Chambers v. Central School Dist. School Bd. of Greene County, 11A01-8705-CV-108

• Decision Date: 18 November 1987
• Docket Number: No. 11A01-8705-CV-108,11A01-8705-CV-108
• Citation: 514 N.E.2d 1294
• Parties: 42 Ed. Law Rep. 909 Paul CHAMBERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD OF GREENE COUNTY, and Herman Bredewey, Mrs. Judy Krueger, and Mrs. Patricia Dhahir, Individually and in Their Capacity as Board Members and Portia Hockman and Steve Graf in Their Capacity as Board Members Only, and Sharon Knoll, Individually and in her Capacity as Greene County Superintendent of Public Education, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 1294

514 N.E.2d 1294

42 Ed. Law Rep. 909

Paul CHAMBERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD OF GREENE COUNTY, and Herman Bredewey, Mrs. Judy Krueger, and Mrs. Patricia

Dhahir, Individually and in Their Capacity as Board Members

and Portia Hockman and Steve Graf in Their Capacity as Board

Members Only, and Sharon Knoll, Individually and in her

Capacity as Greene County Superintendent of Public

Education, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 11A01-8705-CV-108.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

First District.

Nov. 18, 1987.

Nina J. Alexander, Trueblood, Harmon, Carter & Cook, Terre Haute, for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert E. Cambridge, Bloomington, for defendants-appellees.

NEAL, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff-appellant, Paul Chambers (Chambers), appeals a judgment of the Clay Circuit Court, which entered summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellees, Central School District of Greene County et al. (School), on Chambers's suit for breach of his contract as a principal for School.

We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Chambers began his employment as a high school principal by School pursuant to a written contract, which ran from July 13, 1981 to July 13, 1983. On March 18, 1982, School's board granted Chambers a three-year extension by executing three separate, written contracts. The contracts were for the 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-86 school years, the ending date of the last contract being July 13, 1986. Each contract contained a $1,000.00/year raise. On August 15, 1984, School's superintendent notified Chambers by letter that School's board was to meet on September 20 to consider the cancellation of his indefinite contract. Chambers was also informed that School intended to utilize the cancellation procedure set forth in IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-11. Counsel for Chambers responded with a letter dated August 20, 1984. In it, Chambers contended he was not employed under an indefinite contract and the procedural machinery of IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-11 was inapplicable because he was an administrator. Chambers did request a hearing, on the assumption that School had the authority to cancel his contract. By a letter dated August 23, 1984, School informed Chambers that, per his request, a pre-hearing had been scheduled for September 14, and a hearing before the board was set for September 18. Chambers did not attend either proceeding. At its regular meeting on September 20 the board voted to terminate Chambers's contract as a principal and also his indefinite teacher's contract. Chambers was notified by a letter dated that same day.

Chambers filed his eight-count complaint on October 4, 1984 alleging, inter alia, that School breached his definite, written contract. Chambers then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming there was no dispute that his relationship with School was governed by a definite, written contract. School responded and admitted the existence of the series of contracts, but claimed a dispute as to the applicability of the statutory provisions for contract cancellation vis-a-vis its relationship with Chambers. Accordingly, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Chambers. Chambers then filed a second motion for partial summary judgment, stating there was no issue of fact that his definite, written contract with School was for three years and, by acting pursuant to IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-11, School unlawfully terminated his contract. School countered with its own motion for partial summary judgment, alleging it was required to follow the statutory cancellation procedure, Chambers did not exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking redress in the trial court and thus was barred from obtaining relief, and his cause of action represented an impermissible collateral attack. The trial court held a hearing on the motions. It found that the definite, written contract was for a three-year period, but that School could use the statutory cancellation procedure to terminate Chambers's indefinite contract as well as the definite, written contract. The trial court then entered summary judgment on those issues, prompting Chambers to institute this appeal.

ISSUES

Chambers presents the following issues, contending the trial court acted contrary to law in:

I. Finding that the definite, written contract between Chambers and School was supplemental to, and dependent upon, the existence of an indefinite contract between them, such that cancellation of the latter automatically cancelled the former;

II. Finding that School's notice to Chambers of its intent to cancel his III. Finding that IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-10.5 and -11, which provide the grounds and procedure for cancellation of an indefinite contract, are equally applicable to the cancellation of a definite contract.

indefinite contract was sufficient notice of its intent to cancel his definite, written contract; and

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review in an appeal from a summary judgment is well established. We ascertain whether the pleadings, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for admission, and depositions, when read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, reveal any genuine issues of material facts, and if not, whether the trial court correctly applied the law. Shallenberger v. Scoggins-Tomlinson, Inc. (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 699. In performing our function of review we stand in the position of the trial court and consider the same matters as it does. Moll v. South Central Solar Systems, Inc. (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 154.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

ISSUE I: Indefinite/Definite Contracts

Chambers maintains the trial court's ruling that his definite, written contract co-existed with and was dependent upon his indefinite contract was contrary to law, and School's cancellation of the latter could not automatically cancel the former.

IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-9.5 defines indefinite contracts:

(a) Each person who:

(1) serves under contract as a teacher in a public school corporation for two (2) successive years;

(2) at any time thereafter enters into a teacher's contract for further service with that school corporation; and

(3) is not a permanent teacher, as defined in IC 20-6.1-4-9;

is a semi-permanent teacher of that school corporation. When a contract between the school corporation and a semi-permanent teacher expires by its terms, that contract is considered to continue indefinitely as an indefinite contract for a semi-permanent teacher.

(b) An indefinite contract for a semi-permanent teacher remains in force until:

(1) the contract is replaced by a new contract signed by both parties;

(2) the contract is cancelled as provided in sections 10.5 and 11 of this chapter; or

(3) the teacher becomes a permanent teacher, as defined in IC 20-6.1-4-9.

The trial court, in its memorandum of law accompanying its summary judgment ruling, determined that two bases existed to support School's action. The trial court reasoned that the right to become a principal is derived from the status of teacher, and, once the teacher's contract is cancelled, the foundation for the principal's contract no longer exists. In essence, the cancellation of an indefinite teacher's contract necessarily and automatically terminates the definite contract.

The second basis relied upon by the trial court was, assuming the first basis was erroneous, that School satisfied its contractual duty to Chambers by utilizing the statutory cancellation procedure found in IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-11. This basis will be discussed in Issue III.

Concerning the first basis, we do not accept Chambers's argument that an indefinite contract and a definite contract cannot exist simultaneously.

Pursuant to a statute all teachers, regardless of whether they have achieved any level of tenure, must be employed on a uniform teacher's contract. IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-5. This requirement also applies to principals. IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-17.1(1). The legislative purpose behind this requirement is not to terminate tenure by supplanting indefinite contracts with definite ones, but is to enable schools and their tenured teachers to adjust the provisions of indefinite contracts. Stiver v. State ex rel. Kent (1936), 211 Ind. 370, 1 N.E.2d 592., reh. denied, 211 Ind. 370, 7 N.E.2d 181; see also School City of Lafayette v. Highley (1937), 213 Ind. 369, 377, 12 N.E.2d 927, 930 (court held that once an indefinite contract is established, tenure is unaffected by the execution of further written contracts).

In the instant case, Chambers achieved semi-permanent status pursuant to IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-9.5(a), a status that was not lost merely because School and he executed written contracts providing for salary increases. Because IND.CODE 20-6.1-4-5 requires that written contracts be executed even after an indefinite contract is established, obviously the two contracts must exist simultaneously. A written contract does not preempt a teacher's rights secured by the statutes, it merely supplements those rights with a specific contractual relationship. State ex rel. Cleary v. Bd. of School Commissioners (1982), Ind.App., 438 N.E.2d 12; New Castle-Henry Township School Corp. v. Hurst (1969), 145 Ind.App. 131, 247 N.E.2d 835, trans. denied.

Both Cleary and Hurst involved a situation where a tenured teacher was employed as a principal pursuant to a written contract. It was held in both cases that the effect of terminating the written contract is to leave the teacher with an indefinite contract. 438 N.E.2d at 15; 145 Ind.App. at 138, 247 N.E.2d at 839-40.

Here, School cancelled Chambers's indefinite contract. His definite contract being necessarily dependent upon the existence of the indefinite contract, there was nothing for the definite contract to supplement. Therefore, the trial court's ruling was not contrary to law.

ISSUE II: Notice of Termination

Chambers argues the trial court acted...