Chambers v. Meeks
Decision Date | 12 July 2021 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-CV-558-SRW [WO] |
Parties | ZACHARY CHAMBERS, #287502, Plaintiff, v. DENNIS MEEKS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Zachary Chambers, an inmate confined, post-conviction, in the Covington County Jail during the time relevant to the complaint.2 Chambers alleges that the defendants failed to protect him from attack by inmate Kevin Lawrence on January 8, 2018 and did not provide him medical treatment for injuries he suffered in this attack. Doc. 1 at 2-3, 5-7. Chambers names Dennis Meeks, the sheriff of Covington County; Adam Syler, the jail administrator; David Anderson, chief deputy of the Covington County Sheriff's Department; and Stewart Brooks and Hunter Coon, officers at the Covington County Jail, as defendants in this case.3Chambers seeks relief from the defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Doc. 1 at 5. Chambers seeks monetary damages from the defendants for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. Doc. 1 at 8.
The defendants filed an answer, a special report, supplements to their report and supporting evidentiary materials—including affidavits and jail records—addressing Chambers' claims for relief. In these documents, the defendants deny that they acted with deliberate indifference to Chambers' safety. Doc. 21-1 at 1; Doc. 21-2 1; Doc. 21-3 at 2-4; Doc. 21-5 at 3-5; Doc.25-1 at 3-4.4 With respect to the claim regarding a denial of medical treatment, the defendants assert that Chambers received appropriate treatment for his injuries as determined by the jail's medical professionals and deny acting with deliberate indifference to Chambers' medical needs.5 Doc. 21-3 at 3-4; Doc. 21-5 at 4-5 & 25-1 at 4.
After reviewing the initial special report filed by the defendants and documents attached thereto, the court on August 16, 2018 directed Chambers to file a response to each of the arguments set forth by the defendants in their report and advising him that hisresponse should be supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other appropriate evidentiary materials. Doc. 23 at 3. The order specifically advised the parties that "unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party files a response in opposition which presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time provided for the plaintiff to file a response to the order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment, whichever is proper, and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion in accordance with the law." Doc. 23 at 4 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In compliance with this order, Chambers filed a response and sworn affidavit on August 30, 2018. Doc. 27.
Upon receipt of a supplemental special report from the defendants further addressing the exhaustion defense, Doc. 30, the court provided Chambers an opportunity to file a response to this report. Doc. 28. As permitted by this order and after a requested extension of time, Chambers filed an additional affidavit in response on November 8, 2018. Doc. 33.
Pursuant to the orders entered in this case, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendants' reports as a motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the evidentiary materials filed in support thereof, the sworn complaint, the plaintiff's response and affidavits in opposition, the court concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants.
"Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. (). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits or properly sworn statements], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) ( ). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24; Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) ( ).
When the defendants meet their evidentiary burden, as they have in this case, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate evidence, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-94 ( ). In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006) (internal citation omitted). This court will also consider "specific facts" pled in a plaintiff's sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014); Barker v. Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) ( ). However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005).
A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). The evidence must be admissible at trial, and if the nonmoving party's evidence "is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "A mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice[.]" Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Only disputes involving material facts are relevant and materiality is determined by the substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. At the summary judgment stage, this court should accept as true "statements in [the plaintiff's] verified complaint, [any] sworn response to the [defendants'] motion for summary judgment, and sworn affidavit attached to that response[.]" Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2018) ( ); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (...
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