Chamberlin v. Missouri Elections Commission

• Decision Date: 21 June 1976
• Docket Number: No. 59505,59505
• Parties: Howard CHAMBERLIN and Wiolliam Bryan Miller, Respondents, v. MISSOURI ELECTIONS COMMISSION, a Governmental Agency, et al., Appellants, and John C. Danforth, Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 876

540 S.W.2d 876

Howard CHAMBERLIN and Wiolliam Bryan Miller, Respondents, v. MISSOURI ELECTIONS COMMISSION, a Governmental Agency, et al., Appellants and John C. Danforth, Intervenor-Appellant.

No. 59505.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

June 21, 1976.

Howard F. Sachs, Kansas City, for appellants.

Arthur A. Benson II, Kansas City, for respondents.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Andrew Rothschild, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for intervenor.

HENLEY, Judge.

This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. It presents questions involving the constitutionality of parts ¹ of the Missouri Campaign Finance and Disclosure Law (hereinafter the Campaign Law) enacted by the initiative in 1974 effective January 1, 1975. ²

Howard Chamberlin and William Bryan Miller (hereinafter plaintiffs or Mr. Chamberlin, Mr. Miller), ³ brought this action against the Missouri Elections Commission and its members ⁴ (hereinafter the Commission), and Ralph L. Martin, prosecuting attorney of Jackson county, ⁵ as defendants. ⁶ John C. Danforth, attorney general of Missouri, intervened as a party defendant (hereinafter Intervenor). Both plaintiffs are attorneys-at-law licensed to practice in this state. Mr. Chamberlin was a candidate for the office of Mayor of the city of Lotawana in the spring, 1975, election and at that time was a stockholder in a professional legal corporation in which he held an interest of more than 10%. A client paid the corporation more than $500 for his professional services during the 12 months preceding the election. He did not comply with the provisions of either subsection 1(5) or subsection 1(6) of § 130.035. ⁷ Mr. Miller has held since 1968 the office of judge of the municipal court of Raytown, a part-time judgeship. He was a candidate for and was reelected to that office April 6, 1976. It is agreed that he is a sole practitioner and, although the record is not clear, the case was tried and submitted on the theory that the facts were (1) since January 1, 1975, a client has paid him more than $100 for professional services, and (2) he has failed to comply with subsection 1(5).

By this action, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring subsections 1(5) and 1(6) of § 130.035 unconstitutional and void on the ground, among others, that they violate rights guaranteed plaintiffs by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 'by subjecting them to classifications that impose unequal burdens of disclosure upon them without advancing any rational or justifiable state interest in such classifications * * *.' In addition to a declaratory judgment, plaintiffs also sought relief enjoining defendants from compelling them to comply therewith.

Plaintiffs' 'equal protection' ground for relief is that these subsections make an arbitrary and unreasonable difference between the reporting requirements of a candidate who is a lawyer practicing alone (sole practitioner) and a lawyer who, having a 10% or more interest therein, practices in the form of a professional legal corporation (corporate practitioner); that the latter is favored and the sole practitioner invidiously discriminated against in that the sole practitioner is required to report as a source of income the identity of each client who paid him in excess of $100 (the greater burden of disclosure), whereas the corporate practitioner is required to report as a source of income only the identity of each client who paid the corporation more than $500, and then only if it was paid on behalf of or for services rendered by the candidate, as distinguished from another stockholder of the corporation (the lesser burden of disclosure). Other grounds for relief raised by plaintiffs will be referred to and discussed in connection with their cross-appeal.

The trial court filed a memorandum opinion, and entered judgment upholding plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment 'equal protection' claim. The judgment, omitting a part not pertinent to the issues on appeal, is as follows:

1. 'Plaintiffs are not excused from complying with the terms and provisions of Sections 130.035 1. (5) and (6) on the ground that compliance by them would violate the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality and the terms of that statute are not unconstitutional as applied to said plaintiffs under the facts of the case.

2. 'Sections 130.035 1. (5) and (6) V.A.M.S. constitute an unlawful arbitrary classification in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and are declared to be unconstitutional and void.

3. 'Plaintiffs Chamberlin and Miller are excused from complying with Sections 130.035(1)(5) and (6) and Defendants are permanently enjoined from compelling Plaintiffs to comply with said Sections and from instituting criminal prosecution to compel compliance.'

Defendants and Intervenor appealed from that portion of the judgment quoted in paragraphs numbered two and three. Plaintiffs appealed from that portion quoted in paragraph numbered one.

Defendants and Intervenor contend the trial court erred in reaching the constitutional question and in declaring subsections 1(5) and 1(6) unconstitutional, because they are susceptible of construction in harmony with the constitution. In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Paul, et al., 368 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.banc 1963), the court said (l.c. 422):

It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where a statute is fairly susceptible of a construction in harmony with the Constitution it must be given that construction by the courts and, unless the statute is clearly repugnant to the organic law, its constitutionality must be upheld. City of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, Mo., 329 S.W.2d 687, 692(6); Brown v. Morris, 365 Mo. 946, 290 S.W.2d 160, 167(8); State on Inf. Dalton v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 365 Mo. 1, 275 S.W.2d 225, 234(23); State ex inf. McKittrick v. American Colony Ins. Co., 336 Mo. 406, 80 S.W.2d 876, 882--883(5); State ex rel. Barrett v. May, 290 Mo. 302, 235 S.W. 124, 126(3).

'Courts will not ordinarily pass on constitutional questions where the case presented may be properly decided without doing so. McIntosh v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Mo., 366 S.W.2d 409, 412(2); City of St. Joseph v. Roller, Mo., 363 S.W.2d 609, 612(6); Rider v. Julian, 365 Mo. 313, 282 S.W.2d 484, 497(23).'

We conclude that subsections 1(5) and 1(6) are fairly susceptible of a construction that will obviate any need to reach and decide the Fourteenth Amendment question decided by the trial court. Read together, an ambiguity clearly appears from these two subsections in that different amounts or 'floors' ($100 and $500) are fixed as reporting requirements for the same person. Subsection 1(5) appears to require the candidate to report the source of any income in excess of $100 received by him, while subsection 1(6) appears to require the candidate to report the source of any income in excess of $500 paid for services rendered by him to 'any sole proprietorship * * *.' In other words, under the first of these two subsections the reporting requirements of a candidate who is a sole practitioner (a sole proprietorship) is governed by a $100 floor, while under the second the reporting requirements of the same person, a candidate who is practicing as a sole proprietorship (a sole practitioner), is governed by a higher floor: $500, the amount also set for the corporate practitioner.

This conflict or inequality in the level of the 'floor' set by these two subsections for reporting the source of gifts, salaries, fees or other income received by the candidate, his spouse or minor children within the prescribed period of time reasonably may be, and is, resolved by construing the two subsections to require that the candidate who is a sole practitioner shall use the same floor ($500) as that set for a sole proprietorship and those who practice in the form of a partnership or corporation. We believe this construction to be consistent with the intent and purpose of the Campaign Law. With this conflict resolved, we consider and hold that a sole practitioner and a corporate practitioner are required by subsections 1(5) and 1(6) to report as follows:

1. Where the income received within the prescribed period of time is in excess of $100 but not in excess of $500, the candidate who is either (A) a sole practitioner or (B) a corporate practitioner shall report as the 'source' of this income, not the name and address of each person by whom such amount was paid, but the business entity (sole proprietorship or corporation) from which he receives his income.

2. Where the income received within the prescribed period of time from any one person is in excess of $500, the candidate who is:

A. a sole practitioner shall report as the 'source' of this income the name and address of each person by whom such amount was paid; and

B. a corporate practitioner holding a 10% or more interest in and who has rendered any service to the corporation which resulted in such income, shall report as the 'source' thereof the name and address of each person by whom such amount was paid.

Plaintiffs, in rebuttal, argue that this construction of subsections 1(5) and 1(6) ⁸ 'create differential burdens of disclosure which have no rational relationship to any justifiable state interest and the classifications are, therefore, in violation of the equal protection clause of the (Fourteenth Amendment).' In attempting to demonstrate their contention, plaintiffs refer only to hypothetical fact situations which they assert present differences in burdens of disclosure, none of which are applicable to the facts of this case. Our decision is confined to and based upon the very narrow factual situation this case presents. The hypothetical fact situations pointed to by plaintiffs will be ruled upon when, and if, they are presented as live issues in a case.

As noted above, plai...