Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.

Decision Date05 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 147PA18,147PA18
Citation374 N.C. 436,843 S.E.2d 172
Parties Christopher CHAMBERS, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. The MOSES H. CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL; the Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation d/b/a Moses Cone Health System and d/b/a Cone Health; and Does 1 through 25, inclusive
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Higgins Benjamin, PLLC, by John F. Bloss, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Womble Bond Dickinson, LLP, by Philip J. Mohr, Greensboro, and Brent F. Powell, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellees The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation.

Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Burton Craige, Raleigh, and Narendra K. Ghosh, Chapel Hill, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice; Carol L. Brooke, Jack Holtzman, and Clermont F. Ripley, Raleigh, for North Carolina Justice Center; and William R. Corbett and Deborah Goldstein, Durham, for Center for Responsible Lending, amici curiae.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Ryan Y. Park, Deputy Solicitor General, Daniel T. Wilkes, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew C. Burke, Solicitor General Fellow, for the State of North Carolina, amicus curiae.

Linwood Jones, Raleigh, for North Carolina Healthcare Association, amicus curiae.

EARLS, Justice.

Christopher Chambers and his wife were sued in May 2012 by The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation seeking collection of $14,358.14 plus interest, allegedly owed for emergency room services. Around the same time, Christopher Chambers filed a class action complaint against The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital and The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital Operating Corporation (Moses Cone) seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract he signed as an uninsured patient needing emergency medical treatment entitled Moses Cone to recover no more than the reasonable value of the services it provided. We must now decide whether Moses Cone's subsequent, unilateral action dismissing its claims against Chambers and his wife and ceasing all other attempts to collect the debt, prior to certification of the class in Chambers's declaratory judgment action, renders the entire class action moot. Following the logic of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Richardson v. Bledsoe , 829 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2016), we hold that the relation back doctrine "may be applied to relate a now-moot individual claim back to the date of the class action complaint" when the event that moots the plaintiff's claim occurs before the plaintiff has had a fair opportunity to seek class certification and provided that the plaintiff has not unduly delayed in litigating the motion for class certification. Id. at 285. Therefore, "when ‘satisfaction of the plaintiff's individual claim [occurs] before the court can reasonably be expected to rule on the class certification motion,’ the plaintiff's stake in the litigation is not extinguished," and the case is not moot. Id. (quoting Lucero v. Bureau of Collection Recovery, Inc. , 639 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 2011) ).

I. Factual Background

On or about 23 August 2011, Chambers was treated at Moses Cone's emergency room where he underwent an emergency appendectomy. He was uninsured at the time. In his complaint, Chambers alleged that the $14,358.14 he was charged by Moses Cone (separate from independent physicians’ and other non-hospital charges) was "far more than the payment amount required from the vast majority" of Moses Cone's patients receiving similar services, and he alleged that the bill was grossly excessive, out of proportion to Moses Cone's actual cost, and much greater than the reasonable value of such services.

Chambers sought to bring this action on behalf of a class, defined as follows:

All individuals (or their guardians or representatives) who within four years of the date of the filing of the Complaint in this action and through the date that the Court certifies the action as a class action (a) received emergency care medical treatment at Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital or another Cone Health Hospital; (b) whose bills were not paid in whole or part by commercial insurance or a governmental healthcare program; and (c) who were not granted a full discount or waiver under Defendants’ charity care policies or otherwise had their bills permanently waived or written off in full by Defendants.

According to Moses Cone's standard contract in force at the time Chambers had his appendectomy, the patient was obligated to pay the Moses Cone's bill "in accordance with the regular rates and terms of Cone Health." Chambers contended he expected to pay the same as other emergency care patients who sign the same contract but that, as an uninsured patient, he was charged 100% of Moses Cone's Chargemaster rates, which he alleges are artificial, grossly inflated rates.

Chambers initially filed suit on 11 May 2012. Moses Cone filed an answer and counterclaim on 3 August 2012 denying all class allegations, asserting seventeen affirmative defenses, bringing counterclaims against Chambers and his wife seeking compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees, and asking the trial court to consolidate the action with Moses Cone's original lawsuit seeking payment of the $14,358.14 bill. Shortly after Moses Cone filed its answer and counterclaim, Robin D. Hayes sought to intervene as a plaintiff, individually and as a class representative. More than a year later, on 27 September 2013, the trial court ordered that "further consideration of the [m]otion [to intervene] should be delayed until after the Court rules on Plaintiff's motion for class certification." On 2 July 2014, the case was assigned to a new judge and thereafter a status conference was held "at which the parties agreed to ... stay further proceedings in this case until the Court issued an opinion on related matters in Hefner v. Mission Hosp., Inc. , No. 12 CVS 3088, 2015 WL 8773525 ." The plaintiff's claims in Hefner eventually were ruled moot when the defendant hospital in that case "unequivocally bound itself to seek no payment" of its bill from the plaintiff. This case then was reactivated, and Chambers filed an Amended Class Action Complaint. Moses Cone then dismissed its claims for the remainder of its bill and on the following day, filed a motion to dismiss the case. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on 16 March 2017 and, citing Hefner , noted that "[s]imilar to the hospital defendant in Hefner , Moses Cone has voluntarily dismissed with prejudice its collection action against Chambers, meaning that Moses Cone has no right to recover any additional payments from Chambers." In addition, the trial court went on to deny Hayes’ motion to intervene, leaving no plaintiff to maintain the class action claims.

Chambers filed a notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the case. Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. , 259 N.C. App. 8, 13, 814 S.E.2d 864, 869 (2018). The Court of Appeals concluded that because Chambers’ bill was permanently waived, he was no longer a member of the proposed class and, therefore, it was appropriate to apply the general rule that an appeal presenting a question that has become moot will be dismissed. Id. at 12, 814 S.E.2d at 868. Because the class had not yet been certified and the sole class representative no longer had "a genuine personal interest in the outcome of the case," the Court of Appeals concluded that it "need not determine if the class action is now moot based on the conduct of Moses Cone or the public interest." Id. at 13, 814 S.E.2d at 868. This Court granted discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 (2019).

Chambers’ original class action complaint alleged that uninsured patients receiving emergency medical care at Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital or another Cone Health hospital who were charged 100% of the hospital's Chargemaster rates numbered "at least hundreds, if not thousands, of persons." Chambers further alleged (1) that there were questions of law and fact common to the class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members; (2) that he will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class; and (3) that a class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the claims. The complaint asserted the following:

Most losses are modest in relation to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of the litigation necessitated by the Defendants’ wrongful conduct. It would be virtually impossible for the Class members to efficiently redress their wrongs individually. Even if all Class members could afford such individual litigation themselves, the court system would benefit from a class action. Individualized litigation would present the potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. Individualized litigation would also magnify the delay and expense to all parties and the court system presented by the issues of the case.

However, before these allegations could be tested at the class certification stage, Moses Cone sought to end the litigation by dismissing its claims against Chambers and suspending its attempts to collect the debt it alleged was owed by Chambers and his wife for the emergency appendectomy.

II. Class Action Context

Class action lawsuits have long been a feature of our justice system. The class action lawsuit originated in the middle ages. See Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys. , 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (tracing the history of class actions). "In order to facilitate the adjudication of disputes involving common questions and multiple parties in a single action, the English Court of Chancery developed the bill of peace." 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1751 (3d ed. 1986). The English bill of peace became the basis for class actions in the United States, including North Carolina's early class action decisions in...

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5 cases
  • Dewalt v. Hooks
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 4, 2022
    ...a single action, was the basis for North Carolina's early class action decisions in the late 1800s. See Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. , 374 N.C. 436, 440, 843 S.E.2d 172 (2020) (citing Bronson v. Wilmington N.C. Life Ins. Co. , 85 N.C. 411, 414 (1881) (acknowledging the class action......
  • Dewalt v. Hooks
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • November 4, 2022
    ... ... See ... Chambers ... See ... Chambers v. Moses ... See ... Chambers v. Moses H. Cone ... See ... Chambers v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp ... ...
  • Chambers v. The Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of North Carolina
    • December 3, 2021
  • Chambers v. The Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
    • United States
    • Superior Court of North Carolina
    • July 19, 2021
    ... ... he could no longer represent the putative class, and ... dismissed the amended complaint. See Chambers v. Moses H ... Cone Mem'l Hosp., 2017 NCBC LEXIS 22, at *12-20 ( ... N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2017). The Court of Appeals affirmed ... that decision, but the Supreme Court ... ...
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