Chagares v. Monmouth Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 22 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-20677 (MAS) (LHG) |
| Parties | STEPHEN CHAGARES, M.D., Plaintiff, v. MONMOUTH MEDICAL CENTER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This matter comes before the Court on two motions. First is Plaintiff Dr. Stephen Chagares's (“Dr Chagares”) Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants Monmouth Medical Center (“MMC”), Monmouth Medical Center Faculty Practice Plan, Inc., Barnabas Health, RWJ Barnabas Health, Bill Arnold, Barbara Mihelic, Dr. P.H Joseph Jaeger, Dr. Thomas Heleotis, Eric Carney, and Dr Manpreet Kohli (“Dr. Kohli”, and together “MMC Defendants”) opposed Dr. Chagares's Motion (ECF No. 7), as did Defendant Dr. Negin Griffith (“Dr. Griffith” and collectively with MMC Defendants, “Defendants”) in a separate submission (ECF No. 9). Dr. Chagares replied. (ECF No. 8.) Next is Griffith's Motion to Dismiss, to which the MMC Defendants joined. (ECF Nos. 11, 13.) Dr. Chagares opposed (ECF No. 14), and Defendants replied separately (ECF Nos. 15, 16). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the matter without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons below, the Court denies Dr. Chagares's Motion to Remand and grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
In the Spring of 2018, Dr. Chagares, a general surgeon at the Breast Center of MMC, traveled to Milan, Italy to observe the work of Dr. Antonio Toesca (“Dr. Toesca”) of the European Institute of Oncology. (Notice of Removal Ex A. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 2, 16, 20, ECF No. 1-1.) There, Dr. Toesca trained Dr. Chagares in a surgical technology called Robotic Nipple Sparing Mastectomy (“RNSM”), a procedure used to perform mastectomies. (Id. ¶ 21.) Dr. Chagares's experience with Dr. Toesca and his teachings on RNSM was positive, and he reported his findings to MMC. (Id. ¶ 26.) Shortly after, Dr. Chagares received unanimous approval by the MMC Institutional Review Board to begin using RNSM technology. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 35.) Through September 2018, with MMC's approval, Dr. Chagares used the technology while operating on his patients. (Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.)
Not long after, MMC's Breast Center invited Dr. Chagares to take part in a post-operative peer review of RNSM technology. (Id. ¶ 42.) Despite initially supporting Dr. Chagares's use of RNSM technology, about a week later, MMC administrators notified Dr. Chagares that it decided that use of RNSM will be limited to non-cancer patients only, due to “safety concerns.” (Id. ¶ 43.) Following MMC's limiting of Dr. Chagares's use of RNSM, Dr. Chagares alleges that MMC falsely portrayed medical findings surrounding the safety of RNSM technology. (Id. ¶ 50.) That December, the Asbury Park Press published a statement that RNSM was unsafe. (Id. ¶ 60.) Around the same time, MMC notified Dr. Chagares that the RNSM trials were suspended because of the alleged safety concerns. (Id. ¶ 57.) In February of the following year, trials were officially terminated. (Id. ¶ 62.) Around this time, a periodical called The Cancer Letter published an article alleging that Dr. Chagares's RNSM trials (1) were opposed by MMC from the outset; (2) failed to follow proper Food and Drug Administration protocols for use of the technology; and (3) failed to receive informed consent from patients. (Id. ¶ 63.) As a result of The Cancer Letter publication, Dr. Chagares allegedly suffered disparagement of his professional career. (Id. ¶ 71.)
A few weeks later, the tide turned in Dr. Chagares's favor. The Cancer Letter published a corrected statement, this time articulating how MMC chucked Dr. Chagares “under the bus” without giving him a valid reason as to why the RNSM trials were terminated. (Id. ¶ 73.) On December 2,2019, Dr. Chagares filed an action against several MMC administrators in state court. After two years and extensive discovery, Dr. Chagares then amended his complaint in December' 2021 (also in state court). This amended pleading added a new Defendant, Dr. Griffith, a plastic surgeon who, according to Dr. Chagares, receives many referrals for breast cases from Dr. Kohli, another doctor employed by MMC at the Breast Center. Dr. Chagares alleges, among other claims, that Defendants violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, a federal claim, by wrongfully excluding Dr. Chagares from the breast surgery market and preventing competition that would accrue from the introduction of RNSM technology. (Id. ¶¶ 87-93.) With the inclusion of a federal claim, Dr. Griffith filed a Notice of Removal on December 22, 2021. (See generally Notice of Removal.) On January 3, 2022, Dr. Chagares filed a motion to remand. (ECF No. 5-1.) In May 2022, Dr. Griffith filed a motion to dismiss, to which the MMC Defendants joined. (ECF No. 11, 13.)
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a case can only be removed to a federal district court if the case could have been originally filed there.” MHA LLC v. Healthfirst, Inc., 629 Fed.Appx. 409, 411 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction ... is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, plaintiffs are the masters of their claim; “[they] may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id.
A defendant must generally file a notice of removal “within [thirty] days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). A defendant may alternatively remove a state action within thirty days of receipt or service of “a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).
Removed cases shall be remanded “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The party initially removing the action has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006,1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (citations omitted). This burden is heavy, since “the removal statutes are to be strictly construed against removal and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)[1] requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must “review[] the complaint to strike conclusory allegations.” Id. The court must accept as true all of the plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). In doing so, however, the court is free to ignore legal conclusions or factually unsupported accusations that merely state “the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, the court must determine whether “the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.'” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
An issue presented in this motion is antitrust standing. Article III standing and antitrust standing are “distinct” concepts. Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2016). “Unlike Article III standing, statutory standing is not jurisdictional.” Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 804 F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 n.4 (2014)).
Thus, dismissal for lack of statutory standing is properly addressed as a matter of sufficiency of pleading under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than under Rule 12(b)(1). See id.; NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) ().
The Court begins by addressing the Motion to Remand. Next, the Court addresses Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
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