Challis v. Hartloff

CourtKansas Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtHUTCHISON, J.
CitationChallis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (Kan. 1933)
Decision Date28 January 1933
Docket Number30886.
PartiesCHALLIS v. HARTLOFF et al. [*]

Syllabus by the Court.

Consumer's action against retailer and wholesaler for sickness caused by poisonous substance in flour held action for breach of implied warranty, hence three-year, and not two-year, statute of limitation applied (Rev. St. 1923, 60-306, subds. 2, 3).

Damages recoverable for breach of implied warranty that flour was edible are such as are natural, direct, and proximate result of breach.

Neither absence of negligence nor presence of contributory negligence is defense in action for breach of implied warranty that flour was edible.

Consumer paying for flour after discovering its unfitness, held not estopped from suing retailer and wholesaler for breach of implied warranty.

Wholesaler selling flour to dealer knowing it would be resold is liable to consumer for breach of implied warranty that flour was edible.

Where in an action against a broker and a retail dealer, the plaintiff in his petition in substance states that the broker sold flour to the retail dealer, who in turn sold one sack of it to him for immediate human consumption, and that it contained a poisonous substance of arsenic nature, that the plaintiff was made very sick by partaking of the food prepared from the flour, that there was an implied warranty that the flour was free from harmful ingredients and was fit for human food, and, where he seeks to recover damages for pain and suffering, loss of time and damage to his business and for expenses for medicine, physician and nurse hire without any allegations of negligence or carelessness in the petition, it is held (1) that the action is one for a breach of an implied warranty and not an action in tort; (2) that the recovery therein is not limited to the resulting benefits to the defendants, or the difference between the price of a sack of good flour and a sack of bad flour, but, where the dealers had knowledge or notice that the flour was to be used for human food, the measure of damages is such as are the natural, direct, and proximate result of the breach; (3) that the fact that the damages may be substantially the same as in a tort action does not make the action one in tort; (4) that the two-year statute of limitations is not applicable to such an action nor a bar thereto; (5) that neither allegations of contributory negligence nor those negativing any possible carelessness on the part of the defendants in an answer are a defense to an action of this character; (6) that the payment of the purchase price of the flour by the plaintiff after full knowledge of its contents does not constitute an estoppel to a recovery of resulting damages by the plaintiff; (7) that the broker is liable to the plaintiff under his implied warranty in selling the flour to the dealer knowing it was to be resold for human consumption; and (8) that the three-year statute of limitations pleaded by the broker in his answer is a proper defense.

Appeal from District Court; Pottawatomie County; Horace T. Phinney, Judge.

Action by W. F. Challis against Ed Hartloff and others. From an order overruling its demurrer to the separate answers of the defendants, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded, with directions.

William E. Smith, of Wamego, for appellant.

B. C. Pickering, of Wamego, for appellee Ed Hartloff.

E. C. Brookens, E. S. Francis, and H. L. Hart, all of Westmoreland, for appellee J. W. Machin.

HUTCHISON J.

This case was here before, and is reported in 133 Kan. at page 221, 299 P. 586, but then only concerning another defendant, a flour mill company which was eliminated from the case because of the running of the statute of limitations before it was made a party defendant by amendment. The appeal at this time is by the plaintiff from the order of the trial court overruling his demurrers to separate answers of the two remaining defendants to the plaintiff's petition. The demurrers to the answers of course search the record and go back to the question of the sufficiency of the petition.

Plaintiff seeks in his petition to recover damages from the defendants, Machin and Hartloff, a broker and a retail merchant respectively. The petition in substance alleges that Machin, the broker, sold flour to the defendant retail merchant, who in turn sold a sack of it to plaintiff on July 21, 1926; that there was an implied warranty that the flour was free from harmful ingredients and was fit for human food; that, when so sold by the defendants, it contained a poisonous substance of arsenic nature; that plaintiff partook of foodstuffs prepared from said flour, and as a result was made very sick, was confined to his bed for more than six months, and was compelled to use crutches for about two years, and that his affliction is likely to be permanent and incurable; that he suffered much pain, and could not attend to his business, and has suffered loss and damage to his business in the sum of $5,000 already, and will suffer an additional loss of $5,000; that he has paid or is obligated in the sum of $100 for medicines, $500 for the services of a physician, and nurse hire in the sum of $500, making in all the sum of $11,100, for which he asks judgment against the defendants.

The separate answers of defendants are substantially alike, except that the answer of the defendant Hartloff, the retail merchant, does not plead the three-year statute of limitations pleaded by the broker Machin as the third defense of his answer. They otherwise both pleaded a general denial, the two-year statute of limitations, contributory negligence, estoppel, and statements negativing any possible carelessness on the part of each defendant as to himself. The plaintiff demurred to all these defenses, except the general denial, and the trial court overruled the demurrers, which in effect left all the defenses above enumerated as competent and proper defenses to the plaintiff's cause of action. From this ruling the plaintiff has appealed, claiming the trial court was in error holding these several alleged defenses to be, proper defenses to his cause of action.

The action was commenced on July 20, 1929, which was one day less than three years from the day on which the plaintiff alleges he purchased the flour from the retail merchant, which apparently was the reason the three-year statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1923, 60-306, subd. 2) was not pleaded by him. The two-year statute of limitations (Rev. St. 1923, 60-306, subd. 3) pleaded by both defendants would not be applicable to an action for damages upon the breach of an implied warranty, but would be applicable if the action is one in tort, which both defendants claim it is. This is the real controversy in this action around which the other grounds of defense all center, except estoppel. In other words, there can be no defense of contributory negligence, unless negligence of defendants is alleged or involved, nor any defense negativing any possible carelessess, unless carelessness is alleged or involved.

The theory of the defendants is that, although the petition is on its face an action for damages for breach of an implied warranty, yet the breach of a warranty is a wrong done by the defendants to the plaintiff from which he has suffered these damages; that the purchase, sale, and handling of flour that is permitted to contain arsenic is necessarily an act of carelessness, and renders the action one in tort, in spite of the studied efforts of the plaintiff to avoid it. The defendants earnestly contend it is a tort action, and these defenses are proper and applicable, and further that it should be barred by the two-year statute of limitations.

Appellees cite some cases where the action was commenced within less than two years, and where the petition contained allegations of negligence and carelessness as well as those necessary to plead a breach of an implied warranty, and some where the pleader waived the tort and endeavored to recover upon the warranty; among them were Stewart v. Balderston, 10 Kan. 131; Tightmeyer v. Mongold, 20 Kan. 90; Fanson v. Linsley, 20 Kan. 235; and Smith v. McCarthy, 39 Kan. 308, 18 P. 204. The first case above cited was where the petition alleged the taking of money from the plaintiff tortiously which reduced the value of his estate and increased that of the defendant. Both tort and implied contract were recognized, but recovery under the latter was limited to the benefit actually received. The second and third were where there were attempts to waive the tort, but the circumstances lacked the necessary elements for a contract, express or implied, both being cases of naked trespass without intentional or resulting benefits, and they were held to be torts and not actions on implied contracts. In the fourth case it was held, where it was alleged that the defendant took and sold the property of the plaintiff, that: "In such a case, where the facts alleged indicate a waiver of the tort, and are sufficient to constitute a cause of action on contract, it should be so regarded, although some words of the pleadings are adapted to an allegation in an action ex delicto." Smith v. McCarthy, supra, syl. par. 2.

None of these cases tends to show that allegations like those in this case are not sufficient to state a cause of action for damages for breach of an implied warranty, nor to prevent the waiving of the tort that might possibly be involved. These cases are also cited to show plaintiff is limited in his possible recovery to the benefit actually received by the defendants in the transaction, which they claim would be the profit they may have made on the sack of flour sold plaintiff, and they reason that the attempt of plaintiff to...

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23 cases
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    • United States
    • New York City Municipal Court
    • June 24, 1958
    ...of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa.Super. 515, 156 A. 537; Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104, 119 N.W. 428; Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199; Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., 75 N.J.L. 748, 70 A. 314, 19 L.R.A.,N.S., 923; Salmon v. Libby, McNeill & Libby, 219 Ill. 421, 76 N......
  • Ablah v. Eyman
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • October 9, 1961
    ...119; Scherger v. Union National Bank, 138 Kan. 239, 246, 25 P.2d 588. The rule is known as the resulting benefit rule (Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 826, 18 P.2d 199), and it is based, at least in part, upon the principle that no one should be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the ......
  • Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp.
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • January 13, 1984
    ...the basis of an implied warranty that the food is fit for human consumption. (Parks v. Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 P. 202; Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199; Stanfield v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 143 Kan. 117, 53 P.2d 878; Swengel v. F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P.2......
  • Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co.
    • United States
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    • November 9, 1939
    ...negligence into an action for breach of warranty, a procedure for which their is no reason nor authority. See Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199. Under such rule, although a manufacturer had falsely advertised that a windshield was made of shatterproof glass, as in the now famou......
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