Chambers v. Cameron, 169.
| Decision Date | 03 October 1939 |
| Docket Number | No. 169.,169. |
| Citation | 29 F. Supp. 742 |
| Parties | CHAMBERS et al. v. CAMERON (JACOBSON, Intervener). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Frank J. Jacobson and Mayer, Altheimer & Kabaker, all of Chicago, Ill., for intervenor.
William S. Bedal, of St. Louis, Mo., and Gordon, Pierce, Edmonds & Martin, of Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Yowell & Langdon, of Chicago, Ill., for defendant Malleable Iron Co.
The pleadings, although confusing because of improper designation, in substance follow the order required by the new "Rules of Civil Procedure." So far as here pertinent plaintiffs are trustees under a trust agreement and declaration of trust executed by James H. Jacobson, defendant, and his wife, to secure an indebtedness by one of defendant's companies, since paid, and a $30,000 loan from Southern Malleable Iron Company evidenced by one promissory installment note. To secure payment, defendant transferred to plaintiffs as trustees certain real and personal property including, by bill of sale, nine show horses on defendant's farm at Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. The bill of sale, trust agreement and promissory note are dated April 12, 1938. Plaintiffs, alleging a default in the payment of the first installment due October 12, 1938, filed their affidavit and complaint in replevin demanding that a writ of replevin issue and that plaintiffs, under the terms of the trust agreement, be adjudged entitled to the possession of the show horses which Jacobson had delivered for sale to Adolph Cameron. James H. Jacobson was granted leave to intervene and file his answer and counterclaim. The counterclaim charges that plaintiffs as individuals and as officers of the Southern Malleable Iron Company and the company as an entity, among other things, were guilty of a conspiracy the object of which was to irreparably damage defendant forcing him to default in the payment of the note, whereupon under the terms of the trust agreement they could acquire the property of the defendant therein conveyed. The original complainants, as trustees, and the Southern Malleable Iron Company have answered and moved to strike the counterclaim of Jacobson. The Court has examined the pleadings and considered the briefs and is of the opinion the motions must be allowed for several reasons:
(1) The counterclaim of Jacobson is in gross and flagrant violation of Rule 8(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c, which requires that a claim for relief, whether an original claim or counterclaim "shall contain * * * a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The counterclaim, omitting the exhibits thereto, contains thirty-one pages of typewritten matter and, with the exhibits, forty-five pages. It contains forty-four numbered paragraphs. The pleading is, in many respects, argumentative, is verbose, prolix and contains much evidentiary matter and otherwise is highly objectionable under the new rules.
(2) The counterclaim of Jacobson is also in violation of Rule 12(f) in that it contains redundant, immaterial and impertinent matter.
(3) The averments of fraud...
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...States Government in its proprietary role where the Government had sued not in its proprietary role, but as a trustee); Chambers v. Cameron, 29 F.Supp. 742 (N.D.Ill.1939) (in suit by trustees for the benefit of the trust, defendant cannot counterclaim against the trustees individually), see......
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...in my judgment, an "opposing party" within the meaning of rule 13, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Cf. Chambers v. Cameron, D.C.N.D.Ill.1939, 29 F.Supp. 742; Durham v. Bunn, D.C. E.D.Pa.1949, 85 F.Supp. 530; United States ex rel. Rodriquez v. Weekly Publications, D.C.S.D.N.Y.194......
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