Chambers v. Ormiston
Decision Date | 07 December 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 2006-340.,2006-340. |
Citation | 935 A.2d 956 |
Parties | Margaret R. CHAMBERS v. Cassandra B. ORMISTON. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Louis M. Pulner, for Margaret R. Chambers.
Nancy A. Palmisciano, Providence, for Cassandra B. Ormiston.
Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.
The Family Court, a legislatively created court of limited jurisdiction,1 acting pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 9-24-27, has certified the following question to this Court:
"May the Family Court properly recognize, for the purpose of entertaining a divorce petition, the marriage of two persons of the same sex who were purportedly married in another state?"
For the reasons set forth herein, it is our opinion that the certified question must be answered in the negative.2
On May 26, 2004, Rhode Island residents Margaret Chambers and Cassandra Ormiston3 traveled to Massachusetts and applied for a marriage license in that state. After Ms. Chambers and Ms. Ormiston received a marriage license, a Massachusetts justice of the peace performed a marriage ceremony in Fall River, Massachusetts. The couple thereafter returned to Rhode Island, where they resided together until they decided to seek to dissolve in this state the relationship that Massachusetts deems to be a marriage4 and that had been solemnized by the Massachusetts justice of the peace.
On October 23, 2006, Ms. Chambers filed a petition for divorce in the Family Court, and on October 27 of that year Ms. Ormiston filed an answer and counterclaim. Thereafter, on December 11, 2006, the Chief Judge of the Family Court certified to this Court a question as to whether or not the Family Court has subject matter jurisdiction to grant a petition for divorce with respect to a same-sex couple.
We considered the Family Court's certified question in conference on January 4, 2007 and again on January 10, 2007, and we determined at that point that our consideration of the certified question required that the Family Court make further findings of fact. While retaining jurisdiction, we remanded the matter to the Family Court and directed that it address several questions of fact. We also directed the certifying justice of the Family Court, based on his findings of fact, to determine: (1) whether or not the case presented an actual case or controversy; (2) whether or not the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution was relevant to the case; and (3) whether or not the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000), was pertinent to the case. This Court further directed that the Family Court reword the certified question to clarify that the issue was whether the Family Court could recognize the purported marriage for the purpose of entertaining a divorce petition. Chambers v. Ormiston, 916 A.2d 758, 758-59 (R.I.2007) (mem.). The Family Court responded to our request on February 21, 2007. The court's response set forth its conclusion that the case presented an actual case or controversy, that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was relevant, and that the Defense of Marriage Act had only "nominal" effect.
On October 9, 2007, after reviewing the briefs filed by the parties, as well as the briefs of a number of amici curiae, we heard oral argument from the parties with respect to the certified question.5
Upon contemplating the question certified by the Family Court, it became clear to us that the precise issue we must decide is ultimately the following: What is the meaning of the word "marriage" within the Rhode Island statute6 that empowers the Family Court to grant divorces-or, stated even more precisely, what did the word mean at the time that the members of the General Assembly enacted the statute? It is imperative that we direct our attention to the meaning of this statutory term at that point in time. We are well aware that "[t]his Court is the final arbiter with respect to questions of statutory construction." New England Expedition-Providence, LLC v. City of Providence, 773 A.2d 259, 263 (R.I.2001); see also Unistrut Corp. v. State Department of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 98 (R.I.2007). In carrying out that responsibility, we are mindful of the principle that our role is to determine the intent of the General Assembly by looking to "the language, nature and object" of the enactments of that body. In re Estate of Gervais, 770 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I.2001)); see also Pacheco v. Lachapelle, 91 R.I. 359, 361-62, 163 A.2d 38, 40 (1960).
We have employed our customary procedure in approaching this particular question of statutory construction.7 Pursuant to that procedure, we first attempt to see whether or not the statute in question has a plain meaning and therefore is unambiguous; in that situation, we simply apply that plain meaning to the case at hand. See, e.g., State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998); Pacheco, 91 R.I. at 361-62, 163 A.2d at 40. By contrast, if a statute is ambiguous, we must engage in a more elaborate statutory construction process, in which process we very frequently employ the canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Horn v. Southern Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 294 (R.I.2007) ( ); Kells v. Town of Lincoln, 874 A.2d 204, 212 (R.I.2005) ( ); State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 667 (R.I.2004) ( ); Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 248, 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979) ( ); see also Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 738 n. 9 (R.I.2005) ( ).
After initially addressing the issue of our own jurisdiction, we shall turn to the certified question itself and determine whether or not the language of the statute (understanding that language as did the legislators who enacted the statute) has a plain meaning and so is unambiguous. Thereafter, we shall consider the same language through the prism of the most relevant canon of statutory construction. Finally, we shall conclude by referencing certain highly relevant jurisprudential and public policy principles.
In our judgment, this case is properly justiciable. By contrast with the federal courts, our jurisdiction is not limited by an inflexible constitutional "cases and controversies" requirement. Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 28, 317 A.2d 124, 130 (1974). Although it is our policy not to rule on abstract questions (see id. at 28, 317 A.2d at 130-31), we do not view the instant case as presenting an abstract question. Rather, the issue of Family Court jurisdiction vel non, which lies at the heart of this case, is an issue about which there is real controversy, and the resolution of that controversy will have definite real-world consequences. In view of those considerations, and bearing in mind our general supervisory authority over the courts, we are convinced that it is proper for us to adjudicate this case. See generally Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915 (R.I.1991).
The issue before us is rather narrow, and it can be decided entirely on the statutory level: Does G.L. 1956 § 8-10-3(a), the statute authorizing the Family Court to "hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage," empower that court to grant a divorce to the instant parties, who are described in the certified question as "two persons of the same sex who were purportedly married in another state?"
When we are called upon to decide what the General Assembly intended when it enacted a particular statute, we always begin with the principle that "[t]he plain statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent." State v. Santos, 870 A.2d 1029, 1032 (R.I.2005) ( ).
It is clear to us that in this instance we are not confronted with an ambiguous statute. Therefore we simply must determine what the words in this statute were intended to mean. Once we have done so, our interpretive task is at an end and our role is simply to apply the statute as written. See Santos, 870 A.2d at 1032; DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253; In re Denisewich, 643 A.2d 1194, 1197 (R.I.1994).
It is a fundamental principle that "in the absence of statutory definition or qualification the words of a statute are given their ordinary meaning." Pacheco, 91 R.I. at 362, 163 A.2d at 40. What is crucial, however, is to determine the ordinary meaning as of the time of enactment. See, e.g., St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987); State v. Perry, 336 Or. 49, 77 P.3d 313, 315-16 (2003).
Words can have different meanings at different points of historical time, but it is the role of the judiciary to ascertain what meaning a particular word had when the statute containing that word was enacted.8 It is possible that today's members of the General Assembly might have an understanding of the term "marriage" that differs from the understanding of those legislators who enacted § 8-10-3(a) in 1961,9 but our role is to interpret what was enacted and not to speculate as to what some other not-yet-enacted statute might say or mean. See West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991) () (Internal quotation marks omitted.).
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