Chambers v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps. Int'l Union, AFL-CIO

Decision Date31 March 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 3:18-cv-1685-SI
Citation450 F.Supp.3d 1108
Parties Jenni CHAMBERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Oregon

Milton L. Chappell, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., 8001 Braddock Road, Suite 600, Springfield, VA 22151; James G. Abernathy and Rebekah C. Millard, Freedom Foundation, PO Box 552, Olympia, WA 98507. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

Scott A. Kronland, P. Casey Pitts, Matthew J. Murray, and Amanda C. Lynch, Altshuler Berzon LLP, 177 Post Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94108; Margaret S. Olney, Bennett Hartman Morris & Kaplan LLP, 210 SW Morrison Street, Suite 500, Portland, OR 97204; James S. Coon, Thomas, Coon, Newton & Frost, 820 SW Second Avenue, Suite 200, Portland, OR 97204; Jason M. Weyland, Tedesco Law Group, 12780 SE Stark Street, Portland, OR 97233; Jeffrey W. Burritt, National Education Association, 1201 Sixteenth Street NW, Eighth Floor, Washington, DC 20036. Of Attorneys for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are public employees in Oregon.1 Defendants are unions or their affiliates (collectively, "Defendants" or the "Unions") that exclusively represent Plaintiffs in the public workplace.2 The Unions negotiated collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with Plaintiffs' public employers. These CBAs established the terms and conditions of employment for the relevant bargaining units. Although Plaintiffs were not members of the Unions, Oregon law had previously required Plaintiffs to pay compulsory union fees, often by automatic deduction from Plaintiffs' wages, to the Unions as a condition of Plaintiffs' public employment. In addition, certain provisions in Plaintiffs' respective CBAs reinforced this obligation. Plaintiffs did not consent to paying these fees to the Unions.

Under Oregon's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act ("PECBA"), Or. Rev. Stat. ("ORS") §§ 243.650 - 243.782 (2017), bargaining units of public employees may choose, by majority vote, to form a union for collective bargaining with public employers about their terms and conditions of employment. PECBA also had previously authorized public employers and employee unions to enter into agreements that required represented employees who were not union members to pay "fair-share fees"3 to cover their proportionate share of the costs of collective-bargaining representation. See ORS § 243.650(10) and (18) (2017) ; ORS § 243.666(1) (2017) ; ORS § 243.672(1)(c) (2017) ; and ORS § 292.055(5) (2017).4 In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education , 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), the United States Supreme Court explicitly upheld this practice of collecting compulsory fair-share fees from public employees under state law. It was also standard practice in public-sector bargaining agreements throughout the United States for more than 40 years. That all changed in June 2018, when the Supreme Court overturned Abood in Janus v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Council 31 , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L.Ed.2d 924 (2018). In Janus , the Supreme Court held that collecting fair-share fees from nonconsenting public sector employees violates the First Amendment rights of those nonconsenting employees, no matter how the fees were spent.

In September 2018, Plaintiff brought this putative class action against Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the forced fee deductions, or fair-share fees, violate their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs seek money damages and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs also allege state a tort claim of conversion of property for which they seek replevin or restitution. Defendants have moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, and the Court will treat Defendants' motion as a motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Court notes that a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Danielson v. Inslee , 945 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir.2019), involves issues that are nearly identical to those here and is binding precedent on this Court.5 For the reasons below, including the Ninth Circuit's decision in Danielson , Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.

STANDARDS

A party is entitled to summary judgment if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc. , 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). Although "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge ... ruling on a motion for summary judgment," the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position [is] insufficient ...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants primarily make three arguments. First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' claims for monetary relief should be dismissed because before Janus Defendants collected fair-share fees in good-faith reliance on state law and controlling Supreme Court precedent. Second, Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their state claim for conversion and are not entitled to either replevin or restitution. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief is moot. In response, Plaintiffs offer essentially four points. First, Plaintiffs assert that "good faith" is not a recognized defense for a private party against a claim under § 1983 for violating First Amendment rights. Second, Plaintiffs contend that even if good faith were a defense, Defendants have not established their good faith. Third, Plaintiffs argue that they have presented evidence of conversion under Oregon law as well as their entitlement to the equitable remedy of restitution. Fourth, Plaintiffs reject Defendants' assertion of mootness. The Court will address each point in turn.6

A. Whether Good Faith Is Available as a Defense for a Private Party in a § 1983 Claim

In Danielson , the Ninth Circuit addressed a case involving almost identical facts, claims, and defenses. The Ninth Circuit, agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, stated:

We hold that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for monetary relief against the Union. In so ruling, we join the Seventh Circuit, the only other circuit to have addressed the question before us. See Janus v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 31 , 942 F.3d 352 (7th Cir. 2019) (" Janus II "); Mooney v. Ill. Educ. Ass'n , 942 F.3d 368 (7th Cir. 2019). We agree with our sister circuit that a union defendant can invoke an affirmative defense of good faith to retrospective monetary liability under section 1983 for the agency fees it collected pre- Janus , where its conduct was directly authorized under both state law and decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Union was not required to forecast changing winds at the Supreme Court and anticipatorily presume the overturning of Abood . Instead, we permit private parties to rely on judicial pronouncements of what the law is, without exposing themselves to potential liability for doing so.

Danielson , 945 F.3d at 1098-99. In that case, the Ninth Circuit thoroughly explained its rationale. See Danielson , 945 F.3d at 1099-102. There is no need to repeat it here. Under binding Ninth Circuit precedent, Defendants here may assert good faith as a complete defense to Plaintiffs' claim under § 1983.

B. Whether Defendants Have Established Good Faith as a Matter of Law

Plaintiffs argue that, even if good faith is available as a defense, Defendants have not established their good faith as a matter of law. Plaintiffs make several arguments. First, Plaintiffs state that Defendants subjectively "knew" that the Supreme Court was likely to reverse Abood and hold that mandatory fair-share fees are unconstitutional. Second, Plaintiffs maintain that Defendants also expected and planned for the outcome in Janus and even used indemnity clauses, further reflecting their legal uncertainty in the viability of Abood . Third, Plaintiffs argue Defendants were not acting under "close government supervision."

Plaintiffs maintain that their evidence shows that Defendants subjectively anticipated the Supreme Court's ruling in Janus and planned for its outcome, including by using indemnity clauses. Even if that were true, none of it is legally relevant. As did the defendants in Danielson , Defendants here relied on presumptively valid state law and then-binding Supreme Court precedent. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Danielson :

The Supreme Court has admonished the circuit courts not to presume the overruling of its precedents, irrespective of hints in its decisions that a shift may be on the horizon.... We decline to hold private parties to a different standard. It would be paradoxical for the circuit courts to be required to follow Abood until its overruling in Janus , while private parties incur liability for doing the same.
The ability of the public to rely on the courts' pronouncements of law is integral to the functioning of our judicial system. After all, "[i]t is emphatically the
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