Chamberlin v. Fisher

• Decision Date: 20 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 15-70012,15-70012
• Parties: Lisa Jo CHAMBERLIN, Petitioner–Appellee v. Marshall L. FISHER, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondent–Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

885 F.3d 832

Lisa Jo CHAMBERLIN, Petitioner–Appellee

v.Marshall L. FISHER, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Corrections, Respondent–Appellant

No. 15-70012

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 20, 2018

Elizabeth Unger Carlyle, Kansas City, MO, Michael James Bentley, Esq., Michael Leland Cowan, Alicia Kate Margolis, Esq., Attorney, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, L.L.P., Jackson, MS, for Petitioner–Appellee.

Cameron Leigh Benton, Special Attorney to the Attorney General, Marvin Luther White, Jr., Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Jackson, MS, for Respondent–Appellant.

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and JOLLY, DAVIS, JONES, SMITH, DENNIS, CLEMENT, PRADO, OWEN, ELROD, SOUTHWICK, HAYNES, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.¹

Lisa Jo Chamberlin participated in a heinous double murder in Mississippi. A jury convicted her of two counts of capital murder. She was sentenced to death. Chamberlin, who is white, appealed her conviction, arguing in part that the prosecution invidiously discriminated against black prospective jurors during jury selection at her trial in violation of Batson v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Her appeal made its way through the Mississippi court system, where it was denied at every stage. She then turned to federal court, petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Chamberlin's petition and ordered the State to give her a new trial, finding that the Mississippi Supreme Court erred when it concluded that the prosecution did not discriminate against black prospective jurors at Chamberlin's jury selection. Mississippi appealed to a panel of this court, which affirmed in a split decision. We agreed to hear the case en banc and now REVERSE the district court.

I

The gruesome details of Chamberlin's crimes have been laid out in detail several times—we need not reiterate them here. The evidence against her was substantial; she was duly convicted by a jury of her peers of two counts of capital murder. What is essential to this appeal is not what happened during the trial, however, but rather what took place before the trial began.

A. Jury Selection

Chamberlin's jury selection began with a pool of 42 qualified jurors, thirteen of whom—31%—were black. The prosecution and defense were each entitled to exercise up to fourteen peremptory strikes. The prosecution began by moving through a batch of prospective jurors, striking or keeping as it went. The defense then went through the jurors the prosecution had accepted, exercising its peremptory strikes as it wished. Any jurors that were accepted by both the prosecution and defense were put on the jury, and the prosecution then began again with a fresh batch. This procedure continued until twelve jurors and two alternates were selected. The prosecution exercised thirteen of its peremptory strikes throughout the process; the defense used all fourteen. Ultimately, Chamberlin's jury consisted of ten white jurors, two black jurors, and two white alternates.

Chamberlin's counsel objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors throughout jury selection. The trial court expressed doubts that Chamberlin had established a prima facie case under the Batson framework, but asked the prosecution for its race-neutral reasons for the strikes in any case. The prosecution's race-neutral reasons for striking two specific prospective black jurors are pertinent here. When asked to explain its strikes of black prospective jurors Sturgis and Minor, the prosecution pointed to their answers to three questions on the jury questionnaire. Both answered questions 30, 34, and 35 in ways that indicated they were uneasy with the prospect of announcing a verdict of death and might hold the government to a higher burden of proof than the law requires. The defense responded to these proffered race-neutral reasons on general grounds, arguing that both Sturgis and Minor "could be ... fair-minded jurors on the question of the death penalty." Relevant to this appeal, at no point did Chamberlin's counsel seek a comparative juror analysis between black jurors the prosecution struck and white jurors it accepted, nor did the trial court conduct such a comparison sua sponte . The trial court rejected Chamberlin's Batson argument and the trial proceeded apace. Chamberlin was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death.

B. Mississippi Supreme Court

The Mississippi Supreme Court had two separate opportunities to review Chamberlin's Batson claim. It rejected her contentions both times. First was Chamberlin's direct appeal, where she argued that the trial court erred in denying her Batson challenge, focusing on the prosecution's strikes of seven black prospective jurors. See Chamberlin v. State , 989 So.2d 320, 336 (Miss. 2008). The court concluded that Chamberlin's argument as to four of the prospective jurors was procedurally barred. See id. at 339. As for the other three, the court concluded that "Chamberlin argued reasons why they would make good jurors but failed to rebut the specific reasons proffered by the State for striking them." Id. Accordingly, the court found that, "[c]onsidering the totality of the evidence, the trial court's ruling on Chamberlin's Batson challenge was neither clearly erroneous nor against the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Id. Just as in the trial court, Chamberlin's counsel never sought a comparative juror analysis on direct appeal, nor did the Mississippi Supreme Court perform such an analysis sua sponte .

Chamberlin's Batson claim again came before the Mississippi Supreme Court two years later when she filed a motion for post-conviction relief, arguing in relevant part that her state trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to adequately argue her Batson challenge. This time Chamberlin specifically argued that her counsel "should have performed a comparative jury analysis, which would have demonstrated disparate treatment of the jurors, indicating that the State's strikes were pretextual." Chamberlin v. State , 55 So.3d 1046, 1051 (Miss. 2010). In response to this contention, the Mississippi Supreme Court conducted a "thorough review of the record ... including the jury questionnaires provided by Chamberlin," and concluded that each of the black jurors struck gave responses "in his or her jury questionnaire that differentiated him or her from the white jurors who were accepted by the State." Id. at 1051–52. The court was therefore "unable to find disparate treatment of the struck jurors" and concluded that Chamberlin's Batson claim was "without merit." Id . at 1052.

C. Federal Habeas

Having failed to get the desired relief from the Mississippi courts, Chamberlin petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Her petition listed thirteen grounds for relief, among them that the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly erred in denying Chamberlin's Batson claims. See Chamberlin v. Fisher ("Chamberlin I "), No. 11CV72CWR, 2015 WL 1485901, at *12 n.3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2015).

The district court granted Chamberlin's petition, finding that her Batson claim warranted federal relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). AEDPA provides two grounds upon which a federal court can grant habeas relief for claims decided in state court: if the state court decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ; or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The district court concluded that both grounds for relief applied in Chamberlin's case.

First, the district court interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke ("Miller-El II "), 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), as requiring a state court to conduct a comparative juror analysis between black jurors who were struck by the prosecution and white jurors who were kept, even where the defendant had not sought any such comparison. See Chamberlin I , 2015 WL 1485901, at *17. Accordingly, the district court found that "the Mississippi Supreme Court's failure to conduct a comparative analysis was contrary to clearly established federal law requiring that analysis, as announced in Miller-El [II ]." Id.

The district court further held that the lack of comparative juror analysis rendered "the state court's conclusion that there was no showing of purposeful discrimination ... incomplete." Id. It concluded that the lack of comparative analysis "required by federal law" rendered the Mississippi Supreme Court's "factfinding procedures ... [in]adequate for reaching reasonably correct results." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court thus held that the Mississippi Supreme Court's factual findings were not entitled to AEDPA deference. Id.

In short, the district court concluded as a matter of law that a state court must conduct a comparative juror analysis in Batson cases sua sponte . It reasoned that because the Mississippi Supreme Court failed to do so, its decision on Chamberlin's Batson case was both unreasonable as a matter of law and so infirm as a factual matter so as to not be entitled to the substantial deference AEDPA would otherwise require.²

II

"In reviewing a grant of habeas relief, the Court examines ‘factual findings for clear error and issues of law de novo.’ " Richards v. Quarterman , 566 F.3d 553, 561 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Barrientes v. Johnson , 221 F.3d 741, 750 (5th Cir. 2000) ).

This case is governed by AEDPA. As noted above, AEDPA restricts a federal court's ability to grant habeas relief after an adjudication on the merits in state court to only two grounds. Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal court "may grant relief when a state...