Chainani by Chainani v. Board of Educ. of City of New York

• Decision Date: 28 February 1994
• Citation: Chainani by Chainani v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 608 N.Y.S.2d 283, 201 A.D.2d 693 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)
• Parties: , 89 Ed. Law Rep. 569 Monica CHAINANI, an Infant, by Her Father and Natural Guardian, Suresh CHAINANI, et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 283

608 N.Y.S.2d 283

201 A.D.2d 693, 89 Ed. Law Rep. 569

Monica CHAINANI, an Infant, by Her Father and Natural Guardian, Suresh CHAINANI, et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Feb. 28, 1994.

Silverman, Collura & Chernis, P.C., New York City (L. Kevin Sheridan, of counsel), for appellants Amboy Bus Co., Inc. and Edward C. Acuti.

Paul A. Crotty, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Fay Leoussis and Alan G. Krams, of counsel), for appellant Board of Educ. of the City of New York.

Sullivan & Liapakis, P.C., New York City (Pamela Anagnos Liapakis and Cheryl Eisberg Moin, of counsel), for respondents.

Before RITTER, J.P., and PIZZUTO, FRIEDMANN and GOLDSTEIN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc. (1) the defendants Amboy Bus Co., Inc. and Edward C. Acuti appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated June 7, 1991, as upon a jury verdict finding them to be 45% and the injured plaintiff 25% at fault in the happening of the accident, is in favor of the plaintiffs and against them in the principal amount of $3,000,000, and (2) the defendant Board of Education of the City of New York separately appeals from so much of the same judgment as, upon finding that it is vicariously liable for the defendant Acuti's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b), is in favor of the plaintiffs and against it in the principal amount of $3,000,000.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed insofar as appealed from by the defendant Board of Education of the City of New York, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and the complaint is dismissed insofar as it is asserted against that defendant; and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is otherwise affirmed insofar as appealed from by the remaining defendants, without costs and disbursements.

The infant plaintiff suffered multiple injuries when she was hit by a school bus from which she had just alighted at her appointed bus stop across the street from her home. The complaint and the bills of particulars alleged causes of action to recover damages for negligence and a claim that there had been a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1174(b), which provided:

"The driver of such school bus, when receiving or discharging passengers who must cross the highway, shall instruct such passengers to cross in front of the bus and the driver thereof shall keep such school bus halted with red signal lights flashing until such passengers have reached the opposite side of the highway".

At trial the court ruled that a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1174(b) imposed strict liability and, as a matter of law, that the Board of Education would be held vicariously liable for any violation of that provision by its agents. In connection with the cause of action predicated on Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1174(b), the jury found that although the driver had violated the statute, this violation was not a proximate cause of the accident. The court set aside this finding as against the weight of the evidence.

On appeal the defendants Amboy Bus Co., Inc. (hereinafter Amboy) and Edward C. Acuti, the driver, claim that the court erred in holding that a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1174(b) imposes strict liability, absent a showing that the driver had knowledge that the infant plaintiff had to cross the street. The driver testified that he was not aware that the infant plaintiff was required to cross the street in order to reach her home. The cases relied on by the defendants, however, do not support their argument since those cases merely hold that violation of the statute imposes strict liability (see, Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 244-245, 287 N.Y.S.2d 77, 234 N.E.2d 243; Sewar v. Gagliardi Bros. Serv., 69 A.D.2d 281, 418 N.Y.S.2d 704, affd. 51 N.Y.2d 752, 432 N.Y.S.2d 367, 411 N.E.2d 786). While there is dicta in these decisions indicating that the bus driver was aware that the students had to cross the street, the holdings of these cases do not require a finding that the driver have such knowledge before strict liability can be imposed. Furthermore, in affirming the Appellate Division in the Sewar case, the Court of Appeals recognized that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b) contained "the at least implicit compulsion that the bus driver inform himself as to 'the pupils who must cross the highway' " (Sewar v. Gagliardi Bros. Serv., supra, 51 N.Y.2d at 757, 432 N.Y.S.2d 367, 411 N.E.2d 786).

To require that a plaintiff prove that the driver knew that the injured passenger had to cross the road before imposing strict liability pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1174(b), would defeat the purpose of the statute, which was designed to protect a definite class of " 'school children who ride school buses. * * * The explicit purpose of this statute was to see to it that children would cross the highway under the careful supervision of the driver who would not only watch them cross the street in front of him but would flash his red lights to warn oncoming traffic to stop' " (Van Gaasbeck v. Webatuck Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 21 N.Y.2d 239, 245, 287 N.Y.S.2d 77, 234 N.E.2d 243, supra ).

Also unavailing is the defendants' claim that the court erred in setting aside the jury's verdict that Acuti's violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law former § 1174(b) was not a proximate cause of the accident. We agree with the trial court that given the record before us "there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [persons] to the conclusion reached by the jury" (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, 382 N.E.2d 1145). In the...