Chambers v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 06 April 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 14-2032 (RBW).
• Citation: 249 F.Supp.3d 66
• Parties: Mary E. CHAMBERS, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

249 F.Supp.3d 66

Mary E. CHAMBERS, Plaintiff,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-2032 (RBW).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed April 6, 2017

Johnnie Louis Johnson, III, Law Offices of Johnnie Louis Johnson III, Reston, VA, for Plaintiff.

David A. Jackson, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiff, Mary E. Chambers, filed her amended complaint against the defendant, the District of Columbia (the "District"), on November 13, 2015, alleging that the District retaliated against her for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in 2011, discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and age, and created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2 to – 17 (2012) ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) ("ADEA").¹ Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶¶ 1, 10–15. Currently before the Court is Defendant the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Mot."). Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,² the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the District's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff is a Support Enforcement Specialist in the Child Support Services Division of the District's Office of the Attorney General. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. According to the plaintiff, the Office of the Attorney General

permitt[ed] male employees under the age of 40 years to transfer to other departments and receive[ ] incentive awards and special awards after their transfers[,] but denied [the plaintiff] and another female employee the same opportunity to transfer to other units or receive incentive awards and special awards. ... [A] male co-worker had communication and performance issues with customers but was not disciplined[,] but [the plaintiff] was disciplined because she had filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC.

Id. ¶ 10.

On March 4, 2011, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and the District's Office of Human Rights, alleging that she was discriminated against based on her gender and retaliated against for filing a prior charge of discrimination in August 2010.³ Def.'s Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2011–00598) at 3. On August 14, 2014, the EEOC mailed to the plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Rights, in which the plaintiff was informed that "the EEOC [wa]s closing its file on th[e] charge[s she had filed] ... [because, b]ased upon its investigation, the EEOC [wa]s unable to conclude that the information obtained establishes violations of the statutes." Complaint ("Compl."), Ex. 1 (Dismissal and Notice of Rights No. 570–2011–00598) at 1.

On November 20, 2014, the plaintiff filed her Complaint in this case.⁴ Id. at 1. On October 23, 2015, the Court granted the District's⁵ motion to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but did so without prejudice. Order at 1–2 (Oct. 23, 2015), ECF No. 15. Specifically, the Court noted that it was "unable to discern a factual predicate for any of the plaintiff's claims," id. at 4, and offered the plaintiff the opportunity to amend her Complaint, id. at 10. The plaintiff then filed her Amended Complaint on November 13, 2015, alleging discrimination based on gender and age, the creation of a hostile work environment, and retaliation. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10–15.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether a complaint "state[s] a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6) ], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While the Court must "assume [the] veracity" of any "well-pleaded factual allegations" in a complaint, conclusory allegations "are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached thereto or incorporated therein, and matters of which it may take judicial notice." Abhe & Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao, 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiff's Age Discrimination & Hostile Work Environment Claims

The District moves to dismiss the plaintiff's age discrimination claim, contending that she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to this claim. See Def.'s Mem. at 4. Specifically, the District argues that the plaintiff's age discrimination claim fails as a matter of law because she did not include it in her administrative charge of discrimination, as "[t]here is no claim, explicit or implied, in the [c]harge of [d]iscrimination relating to age." Id. The Court agrees with the District that the plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to her age discrimination claim, and further concludes that the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her hostile work environment claim as well.⁶

"Before suing under either the ADEA or Title VII, an aggrieved party must exhaust his [or her] administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory incident." Washington v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 160 F.3d 750, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "[A]s the D.C. Circuit has emphasized: ‘Allowing a complaint to encompass allegations outside the ambit of the predicate EEOC charge would circumvent the EEOC's investigatory and conciliatory role, as well as deprive the charged party of notice of the charge, as surely as would an initial failure to file a timely EEOC charge.’ " Singleton v. Potter, 402 F.Supp.2d 12, 32 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Marshall v. Fed. Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ). This exhaustion requirement is not a "mere technicality," but "serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrow[ing] the issues for prompt adjudication and decision." Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court concludes that the plaintiff's age discrimination and hostile work environment claims must be dismissed because her "charge not only lacks the words ‘hostile work environment’ [and ‘age discrimination,’] but also lacks any factual allegations supporting such [ ] claim[s]." Id. at 908. In her charge of discrimination, the plaintiff alleged only that (1) male co-workers were treated more favorably with regard to discipline and department transfers; and (2) the plaintiff was retaliated against when her "caseload was taken from [her] and [she] was reassigned to another unit without ... proper training." Def.'s Mot., Ex. 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2011–00598) at 3. Therefore, the plaintiff's charge of discrimination lacks any reference to age discrimination or a hostile work environment. See id., Ex. 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2011–00598) at 3.

Nevertheless, the plaintiff contends that the inclusion in the charge of discrimination of her date of birth and the year she was hired by the District sufficed to put the District on notice that she was alleging age discrimination. Pl.'s Opp'n at 4. The Court disagrees that the inclusion of this information put the District on notice of a claim of age discrimination, particularly given the fact that the plaintiff concluded her allegations by designating the specific type of discrimination she believed she had suffered, without mentioning age discrimination or saying anything about having been subjected to a hostile work environment, see Def.'s Mot., Ex. 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2011–00598) at 3 ("I believe I have been discriminated against based on my sex (Female) and retaliated against, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended."); see also Park, 71 F.3d at 908 (concluding that a statement alleging discrimination based on national origin "cannot be read to encompass a hostile work environment claim").

Finally, the plaintiff argues that the District's argument regarding her alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to her age discrimination claim is erroneous because the plaintiff "filed an additional charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC [in 2016] in which she alleged acts of retaliation and disability discrimination," Pl.'s Opp'n at 3; see also id., Ex. 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2016–01667) at 1, and that she "inten [ds] to amend the Amended Complaint to include these additional allegations of employment discrimination," id. at 3. This 2016 charge of discrimination, however, only alleges discrimination based on disability and retaliation, and does not contain any factual allegations regarding age discrimination or a hostile work environment. See id., Ex. 1 (Charge of Discrimination No. 570–2016–01667) at 1 (alleging disability discrimination and a breach of confidentiality regarding the plaintiff's disability status). Accordingly, even if ...