Chagnon v. Union-Leader Corp.

• Decision Date: 24 May 1963
• Docket Number: UNION-LEADER
• Parties: Roger H. CHAGNON v.CORPORATION.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 721

190 A.2d 721

104 N.H. 472

Roger H. CHAGNON v. UNION-LEADER CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued March 5, 1963.

Decided April 30, 1963.

Rehearing Denied May 24, 1963.

Craig & Craig and McLane, Carleton Graf, Greene & Brown and G. Marshall Abbey, Manchester, for plaintiff.

Fuller & Flynn and Thomas M. Dudley, Jr., Thomas E. Flynn, Jr., Portsmouth, for defendant.

BLANDIN, Justice.

The first question before us is whether interest on the verdict shall be computed under RSA 524:1 or RSA 524:1-b (supp). The difference, which sum is being held by the Clerk of Court, amounts to $25,398.25.

RSA 524:1 reads as follows: 'Form; Interest. Judgments for debt, damages or costs shall be rendered in dollars and cents; and, in rendering judgment for the debt or damages found by verdict, report of an auditor or otherwise, interest shall be added from the time of such finding to the rendition of judgment.'

RSA 524:1-b (supp) provides: '[New] Interest from Date of Writ. In any action in which a verdict is rendered or a finding made for pecuniary damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff, or for wrongful death or for consequential damages, or for damage to property, there shall be added by the clerk of court to the amount of damages interest thereon from the date of the writ, even though such interest brings the amount of the verdict or finding beyond the maximum liability imposed by law.'

The familiar test to determine which section applies here is to inquire as to what was the legislative intent. L'Esperance v. Sherburne, 85 N.H. 103, 108, 155 A. 203. This inquiry, in turn, resolves itself into a question of fact to be determined by all the competent evidence available. Gagnon v. Pronovost, 96 N.H. 154, 158, 71 A.2d 747; see Hogan v. Lebel, 95 N.H. 95, 97, 58 A.2d 321. Such evidence here consists primarily of the language of the statute and its legislative history.

In their broadest legal sense, it is true that actions for 'personal injuries' embrace a great variety of actionable wrongs, such as breach of promise suits (Stewart v. Lee, 70 N.H. 181, 185, 46 A. 31)--a cause now repealed by RSA 508:11--suits for seduction, or libel. Gray v. Wallace, 319 S.W.2d (Mo.) 582, 584-585; 43 C.J.S. Injuries p. 1115. In a more restrictive sense, the meaning is limited to physical injuries to the person. Gray v. Wallace, supra, 319 S.W.2d 584; 43 C.J.S. supra, Injuries p. 1115. In the ordinary layman's understanding, it may be doubted whether 'personal injuries' signifies anything except physical injuries to the person, resulting from some external force, or trauma, as it is often called. A personal injury is 'A hurt or damage done to a man's person, such as a cut or bruise, a broken limb, or the like, as distinguished from an injury to his property or his reputation. The phrase is used chiefly in connection with actions of tort for negligence.' Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 'Personal Injury,' p. 925. However this may be, the question before us is in what sense did our Legislature use these words in RSA 524:1-b (supp), since their intent, rather than any arbitrary canons of statutory construction, is controlling. North Hampton &c. Ass'n v. Commission, 94 N.H. 156, 159, 48 A.2d 472.

At the outset, it should be noted that the heading of the original enactment of RSA 524:1-b (supp), being Laws 1957, c. 201, § 1, is as follows: 'An act relative to interest from date of writ in certain civil actions.' (Emphasis supplied). Obviously, the purpose was to limit its effect to a definite class of cases. There was no design, express or implied, to repeal RSA 524:1, but section 1-b, Id., was merely 'supplemental' to it, and we have so held. Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 89, 151 A.2d 230.

This failure to repeal RSA 524:1 shows that it was still intended to apply to other than the 'certain' class of actions covered by § 1-b (supp). An examination of the legislative history of § 1-b (supp), including the transcript of hearings and the House and Senate Journals (Colby v. Broderick, 96 N.H. 316, 318, 75 A.2d 790), sheds light on what class of cases the new section was designed to cover. The record shows unmistakably that the main concern of the lawmakers was over the delay in accident cases where physical injury to the person was sustained, particularly automobile accidents.

On June 5, 1957, persons appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on House Bill 374, which as finally amended and passed became RSA 524:1-b (supp), spoke as follows:

'REP. E. HAROLD YOUNG, Sponsor: This is a very simple bill; it comes as a result of long and sad experience in many cases in relation to monies owed where the time elapsed between the time of the accident, or the time of the accrual of the obligation, and the settlement. It works, therefore, a hardship on many people. I was personally involved in an automobile accident when it was not my fault. It was agreed that I get my reward, which was $1,000 less than it cost me. Most of that difference was the cost of money borrowed to sustain myself through the years intervening between the time of the accident and the time of the settlement, which was about four years. The negligence, or obligation to pay, did not arise over a period of years; it arose at that instant only, at the time of the accident. I have talked with three Superior Court justices about this bill, before it was even drafted, and it was their opinion that it would help to get rid of the log jams in the court * * * The insurance companies sometime figure that the suit will not be tried for an indefinite period. This bill is to compel them to do this; much money is involved in this operation. It is a common occurrence to wait so that they, the companies, have the benefit of the interest on the money, which should have been paid much sooner, and the accrual over a period of years is substantial. It is to the advantage of the insurance companies to keep the money as long as they can. If the court says no, there is no problem; but money borrowed cost high rates.

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'SEN. KARKAVELAS: I have had experience with insurance adjustors and have seen them settle for a ridiculous sum. I have no sympathy with the insurance companies in that respect. I am in favor of their being made to pay every cent of interest for this procrastination. They can outwait any claimant.'

On the next day Senator Cleveland, majority floor leader of the Senate and the sponsor of S.B. 77, which was incorporated in H.B. 374 as an amendment, in urging its passage, said: 'Mr. President, there are two amendments. The first one rewrites all of the bill [H.B. 374] as it came to us because of errors in reference to sections. It clarifies the law [i. e., with reference to actions for 'debt,' 'account stated' or 'liquidated damages.' RSA 524:1-a (supp)] as many attorneys believe it to exist. The second amendment [s. 1-b (supp.)] is the change in the law on personal injury cases--interest will run from the date of the writ...