Chambers v. Groome Transp. of Ala.
| Decision Date | 26 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:14–CV–237–WKW. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
| Parties | Nettie CHAMBERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GROOME TRANSPORTATION OF ALABAMA, et al., Defendants. |
David A. Hughes, Hardin & Hughes, LLP, Tuscaloosa, AL, John Michael Segrest, The Segrest Law Firm, Tallassee, AL, for Plaintiffs.
David Lee Brown, Jr., Martha Leach Thompson, Hugh Cannon Lawley, Huie Fernambucq Stewart LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.
Forty-five Plaintiffs bring this complaint against their former employer, alleging violations of the Workers' Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 –09 (“WARN Act”) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 –19. In lieu of an answer, Defendant Groome Transportation of Alabama, Inc. (“Groome Transportation”) filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Doc. # 8.) Groome Transportation argues that an arbitration agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 –16 require Plaintiffs to submit their claims to binding arbitration rather than file suit. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the evidence, the court finds that, as to all but one Plaintiff, there exists a genuine dispute with respect to the “making” of an arbitration agreement. As to those forty-four Plaintiffs, this action will proceed to a bench trial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4 regarding the making of agreements to arbitrate. As to Plaintiff Annie L. Adams, Groome Transportation's motion to compel arbitration is due to be granted.
Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.
The forty-five Plaintiffs are former employees of Groome Transportation, which had contracted with Auburn University to provide shuttle bus services for its students. Plaintiffs worked as shuttle bus drivers, transporting students within Auburn's city limits and principally on Auburn University's campus, beginning prior to April 2012 and continuing until July 2013 when Groome Transportation closed its area plant. (Compl.¶ 16.)
Until April 2012, Groome Transportation paid Plaintiffs at a rate of time-and-a-half for all hours worked over forty per week. However, in April 2012, Groome Transportation ceased paying its shuttle bus drivers overtime wages, even though the drivers continued to perform the same duties and work the same shifts with overtime hours. Plaintiffs allege that, at this time, Groome Transportation created a bogus shuttle service to the Atlanta, Georgia airport in an attempt to “create a loophole in the [FLSA] overtime laws” presumably under the motor-carrier exemption, see 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).1 In October 2012, Groome Transportation drivers “staged a walk-out.” (Pl. Cassandra Young Aff., at 2 (Doc. # 18–1).) As a result of the walk-out and concomitant pressure from Auburn University, Groome Transportation recommenced paying overtime wages in December 2012.
Additionally, in October 2012, around the time of the walk-out, Groome Transportation presented its employees with a one-page Arbitration Agreement, which was added to the Personnel Policy Handbook. The Arbitration Clause and Agreement provides:
The parties agree that any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or related to Employee's employment with Groome Transportation of Alabama, shall be submitted to and decided by binding arbitration in Richmond, Virginia. Arbitration shall be administered and conducted under the Mediation Rules by mediators of the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). The rules are available online at www.adr.org. You may also call the AAA at 1–800–778–7879 if there are any questions about the arbitration process. Discovery in any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted according to the American Arbitration Association Rules.
(Arbitration Agreement (Ex. A to Doc. # 8).) The Arbitration Agreement also contains an acknowledgement with signature lines for the employee and a Groome Transportation official to sign. The acknowledgment provides:
This agreement to arbitrate is freely negotiated between Employee and Groome Transportation of Alabama, and is mutually entered into between the parties. Each party fully understands and agrees that they are giving up certain rights otherwise afforded to them by civil court actions, including but not limited to a jury trial.
(Arbitration Agreement.)
The record does not reveal how many Plaintiffs signed the acknowledgement. Groome Transportation submits only one signed Arbitration Agreement, and that agreement bears the signature of Plaintiff Annie L. Adams, dated January 23, 2013. (Pl. Adams's Arbitration Agreement (Ex. A to Doc. # 8).) Plaintiffs, in turn, submit one affidavit from Plaintiff Cassandra Young, who says that she “refused to sign the arbitration agreement.” (Young's Aff., at 2.) While Ms. Young further attests that “many [other] employees” also refused to sign, she does not identify which Plaintiffs, if any, are in the group of employees who did not sign an Arbitration Agreement. (Young's Aff., at 2.) On this record then, the facts known are that one Arbitration Agreement bears the signature of Annie L. Adams (who has not disputed the authenticity of the signature) and that one Plaintiff has refused to sign the agreement. The status of whether the remaining forty-three Plaintiffs signed or did not sign an Arbitration Agreement is unknown.
Groome Transportation's Regional Director, Kristie Holcombe, also attests that, “[a]s a condition of employment and/or continued employment, the Personnel Policy Handbook has contained a mutually binding arbitration agreement since October 19, 2012.” (Holcombe's Aff., at ¶ 4 (Ex. 1 to Doc. # 8).) Groome Transportation has not submitted an excerpt from the Personnel Policy Handbook that contains a written provision indicating that continued employment equates acceptance of the Arbitration Agreement. (Holcombe's Aff., at ¶ 4.) It is unclear from Ms. Holcombe's affidavit how Groome Transportation notified its employees of this condition of employment. Ms. Young attests, though, that Groome Transportation officials orally informed her, that if she did not sign the Arbitration Agreement, her employment would be terminated. But she also says that, when she refused to sign the agreement, she was not fired. Ms. Young also attests that she is “not aware of any co-workers who were terminated for refusing to sign the arbitration agreement.” (Young's Aff., at 2.)
Ms. Young, along with her co-Plaintiffs, continued to work for Groome Transportation until July 2013, when Groome Transportation closed its Lee County facility. At that time, Plaintiffs' employment ended.
On April 2, 2014, Plaintiffs filed this action against Groome Transportation and three of its corporate officers. The Complaint contains two counts. In Count One, which alleges violations of the FLSA, Plaintiffs contend that from approximately April 1, 2012, to November 30, 2012, Groome Transportation did not adequately compensate them for hours worked in excess of forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (). Plaintiffs seek unpaid overtime wages in a collective action under the FLSA. In Count Two, Plaintiffs bring a claim under the WARN Act, individually and as representatives of a proposed class, alleging that Groome Transportation failed to give the minimum sixty-day written notice to its employees as required by the WARN Act. Plaintiffs seek all relief available under the WARN Act, including sixty days back pay. Plaintiffs further demand a jury trial as to Count One. But Groome Transportation contends that court litigation of Plaintiffs' claims is not an option and that Plaintiffs must submit their claims to arbitration.
Pursuant to the FAA, a written arbitration provision in a “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce” is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. If a party is “aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement,” it may petition a federal district court “for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in [the] agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. When addressing a § 4 motion, the district court must determine whether there is a binding agreement to arbitrate and, if so, whether the nonmovant has breached its obligation to arbitrate under that agreement. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 6 ).
The court can consider evidence outside of the pleadings for purposes of a motion to compel arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit has countenanced the use of the summary judgment standard to resolve a motion to compel arbitration. See Johnson v. KeyBank Nat'l Assoc., 754 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir.2014) () (quoting Magnolia Capital Advisors, Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 272 Fed.Appx. 782, 785–86 (11th Cir.2008) (per curiam)).
The FAA evinces a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Hill v. Rent–A–Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Moses, 460 U.S. at 24, 103 S.Ct. 927 ); see also Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.2009) (). “[A]ny doubts concerning the scope of...
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