Chahta v. Bureau of Indian Affairs

• Docket Number: 20-cv-1158-DWD
• Decision Date: 14 January 2022
• Parties: BREEZE CHAHTA, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, and CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

1

BREEZE CHAHTA, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, and CHOCTAW NATION OF OKLAHOMA, Defendants.

No. 20-cv-1158-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

January 14, 2022

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID W. DUGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On November 2, 2020, Plaintiff Breeze Chahta, filed a pro se civil rights complaint against Defendants, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (Doc. 1) and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") without prepayment of the filing fee in this action (Doc. 3). Following a threshold review of the complaint, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for a failure to state a claim, and likewise denied Plaintiffs IFP motion (Doc. 8). The Court granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, and later directed Plaintiff to pay the filing fee or file a new IFP motion (Doc. 8; Doc. 10). Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) and a new Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP (Doc. 11). Now before the Court is Plaintiffs renewed IFP motion (Doc 11).

Plaintiff is not a prisoner within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), nonetheless, a federal court may allow a civil case to proceed without prepayment of fees, if an IFP applicant demonstrates that he is indigent under 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(1). Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) (District courts "have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status. The district court may screen the complaint prior to service on the defendants and must dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a claim.").

Two issues must be resolved before in forma pauperis status can be granted. First, the plaintiff must show that he is indigent by submitting an affidavit that "includes a statement of all assets [he] possess [showing] that [he] is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor"; and second, plaintiff's complaint must not be clearly frivolous or malicious, must state a claim on which relief may be granted, and may not seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Upon review of Plaintiff's financial affidavit, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is indigent. However, the second prong requires additional review. To proceed in forma pauperis, Plaintiffs complaint must state a claim on which relief may be granted. An action states a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When considering the claims in a pro se complaint, the factual allegations must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Amb. Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

The Amended Complaint

As alleged in his amended complaint (Doc. 9), Plaintiff is the Chief of the Nu'Yudah Tribe (Choctaw Bank) of Southern Illinois. Plaintiff, and the 66 members of the Nu'Yudah Tribe are direct descendants from a deceased individual named Ada Thomas. Plaintiff alleges that Ada Thomas was a member of the Choctaw Nation. However, because of fraud or other actions, the Dawes Commission ^[1] either (1) failed to properly enroll Ada Thomas onto the Dawes Rolls or (2) Ada Thomas' identity, and subsequent land allocation, were unlawfully assumed after she was fraudulently enrolled onto the Dawes Rolls. Now, Plaintiff, on behalf of the Nu'Yudah Tribe, and the alleged descendants of Ada Thomas, seek formal recognition as members of the Choctaw Tribe. Plaintiff also seeks reparations in the amount of one-hundred million dollars.

With the amended complaint, Plaintiff attached a partial letter from the United States Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, dated May 16, 2019 (Doc. 9, pp. 40-41). This letter purports to deny Plaintiff's application for a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood with the Choctaw Nation (Id.). Plaintiff also provided historical documents related to Ada Thomas, including: (1) an April 11, 1903 Decision from the Department of Interior Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, identifying Ada Thomas as Mississippi Choctaw (Doc. 9, pp. 31-32); (2) guardianship documents for Ada Thomas; and (3) an application for an allotment of lands made on Ada Thomas' behalf, dated February 7, 1906 (Doc. 9, pp. 38-39).

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to raise two distinct claims. First, he challenges the accuracy of the Dawes Rolls and the Dawes Commission's enrollment, or erroneous enrollment, of his ancestor, Ada Thomas in the early 1900s. Separately, he, and the other members of the Nu'Yudah, seek to compel formal recognition as members of the Choctaw Tribe.

Discussion

The Court will not delve into a lengthy overview of the legislative history and various statues comprising the creation and duties of the Dawes Commission.^[2] However, of relevance here, Congress created the Dawes Commission to make rolls of the citizens or members of the Cherokee Chickasaw Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole Tribes. The final rolls of the Choctaw Tribe were approved by the Secretary of the Interior in March 1907. See Kirby v. Parker, 58 F.Supp. 309 (E.D. Okla. 1944) (citing 27 Stat. 645, 30 Stat. 495, 503; 31 Stat. 250, 31 Stat. 861, 867; 32 Stat. 500, 501). As a "quasi-judicial tribunal", the Dawes Commission's decisions concerning tribal enrollment and membership, and allotments of land are "conclusive and impervious to collateral attack." Malone v. Alderdice, 212 F. 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1914); see United States v. Wildcat, 244 U.S. 111, 120 (1917) (Once the findings and decisions of the Dawes Commission were approved by the Secretary of the Interior they were "conclusive of the question of membership in the tribe.").

The United States Supreme Court has reasoned that the Dawes Commission was created by Congress to "forever settle" the enrollment of members of Indian tribes, subject only to impeachment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for challenging final judgments. See United States v. Atkins, 260 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1922); Wildcat, 244 U.S. at 119 (The tribal membership decisions of the Commission are "forever settled, subject to such attacks as could successfully be made upon judgments of this character for fraud and mistakes."); see also Miller v. Allen, 104 Okla. 39, 229 P. 152, 154 (Ok. 1924) ("The Commission . . . was a quasi judicial tribunal empowered to determine who should be enrolled and what lands should be allotted and in what way it should be allotted to every citizen and freedman, and its adjudication of these questions and of every issue of law and fact that it was necessary for it to determine in order to decide these questions is conclusive and impervious to collateral attack.").

Considering the conclusiveness of the Dawes Commission, the Court can discern no jurisdiction for it to review decisions made by the Commission nearly a century later. See, e.g., Cully v. Mitchell, 37 F.2d 493, 499 (10th Cir. 1930), cert denied, 281 U.S. 740 (1930) (Raising "grave doubts" on whether the Court has any power to alter or reform the Dawes Rolls created by Act of Congress and approved by the Secretary of the Interior). The Supreme Court clearly determined that Congress' intention with the Dawes Commission was to conclusively determine the rights of memberships of the Five Tribes, including the Choctaw Tribe, "forever." At best, two avenues may exist to challenge the decisions of the Dawes Commission: (1) if the challenge fits within the narrow bounds for challenging final judgments under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Wildcat, 244 U.S. at 119 (The tribal membership decisions of the Commission are "forever settled, subject to such attacks as could successfully be made upon judgments of this character for fraud and mistakes."); or (2) if the matters involved were not material to the issues decided by the Commission, see Malone v. Alderdice, 212 F. 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1914) (holding that the birthdate and age listed for an individual on the Commission's enrollment records were not material to the Commission's determination of her enrollment as a Creek citizen, and therefore the records were not given conclusive effect as to the question of plaintiff's true age).

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to review the Dawes Commission's actions related to the membership enrollment of Ada Thomas on the Dawes Rolls, those actions are not reviewable. Membership decisions made by the Dawes Commission are given conclusive effect. Atkins, 260 U.S. at 225-26; Wildcat, 244 U.S. at 119. Plaintiff cannot reasonably argue that the issues in his complaint are immaterial to Commission's enrollment decisions concerning Ada Thomas. Further, the time for challenging her enrollment decision under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has long passed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) (motions for relief from a judgment "must be made within a reasonable time-and for [allegations of mistake, newly discovered evidence, and fraud] no more than a year after the entry of the judgment"). Even assuming Plaintiff would have standing to directly challenge the specific findings made as to Ada Thomas, Ada Thomas was allegedly enrolled as a member of the Mississippi Choctaw on April 11, 1903 (Doc. 9, pp. 31-32), and she died in 1977 (Doc. 12). "Reasonable time" to challenge her enrollment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has expired.

As for Plaintiff's...