Chamberlain v. State
| Decision Date | 06 December 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 94,94 |
| Parties | LEWIS MARSELLOUS CHAMBERLAIN v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Washington County
Case No. 21-K-15-051410
UNREPORTED
Berger, Friedman, Thieme, Raymond G., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Thieme, J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Lewis Marsellous Chamberlain, appellant, was convicted, following a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Washington County, of both possession and distribution of heroin and was sentenced to forty years' imprisonment, with all but twenty-five years suspended, to be followed by three years' probation. He then noted this appeal, raising two issues:
Finding neither abuse of discretion nor plain error, we affirm.
This case arose from a controlled drug purchase conducted by Robert LaGrave, a confidential informant cooperating with police officers assigned to the Washington County Narcotics Task Force. Hagerstown Police Officer Frank Toston, an agent with the Task Force, testified at Chamberlain's trial that he had first encountered the informant, LaGrave, during an unrelated investigation, which led to the recovery of "a small amount of crack cocaine" and "other drug paraphernalia" from LaGrave's apartment. Seeking to avoid the legal consequences he faced, LaGrave "indicated his willingness to cooperate . . . with other investigations."
Among the persons LaGrave identified to the Task Force as "involved" in the sale of narcotics was Chamberlain, whom he knew as they had previously lived in the sameapartment building. On April 1, 2015, members of the Task Force arranged for LaGrave to conduct a controlled drug purchase from Chamberlain at his residence.
LaGrave walked into the Hagerstown Police Station and, at the direction of members of the Task Force, called Chamberlain. During that call, which was recorded and subsequently played before the jury, the two men agreed that LaGrave would enter Chamberlain's apartment through a side entrance, whereupon he would purchase a "G," which, according to the State, was understood to mean a gram of heroin. LaGrave was searched by a Task Force member and found to be free of cash and contraband, except for the pre-recorded bills he was given to effect the controlled purchase. Then, equipped with a hand-held video recorder, Chamberlain was transported from the police station and dropped off several blocks away, with instructions to walk to Chamberlain's residence and consummate the drug purchase. According to the original plan, LaGrave would be picked up in a Task Force vehicle several blocks away immediately after completing the controlled purchase.
LaGrave successfully conducted the controlled purchase. As he was leaving Chamberlain's apartment, however, a neighbor called out that he had spotted a police vehicle nearby, which caused LaGrave to deviate from the original plan. When he was several blocks away and no longer in earshot of Chamberlain or his neighbors, LaGrave called Officer Toston, and they agreed that LaGrave would walk in the opposite direction to the Hagerstown Police Station. When LaGrave arrived there, he was searched, and Task Force members recovered a small baggie of suspected heroin, which wassubsequently analyzed and determined to contain 0.90 grams of heroin. LaGrave no longer possessed the cash he had been given to make the controlled purchase.
Because the Task Force had several other suspects, in addition to Chamberlain, under investigation, they did not arrest him at that time. Consequently, they did not recover the currency that had been used in the controlled buy.
Chamberlain was subsequently charged, in a five-count indictment, with two counts each of distribution of heroin and possession of heroin, as well as maintaining a common nuisance. He was thereafter tried, by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Washington County, on the first two counts of that indictment, namely, distribution of heroin and possession of heroin. The jury found him guilty of both charges, and the court thereafter sentenced Chamberlain, as a subsequent offender, to forty years' imprisonment, with all but twenty years suspended, to be followed by three years' probation. He then noted this timely appeal.
Chamberlain contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in declining to give his requested voir dire question, which, he claims, was "designed to expose juror bias against the defendant":
22. Under the law, the Defendant, Mr. LEWIS MARSELLOUS CHAMBERLAIN, has an absolute right to remain silent and refuse to testify. No adverse inference of guilt may be drawn from his refusal to testify. Is there any member of the prospective jury panel who believes that the Defendant has a duty or responsibility to testify or that he must be guilty merely because he may refuse to testify?
In refusing to propound that question, the circuit court, according to Chamberlain, effectively denied him the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.1
In support of that contention, Chamberlain raises several interrelated arguments, which boil down to two: first, that the circuit court erred in declining to propound the disputed voir dire question because it was mandatory; and second, that, even if the decision whether to propound the question was discretionary, the circuit court failed to exercise its discretion in "rejecting [the voir dire question] without consideration."
In support of his contention that his proposed voir dire question 22 was mandatory, Chamberlain cites several Maryland decisions that have held that certain types of voir dire questions are mandatory upon a defendant's request. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 454 Md. 495, 513 (2017) (); Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 363 (2014) (); State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 54 (2011) (), abrogated by Pearson, 437 Md. at 363; Moore v. State, 412 Md. 635, 640 (2010) () (citation and quotation omitted); Thompson v. State, 229 Md. App. 385, 411 (2016) ().
Chamberlain nonetheless acknowledges that Maryland appellate courts previously have upheld the denial of claims similar or even identical to his, reasoning that the specific type of voir dire question he submitted was more akin to a jury instruction and that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in declining to propound such a question during voir dire. He contends, however, that our decisions rest upon a faulty foundation, Twining v. State, 234 Md. 97 (1964), which purportedly has been "undermine[d]" by subsequent changes in the law, specifically, the de facto abrogation, by the Court of Appeals, of the first part of Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, thejury-as-judges-of-law provision.2 We should instead, Chamberlain suggests, look to judicial decisions from other states,3 which hold that a defendant is entitled to ask voir dire questions directed to whether venirepersons would follow a court's instructions on the law. He further cites several academic studies,4 which call into question whether jurors understand the instructions they are given and that, therefore, instructions are no substitute for additional probing questions during voir dire.
In Twining, the defendant had been accused of bastardy5 and, during voir dire, had requested the trial court to ask the venirepersons whether they "would give the accused the benefit of the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof." Id. at 99. The Court first recited the standard of review, which, at that time, was abuse of discretion, id. (citing Grogg v. State, 231 Md. 530, 532 (1963)), but without any of the subsequent gloss adopted in more recent decisions, which have gradually circumscribed a trial court's discretion in propounding voir dire questions.6 It then concluded that the trial court hadnot abused its discretion in refusing the defendant's request to propound the question at issue. The Court reasoned that the "rules of law" stated in the proposed question "were fully and fairly covered in subsequent instructions to the jury" and that...
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