Chambers v. People of State
| Decision Date | 31 January 1883 |
| Citation | 1883 WL 10145,105 Ill. 409 |
| Parties | NATHAN CHAMBERSv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Jasper county; the Hon. WILLIAM C. JONES, Judge, presiding.
Mr. J. M. HONEY, Mr. J. H. HALLEY, and Mr. D. TREXLER, for the plaintiff in error:
The court erred in instructing the jury that “they are not bound to treat the evidence of defendant the same as the evidence of other witnesses.” The defendant in a criminal case, as a witness, is to be tried and treated as any other witness. Gulliher et al. v. People, 82 Ill. 145; Bulliner v. People, 25 Id. 394; Fleter v. State, 49 Ind. 124. The second of the People's instructions tells the jury that any fact and circumstance that concurs with the testimony of the prosecutrix, (meaning a number of circumstances not proven,) give great probability to her evidence. The circumstances cited, if proved, only give probability, not great probability, to her evidence. Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39; Waterman's United States Crim. Digest, 523, secs. 68, 74, 524.
The instruction gives undue prominence to this group of circumstances assumed to be proven, and was unfair and highly prejudicial to the defendant, and invaded the province of the jury. Shaw v. People, 81 Ill. 150; Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Hall, 90 Id. 42; City of Aurora v. Pennington, 92 Id. 564.
The court, in a criminal case, can not instruct as to a combination of facts assumed to be proven. Weyrich v. People, 89 Ill. 99; Coon v. People, 99 Id. 371.
Where the evidence is conflicting, the jury should determine the facts without the interference of the court. Swan v. People, 98 Ill. 610; Coon v. People, 99 Id. 368.
Mr. JAMES MCCARTNEY, Attorney General, for the People:
The instruction as to the credence to be given to defendant's testimony is in accord with the statute. Criminal Code, sec. 426; Bulliner v. People, 95 Ill. 394.
The other instruction complained of as invading the province of the jury, does not come within the objections in the cases of Swan v. People, 98 Ill. 610, and Coon v. People, 99 Id. 368. Nothing is assumed in it as proven, but the jury are directed “to give such credit to the testimony of each witness as, under all the circumstances, such witnesses seem to be entitled to.”
Mr. GEO. W. FITHIAN, State's Attorney, and Mr. JOHN P. HEAP, also, for the People. Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:
Plaintiff in error was convicted in the court below of the crime of “an assault with intent to commit rape.” The only witnesses of the acts alleged to constitute the offence were the prosecutrix and plaintiff in error. Both were examined as witnesses, and the evidence they gave as to the fact of such assault having been committed, was directly contradictory.
Although it is quite probable that if the jury had been fairly and accurately instructed as to the law, and still have found as they did, we should not feel it to be our duty to interfere with the verdict, yet there is enough evidence in the record favorable to plaintiff in error to raise in our mind reasonable doubts whether, if the jury had been so instructed, they would have returned the same verdict, and hence we can not say that the objections to which we conceive certain of the People's instructions obnoxious, did no injustice to plaintiff in error.
The first instruction, given at the instance of the People, is as follows:
“The court instructs the jury, for the People, that they are not bound to believe the evidence of the defendant in a criminal case, and treat it the same as the evidence of other witnesses, but the jury may take into consideration the fact that he is defendant, and give his testimony such weight as, under all the circumstances, they think it entitled to.”
The language of the statute is: “No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any criminal case or proceeding by reason of his interest in the event of the same, as a party or otherwise, or by reason of his having been convicted of any crime,”--thus expressly placing the defendant and all other witnesses, as respects competency, on an equality; “but,” the statute proceeds, “such interest or conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility,”--so, also, in this respect as in others, subjecting his evidence to like tests, for the purpose of determining the amount of reliance to be placed upon it, as those to which the evidence of other witnesses is subject, for, in all cases, the interest or bias which may sway a witness to pervert the truth is to be taken into consideration, for the purpose of determining what credit shall be given his evidence. The law contemplates, by allowing persons charged with crime to become witnesses, that they may tell the truth, and if, in a given case, the jury shall believe such a witness does tell the truth, it must have precisely the same effect as if told by any other witness; and, on the other hand, if the jury shall believe that he does not tell the truth, they are not at liberty to give more or less credence to it than to the evidence of any other witness whom they disbelieve. Such a person, when introduced as a witness, moreover, is to be examined and cross-examined precisely as other witnesses, and he may, likewise, be impeached in precisely the same modes. It is, therefore, manifest that there is one respect only in which his evidence differs from that of any other witness, and this is in the fact that he is defendant,--the party being tried for the crime. That fact is to be taken into consideration in determining what reliance is to be placed upon his evidence, and, of course, can not be in any case where the witness is not the defendant charged with crime. The effect of the fact that the witness is the defendant charged with the crime, in disparaging or impeaching his evidence, all experience teaches, will vary with varying circumstances to be disclosed upon the trial, sometimes requiring disbelief and entire disregard of his evidence, while at others not sensibly disparaging it; and hence sometimes the jury will be required to treat it differently from the evidence of other witnesses whom they believe, but not then differently from the evidence of other witnesses whom they disbelieve,--and so, necessarily, the only difference between this and other evidence is, not in the way in which it shall be treated, but in the credence that shall be given it, and that is, in all cases and with regard to evidence given by all other witnesses, precisely the difference between evidence that is unquestioned in every respect, and that which is claimed to be discredited by any circumstances presumptively impairing the probability of its accuracy. It can not, therefore, be true that the evidence given by the defendant charged with crime is not to be treated the same as the evidence of other witnesses. It could not even be true, as a universal proposition, that, as matter of law, it is not to have the same effect as the evidence of other witnesses. Many times it certainly can not have that effect, but there are times when it can and should,--and of this the jury are made the judges.
Counsel for the People contend this instruction is sanctioned by Bulliner v. The People, 95 Ill. 406. Expressions in this instruction are, doubtless, copied from language used in the opinion in that case, but there is nothing there that sanctions the feature in this instruction which we regard as erroneous and prejudicial to the plaintiff in error, namely, that which tells the jury they are not bound to treat the evidence of plaintiff in error as the evidence of other witnesses. There the defendant asked this instruction: “Under the law the evidence of the defendants is just as proper for your consideration in determining their guilt or innocence, as the evidence of other witnesses.” This was modified by the court, and made to read thus: “Under the law the evidence of the defendants is proper for your consideration in determining their guilt or innocence, and should receive such weight as you think it entitled to.” In reply to an objection of counsel for the defendants in criticizing this modification, to the effect that it allowed the jury to disregard the evidence of the defendants, we used the language relied upon by counsel here, saying: It was not said and not intended the jury were to consider the evidence of the defendants in a manner different from that in which they considered the evidence of other...
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