Chamberlain v. Celeste, 83-3381

• Citation: 729 F.2d 1071
• Decision Date: 19 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-3381,83-3381
• Parties: David Whitney CHAMBERLAIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard F. CELESTE, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1071

729 F.2d 1071

David Whitney CHAMBERLAIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Richard F. CELESTE, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 83-3381.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 29, 1983.

Decided March 19, 1984.

Robert Karl Handelman (argued) Handelman & Kilroy, Mary J. Kilroy, Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant.

Simon Karas, Connie J. Harris, Richard David Drake (argued), Asst. Attys. Gen., Columbus, Ohio, for respondent-appellee.

Before MARTIN and JONES, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

In this habeas corpus proceeding David Whitney Chamberlain challenges an extradition sought by the State of Arizona and granted by the Governor of Ohio. District Judge Robert M. Duncan denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, and petitioner appeals. We affirm.

I

On March 16, 1978, Chamberlain was arrested in Arizona, and subsequently was indicted for the unlawful sale of a narcotic drug. On July 25, 1978, as a result of plea negotiations, a written plea agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the Arizona prosecutor. Chamberlain agreed (1) to plead guilty to the first count of the Arizona indictment, (unlawful sale of a narcotic drug), (2) to waive extradition to Ohio, (3) to plead guilty to a pending indictment in Ohio, without assurances relative to the Ohio sentence, (4) to waive extradition back to Arizona, (5) to testify truthfully on behalf of the State of Arizona against a co-defendant, and (6) to serve a mandatory five-year sentence of incarceration for the Arizona conviction. On behalf of the State of Arizona, the Maricopa County Prosecutor agreed to dismiss the second count of the Arizona indictment, (offer to sell marijuana), and allow the petitioner to serve the mandatory five-year sentence of incarceration concurrently with the Ohio sentence in the State of Ohio.

In compliance with the plea agreement, the petitioner returned to Ohio and, on November 22, 1978, pleaded guilty to the indictment pending in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The Ohio trial court sentenced petitioner to a five to twenty-five year term of incarceration in the Ohio State Reformatory.

On November 28, 1978, Chamberlain was sentenced on the Arizona charge. He was not present in Arizona for sentencing, having waived his right to be present. The sentencing order provided in part:

IT IS ORDERED that the Defendant be incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison for a period of not less than five years, nor more than five years and one day, to commence March 28, 1978, to run concurrent with the sentence presently being served in the State of Ohio in 76CR-09-2285 and any time served in the Ohio prison system will count toward the sentence in this cause, and this order will be the authority for the defendant to serve this sentence in the State of Ohio.

Petitioner was incarcerated at the Lebanon Correctional Institute in Lebanon, Ohio. Apparently he was a model prisoner and was granted parole by the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, effective on or after March 13, 1980. Prior to his release, however, the Arizona authorities placed a detainer on the petitioner in order to extradite him to the State of Arizona to complete the remainder of his five years on the Arizona sentence. As a result petitioner was transferred to the Warren County, Ohio jail to await extradition proceedings.

On May 5, 1980, a Governor's warrant of arrest was issued by then Ohio Governor John Rhodes in response to the demand for extradition by Arizona. On August 6, 1980 petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Warren County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas challenging the legality of his arrest and the propriety of Arizona's request for extradition.

On September 9, 1980, the Court of Common Pleas denied the petition. Petitioner then appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals. On November 4, 1980 Warren County Court of Common Pleas Judge William Young released Chamberlain on his own recognizance pending appeal. On July 7, 1982 the Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Warren County Court of Common Pleas. On November 17, 1982, the Supreme Court of Ohio sua sponte dismissed petitioner's appeal to that court for want of a substantial constitutional question.

Petitioner then filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

In his petition Chamberlain claimed the extradition proceeding against him had denied him rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that: (a) he is not a "fugitive" from justice, nor has he been "charged" with a crime in the demanding State; (b) Arizona, the demanding State, has not shown probable cause for extradition; (c) the extradition papers are on their face not in order; and (d) that Arizona breached petitioner's plea agreement.

District Judge Duncan issued an opinion on April 20, 1983 dismissing Chamberlain's petition. Judge Duncan concluded that Chamberlain had been found by the State court "charged with a crime" and that the district court would not upset this finding of fact. In the alternative Judge Duncan held that as a question of law petitioner was charged with an offense. The district judge also upheld the State court determination that petitioner was a "fugitive" from justice. The court refused to inquire into the underlying plea agreement. In addition, the district court did not disturb the State court finding that the extradition papers were proper on their face.

Chamberlain then filed a notice of appeal to this Court. On May 31, 1983, Judge Duncan granted a certificate of probable cause for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2253.

II

Judicial review of extradition proceedings is limited. "Interstate extradition was intended to be a summary and mandatory executive proceeding derived from the language of Art. IV, Sec. 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution." Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 288, 99 S.Ct. 530, 535, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978). The Supreme Court has stated:

A governor's grant of extradition is prima facie evidence that the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met. Once the governor has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. These are historic facts readily verifiable.

Doran, supra at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535 (citation omitted).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) requires federal courts in habeas proceedings to accord a "presumption of correctness" to state court findings of fact, unless one of the enumerated exceptions found in Sec. 2254(d) is present, or a federal court concludes that a state finding was not fairly supported by the record. Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 591-593, 597-598, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1303-1304, 1307, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982) (Sumner II ) (per curiam); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981) (Sumner I ). This presumption is equally applicable to findings made by a state appellate court. Id. Recognizing the limits of our inquiry, we address ourselves to petitioner's contentions.

The first inquiry under Doran is whether the extradition documents on their face are in order.

The Ohio Court of Appeals in addressing this issue stated:

Petitioner contends that the extradition papers are not on their face in order since they fail to show that Arizona has probable cause to extradite. Petitioner relies on Doran. We believe that petitioner's reliance on Doran is misplaced.

Doran held that once the governor of the asylum state has acted on a requisition for extradition based on the demanding state's judicial determination that probable cause exists, no further judicial inquiry may be had on the issue of probable cause in the asylum state. Further, the demanding state's judicial determination of probable cause can be stated in the requisition papers in conclusory language. In other words, the requisition papers need not show the factual basis upon which the demanding state's finding of probable cause is supported.

In the habeas proceeding below, a judicial finding of probable cause in the demanding State of Arizona need not be shown in the requisition papers since there has already been a judicial determination, in Arizona, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of the crime which forms the basis of the extradition request. Apparently, petitioner believes that a judicial finding of probable cause comparable to the preliminary inquiry traditionally required between arrest and trial is required here. However, petitioner overlooks the fact that he has already been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by the demanding state for the crime which forms the basis of the extradition request.

In the Matter of: David Whitney Chamberlain, No. 468 (Warren Cty. Ct. of App. 1982). The district court adopted the findings of the State appellate court, see Sumner I & II, and held that petitioner's claim with respect to the extradition papers is without merit. We agree with the district court. Petitioner has presented nothing to this court which would warrant us to disturb that finding.

Under Doran a court may also inquire whether the petitioner has been "charged with a crime" in the demanding state. The Ohio Court of Appeals found that petitioner had been charged with a crime. The district court held that to the extent such a finding was a factual finding entitled to the "presumption of correctness" under Sumner I and II, it found no basis for disturbing the finding of the state court. Judge Duncan then stated:

Assuming arguendo that the Doran determination with respect to being charged...