Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. State

• Decision Date: 03 May 1982
• Citation: 445 A.2d 353,89 N.J. 131
• Parties: , 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2328, 94 Lab.Cas. P 55,339 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF the UNITED STATES of America and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. STATE of New Jersey and John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 131

89 N.J. 131

445 A.2d 353, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2328,

94 Lab.Cas. P 55,339

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF the UNITED STATES of America and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. STATE of New Jersey and John J. Degnan, Attorney General of New Jersey, Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Dec. 14, 1981.

Decided May 3, 1982.

Robert E. Rochford, Deputy Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellants (Judith A. Yaskin, Acting Atty. Gen., attorney; John DeCicco, Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert E. Rochford and Emily L. Gosnell, Deputy Attys. Gen., of counsel; Emily L. Gosnell, on the briefs)

Vincent J. Apruzzese, Springfield, for plaintiffs-respondents (Apruzzese & McDermott, Springfield, attorneys; Lawrence B. Kraus and Stephen A. Bokat, Washington, D. C., members of the District of Columbia bar, of counsel; Vincent J. Apruzzese and Francis A. Mastro, Springfield, on the brief).

Dennis J. Alessi, Newark, submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey State AFL-CIO (Zazzali & Kroll, Newark, attorneys).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

SCHREIBER, J.

This case concerns the validity of N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 et seq., commonly referred to as the Strikebreakers Act. This Act proscribes the importation, transportation or supplying of individuals for employment in this State for the purpose of interfering by force or violence with lawful employer/employee bargaining, or replacing employees who are lawfully on strike or locked out. The Act also forbids anyone not directly involved in the strike or lockout to recruit persons to replace such employees and prohibits employment agencies from knowingly referring applicants to an employer whose employees are then on strike or locked out. ¹

Plaintiffs, United States Chamber of Commerce and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, filed a complaint in the Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act is unconstitutional. The principal basis for the challenge was that the regulatory scheme is preempted by federal labor law under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution, Art. VI, Clause 2. Plaintiffs also charged that the legislation violates the Due Process, ² Equal Protection, ³ Commerce ⁴ and Privileges and Immunities Clauses ⁵ of the Federal Constitution, and the due The parties entered into a stipulation in lieu of discovery. The stipulation provided that

                process, equal protection and special legislation provisions of the New Jersey Constitution. 6  The Attorney General filed an answer that admitted that a substantial question existed regarding preemption and the Commerce Clause, but denied that the Strikebreakers Act violated any of the other constitutional provisions
                

(1) Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 et seq., various complaints have been issued in municipal courts, and some presentments have been made to various grand juries, but no determination of the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 et seq. has ever been undertaken by any court.

(2) The instant case is ripe for disposition by motions for summary judgment.

(3) For purposes only of a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs United States Chamber of Commerce and New Jersey Chamber of Commerce have standing to challenge the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 et seq.

(4) The Attorney General has never issued any formal or informal opinion concerning the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1 et seq.

No further evidence of these facts other than this stipulation need be offered.

Subsequently, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The trial court declared N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1(c), 34:13C-2 and 34:13C-3 ⁷ unconstitutional. The provisions were invalidated as being preempted by the Supremacy Clause as to those employers and employees covered by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. The court also declared that the same provisions were void in their entirety because they violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The trial court found that N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1(a) and (b) withstood the constitutional attack.

The Attorney General appealed to the Appellate Division. The New Jersey AFL-CIO intervened as amicus curiae. Prior to the adjudication of the matter by the Appellate Division, we granted plaintiff's motion under R. 2:12-2(a) for direct certification.

The issues before us are whether the matter is properly before the Court and whether N.J.S.A. 34:13C-1(c), -2 and -3 ⁸ are constitutional.

I

We turn first to whether the matter is properly before us. The Attorney General's answer questioned whether the plaintiffs were persons whose rights were adversely affected. However, he has not pressed that point upon the appeal and did not oppose plaintiffs' motion for direct certification because of the substantive importance of the issues. Nevertheless, we are compelled to comment on the matter because the proceedings could be viewed as a request for an advisory opinion.

The action was commenced under the Declaratory Judgments Act. That Act authorizes courts to declare rights, status and other legal relations so as to afford litigants relief from uncertainty and insecurity. A person whose rights or legal relations are affected by a statute may have the validity of that statute determined. N.J.S.A. 2A:16-53. To maintain such an action, there must be a "justiciable controversy" between adverse parties, and plaintiff must have an interest in the suit. Young v. Byrne, 144 N.J.Super. 10, 16, 364 A.2d 47 (Law Div. 1976). "The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act cannot be used to decide or declare rights or status of parties upon a state of facts which are future, contingent and uncertain." Lucky Calendar Co. v. Cohen, 20 N.J. 451, 454, 120 A.2d 107 (1956) quoting Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 98 N.J.Eq. 85, 129 A. 617 (Ch.1925).

Membership in the plaintiff organizations, which are non-profit tax exempt corporations, includes thousands of employers within the State. Criminal complaints for violating the Act have been filed against some of these employers. We believe the plaintiffs have standing, even though the harm may technically be not to them but to their constituencies. This holding is in keeping with the now well-established policy enunciated by Justice Jacobs in Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Eq. Corp. of N.Y., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971):

Unlike the Federal Constitution, there is no express language in New Jersey's Constitution which confines the exercise of our judicial power to actual cases and controversies. U.S.Const. art. III, § 2; N.J.Const. art. VI, § 1. Nevertheless we will not render advisory opinions or function in the abstract (New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 240 (1949)) nor will we entertain proceedings by plaintiffs who are "mere intermeddlers" (Baxter v. Baxter, 43 N.J.Eq. 82, 86 (Ch.1887), aff'd, 44 N.J.Eq. 298 (E. & A. 1888), or are merely interlopers or strangers to the dispute (Bergen County v. Port of New York Authority et al., 32 N.J. 303, 307, 318 (1960)). Without ever becoming enmeshed in the federal complexities and technicalities, we have appropriately confined litigation to those situations where the litigant's concern with the subject matter evidenced a sufficient stake and real adverseness. In the overall we have given due weight to the interests of individual justice, along with the public interest, always bearing in mind that throughout our law we have been sweepingly rejecting procedural frustrations in favor of "just and expeditious determinations of the ultimate merits." [Id. 58 N.J. at 107-08, 275 A.2d 433]

See also New Jersey Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, 82 N.J. 57, 67-69, 411 A.2d 168 (1980); Home Builders League of South Jersey, Inc. v. Tp. of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 131-35, 405 A.2d 381 (1979).

II

The Federal Constitution and federal laws are "the supreme Law of the Land" and "Judges in every State [are] bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S.Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. State laws that conflict or interfere with federal legislation must give way because of this constitutional provision, known as the Supremacy Clause. Determining when that conflict or interference exists is frequently a complex and intricate matter, particularly when unraveling the unstated intent of Congress.

                The ultimate question is always whether Congress intended to preempt the subject matter of the state legislation.   See Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n, 85 N.J. 606, 612, 428 A.2d 1283 (1981).  When the doctrine of preemption is applied, the underlying policies of the Supremacy Clause--elimination of inconsistent state policies and ensurance that the states will be bound together with certain goals--are served.  See generally The Federalist No. 15 (A. Hamilton)
                

Preemption analysis begins with identifying the subject matter of the state law and determining whether there is a federal law operative in that field. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 64-68, 61 S.Ct. 399, 402-404, 85 L.Ed. 581, 587 (1941). The focus then shifts to the federal regulation. The Supreme Court has developed some general guidelines that are useful in uncovering Congressional intent. Does the federal statute expressly or by necessary implication indicate exclusivity? See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Is the federal scheme so pervasive that it precludes coexistence of state regulation? See San Diego Bldg. Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, 784 (1959). Does the state program stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"? See Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S. at 67-68, 61 S.Ct. at 404, 85 L.Ed. at 587. An affirmative answer to any one of these questions would establish preemption and the state policy must yield insofar as it frustrates or blocks federal policy. Florida Lime and...