders. That too is common relief on appeal, and the mootness inquiry comes down to its effectiveness. In contending that this case is moot due to Mr. Chafin's failure to pursue an appeal of the expense orders, which were entered as separate judgments, Ms. Chafin again confuses mootness with the merits. Because there is authority for the proposition that failure to appeal such judgments separately does not preclude relief, it is for lower courts at later stages of the litigation to decide whether Mr. Chafin is in fact entitled to the relief he seeks. That relief would not be “ ‘fully satisfactory,’ ” but “even the availability of a ‘partial remedy’ is ‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot,’ ” Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S.Ct. 2066, 135 L.Ed.2d 453. Pp. 1025 – 1026.
(c) Manipulating constitutional doctrine and holding these cases moot is not necessary to achieve the ends of the Convention and ICARA, and may undermine the treaty's goals and harm the children meant to be protected. If these cases were to become moot upon return, courts would be more likely to grant stays as a matter of course, to prevent the loss of any right to appeal. Such routine stays would conflict with the Convention's mandate of prompt return. Courts should instead apply traditional factors in considering whether to stay a return order, see, e.g.,Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550, thus ensuring that each case will receive the individualized treatment necessary for appropriate consideration of the child's best interests. Finally, at both the district and appellate court level, courts should take steps to decide these cases as expeditiously as possible. Pp. 1026 – 1028.
Vacated and remanded.
Michael E. Manely, Marietta, GA, for Petitioner.
Nicole A. Saharsky, for the United States, as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner.
Stephen J. Cullen, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Michael E. Manely, Counsel of Record, John P. Smith, The Manely Firm, P.C., Marietta, GA, Stephanos Bibas, James A. Feldman, Nancy Bregstein Gordon, Philadelphia, PA, Stephen B. Kinnaird, Lisa A. Nowlin, Sean M. Smith, Michelle E. Yetter, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, for Petitioner Jeffrey Lee Chafin.
Bruce A. Boyer, Counsel of Record, Civitas ChildLaw Center, Chicago, IL, Timothy Scott, QC, David Williams, Jacqueline Renton, Counsel for The Centre for Family Law and Practice.
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction generally requires courts in the United States to order children returned to their countries of habitual residence, if the courts find that the children have been wrongfully removed to or retained in the United States. The question is whether, after a child is returned pursuant to such an order, any appeal of the order is moot.
The Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction in 1980. T.I.A.S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11. In 1988, the United States ratified the treaty and passed implementing legislation, known as the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), 102 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq. See generally Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, –––– – ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1983, 1989–1990, 176 L.Ed.2d 78 (2010).
The Convention seeks “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” Art. 1, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99–11, at 7. Article 3 of the Convention provides that the “removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful” when “it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention” and “at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.” Ibid.
Article 12 then states:
“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.” Id., at 9.
There are several exceptions to that command. Return is not required if the parent seeking it was...
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