Chambers Development Co., Inc. v. Com., ex rel. Allegheny County Health Dept.

• Decision Date: 23 April 1984
• Citation: 474 A.2d 728,81 Pa.Cmwlth. 622
• Parties: CHAMBERS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, ex rel. ALLEGHENY COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, Appellee. (Two Cases).
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 728

474 A.2d 728

81 Pa.Cmwlth. 622

CHAMBERS DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, ex rel. ALLEGHENY COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT, Appellee. (Two Cases).

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 12, 1984.

Decided April 23, 1984.

George Shorall, Shorall & Shorall, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert G. Borgoyn, Jr., Asst. County Sol., Mark F. Nowak, James H. McLean, County Sol., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before WILLIAMS, CRAIG and COLINS, JJ.

CRAIG, Judge.

Chambers Development Co., Inc. appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which affirmed a decision of a district justice finding Chambers guilty of two summary violations for improperly accepting sewage sludge at its landfill operation. Chambers also appeals an administrative determination by a county hearing officer, finding that Chambers failed to file timely groundwater monitoring reports. We must determine whether the Allegheny County Health Department (county) had authority to prosecute Chambers for the sludge violations and whether the appeal from the administrative decision is interlocutory.

Under permits from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources and the county, Chambers operates a solid waste disposal site. In 1978, Chambers and DER had entered into an agreement which represented the parties' settlement of a dispute concerning a methane problem at the landfill. In 1981, the county, under authority granted to it by section 106 of the Solid Waste Management Act, ¹ enacted in 1980, filed a complaint before District Justice Ambrose, alleging that Chambers had, on two occasions, accepted human sewage sludge, a violation of its permits. After conviction, Chambers appealed to the court of common pleas at docket number SA 1478 of 1981 in that court, which affirmed the conviction for accepting sewage sludge. Chambers' appeal from the county administrative determination on groundwater monitoring, dated in 1982, was entered at docket number SA 255-1982; although the court's summary conviction affirmance also bears that docket number, the court record contains no proceedings on the merits of the administrative decision.

Sewage Violations

Chambers contends that the county had no enforcement authority at its landfill because the terms of the 1978 agreement provided that DER would be the sole enforcement agency for all federal, state and local regulations.

Chambers bases that contention on paragraph 13 of the agreement, which provides in part:

If Chambers fails to comply in a timely manner with any provision of this Agreement, then DER may at its sole option and discretion proceed to institute any legal or enforceable actions available for the enforcement of this Agreement, for any violations of any of the laws of the Commonwealth and/or for any violations of any laws of the United States of America.

and on paragraph 19, which provides:

Chambers enters into this Agreement with DER with the understanding that DER shall to the best of its ability enforce the applicable rules and regulations relating to all sanitary landfills in Pennsylvania.

Judge Weir of the common pleas court correctly found no merit in Chambers' argument that the parties intended those provisions "to prevent any governmental unit from enforcing any environmental law which it is otherwise empowered to enforce." They are, as Judge Weir noted routine contractual expressions, which empowered DER to proceed, without first consulting Chambers, to enforce the terms of the agreement.

Reinforcing our conclusion is the general principle of contract law that an agreement cannot legally bind persons who are not parties to the contract. Cumberland-Perry Area Vocational-Technical School Authority v. Bogar & Bink, 261 Pa.Superior Ct. 350, 396 A.2d 433 (1978). Accordingly, DER and Chambers were without power to limit the statutorily authorized activities of the county, even if that had been their intent when entering into the contract. Furthermore, as Judge Weir noted, "an agency of government such as DER cannot by contract immunize a citizen or corporation from the consequences of future legislative enactments...."

Chambers next contends that section 106 of the Solid Waste Management Act, 35 P.S. § 6018.106, which, in 1980, empowered county health departments to enforce requirements of that act, did not alter DER's position as sole enforcement agency at its site because the legislature did not intend the act to be retroactive. Because we conclude that the consent agreement did not limit regulatory authority solely to DER, we need not address the merits of that contention. However, we note that there is no element of retroactivity present in this case. The county received enforcement authority in 1980, and exercised that authority by filing complaints in 1981 for violations which also occurred in 1981. The statute does not operate retroactively because it does not purport to affect the relationship, established by contract, between DER and Chambers. Although DER alone may enforce the provisions of that contract, the county's enforcement action is founded on state and local regulations, not on the contract. ²

Based on the language of section 106(b), 35 P.S. § 6018.106(b), Chambers next contends that the county has no authority because DER takes precedence when a conflict exists between it and administration and enforcement by a county. Although correct, Chambers' contention is irrelevant here; DER assured the county in writing that the county's enforcement activities against Chambers in no way conflicted with DER's actions. Before Judge Weir, the county presented the testimony of a DER...