Chamberlain v. Florida Power Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 November 1940
• Citation: 198 So. 486,144 Fla. 719
• Parties: CHAMBERLAIN v. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

198 So. 486

144 Fla. 719

CHAMBERLAIN v. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

November 8, 1940

Error to Circuit Court, Pinellas County; John U. Bird, Judge.

Action by Ralph S. Chamberlain, as administrator of the estate of Raymond T. Chamberlain, deceased, against Florida Power Corporation, for wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. To review a judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff brings error.

Affirmed.

COUNSEL

W. G. Ramseur, of St. Petersburg, for plaintiff in error.

Cook Harris, Barrett, McGlothlin & Dew and K. E. Fenderson, all of St. Petersburg, for defendant in error.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This case is before us on writ of error from a judgment and order of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County sustaining a demurrer to the plaintiff in error's declaration.

There is no controversy as to the facts involved. Raymond T Chamberlain, while employed by the Florida Power Corporation sustained injuries on December 17, 1938, arising from and in the course of his employment, which resulted in his death December 18, 1938. Ralph S. Chamberlain was duly appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of the deceased employee. As such, he filed a declaration against the Florida Power Corporation in which he sought to recover damages for the wrongful death of Raymond T. Chamberlain under the death by wrongful act statute, sections 7047, 7048, C.G.L. 1927.

The defendant corporation filed a demurrer to the declaration, it appearing from the declaration that the deceased was 'an employee of the defendant within the terms and under the provisions of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act Chapter 17481 Act of 1935, as amended by Chapter 18413, Act of 1937.' The court sustained the demurrer and upon the plaintiff's refusal to amend, entered final judgment dismissing the action.

The question presented is whether, under the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, supra, the personal representative of a deceased employee can maintain a suit at law for damages against an employer for the alleged wrongful death of the employee under the death by wrongful act statute, supra, when the employer has complied with and the employee accepted the provisions of the act.

The deceased employee left no dependents to take compensation under the act and the plaintiff in error earnestly contends that a remedy under the act cannot be 'exclusive' where no right of action exists, there being no provision in the act for payment of compensation to other than dependents of the deceased employee.

Under our Workmen's Compensation Act, the provisions of the act are optional, and if accepted, the relation of the employer and employee being contractual, the terms of the act are to be read into every contract of service between those subject to its terms. Smith v. Van Noy Interstate Co., 150 Tenn. 25, 262 S.W. 1048, 35 A.L.R. 1409; Industrial Commission v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 64 Colo. 480, 174 P. 589, 3 A.L.R. 1336; Grinnell v. Wilkinson, 39 R.I. 447, 98 A. 103, L.R.A.1917B, 767, Ann.Cas.1918B, 618.

In Liberato v. Royer, 281 Pa. 227, 126 A. 257, 259, the court states:

'* * * What the employee, on behalf of himself and relatives, waives by the contract, is the right to recover damages, by an action at law, for his injury or death in the course of his employment resulting from the negligence of the employer. This contract he is authorized by the statute to make. What he acquires by the contract is the right to compensation under the statute for any injury which he may sustain in the course of his employment, and the certainty that, in case of his death from such injury, compensation shall be made to his dependents in the manner by the statute provided, and this to be in no manner dependent upon whether the injury or death resulted from any negligence or fault of his employer. * * *

'Parents had no property, no vested interest, in the right given by statute to recover damages for negligence resulting in the death of an adult son. * * * When employer and employee accept the provisions of the statute their relations become contractual, and the statutes which give to parents the right to recover damages for the death of an adult son resulting from the negligence of the employer have no application. * * *'

Mr. Justice Holmes, in the same case, 270 U.S. 535, 46 S.Ct. 373, 374, 70 L.Ed. 719, states:

'* * * the Compensation Act offers a plan different from the common law and the workman is free not to come in under it. If he does, of course all benefits dependent on the new arrangement are matters of agreement and statutory consequences of agreement and cannot be carried further than the contract and statute go. * * *'

One of the benefits to the employee is compensation irrespective of the cause of...