Chambers v. Prince

• Decision Date: 29 May 1896
• Parties: CHAMBERS et ux. v. PRINCE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

75 F. 176

CHAMBERS et ux. v. PRINCE.

United States Circuit Court, D. West Virginia.

May 29, 1896

Brown Jackson & Knight and J. H. McGinnis, for plaintiffs.

Watts &amp Ashby and John W. McCreery, for defendant.

JACKSON District Judge.

This is a suit in equity, instituted by T. W. Chambers and wife alleging that they are residents and citizens of the state of Missouri, against Burt Prince, executor of Edwin Prince deceased, a citizen of the state of West Virginia. The question at issue is whether the domicile of the plaintiff in this case, at the institution of this suit, was in Missouri or in West Virginia. The bill was filed on the 28th day of October, 1895, and the subpoena in chancery was issued returnable to December rules, 1895. Much evidence has been taken in regard to the question whether the plaintiff was at the time of the institution of this suit a resident of Missouri or West Virginia. The facts testified to by the witnesses on the opposing sides have somewhat the appearance of being conflicting; but an analysis of the evidence clearly shows, to my mind, that they are not necessarily conflicting, and are easily reconciled with each other. The question whether a party moving from one state to another has acquired a legal residence in the state to which he has removed has been passed upon in many instances, and, so far as I am able to judge from the adjudications, it is mostly a question of intention with the party. The evidence discloses that the plaintiff had resided in Pacific, Mo., for a number of years, and was engaged in business there until he formed the intention of going to West Virginia, with a view of intermarrying with the lady to whom he was afterwards married. Pacific was his domicile, and by reason of his being domiciled there he was not only a resident, but a citizen, of the state of Missouri. A domicile thus acquired will continue until it is shown to have been changed. Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 787; President, etc., v. Gore, 5 Pick. 370. It appears from the evidence that when Chambers left the state of Missouri and went to the state of West Virginia he went for a specific purpose, and, so far as is disclosed by the evidence, there was no intention upon his part to acquire a new residence and domicile or a settled home in West Virginia. His only object, so far as the evidence discloses, was to intermarry with the lady to whom he was married after his arrival in West Virginia. It is a well-settled principle that where a party leaves his residence, or acquires a new one, the declaration of his intentions must control, unless those declarations are overthrown by acts inconsistent with them. The absence, even for a short time, from a home that a party has long occupied, if accompanied with the intention of making the place to which he has removed a residence, is sufficient to establish a domicile at his new place of abode, although he may have altered, shortly afterwards, his intention in reference to the change.

As to the question of intention, we must strongly rely upon the declarations of the party, though they are not necessarily conclusive, because those declarations may be met and opposed by acts of the party that would control them. This principle of law seems to be well settled by both the state and federal authorities. Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 17 N.E. 232; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 Sup.Ct. 289; Viles v. City of Waltham, 157 Mass. 542, 32 N.E. 901; White v. Tennant, 31 W.Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596. In this connection it is to be noted that there is not only an obvious but a wide distinction between domicile and residence, which is recognized by all the authorities that I have examined. Domicile is a residence accompanied with proof, either positive or presumptive, of the intention of the party to remain at his place of abode for an unlimited time. It will be observed that domicile consists of two things, which must concur,-- residence and intention to remain. Gilman v. Gilman, 52 Me. 165; Gravillon v. Richards' Ex'r, 13 La. 293; Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704; Hart v. Lindsey, 17 N.H. 235. A party may be a resident of a place, and yet not domiciled there, for, while he is a resident there, still if he does not intend to make that his permanent place of abode, but has always the 'animo revertendi,' there can be no doubt that the mere fact of his residing for the time being in a place does not establish a domicile at the place of residence. A man always retains his domicile if he leaves it 'animo revertendi.' Long v. Ryan, 30 Grat. 718; Pilson v. Bushong, 29 Grat. 240.

Having settled the questions of law which govern and control the question arising upon the facts in this case, I will now discuss the evidence relied upon by both parties in support of their respective positions. The evidence of the plaintiff himself states in unequivocal terms that at no time up to the date of the institution of this suit was it his intention to make the state of West Virginia his place of permanent abode but, on the contrary, when asked by various parties, he had on repeated occasions stated 'that it was his intention to return to Missouri as soon as he could settle up his business in the state of West Virginia'; and the inference, from all that he has said upon that subject, clearly satisfies me that there was an abiding intention upon his part to return sooner or later, to Missouri, and that at no time had he ever intended to change his domicile. In this he is supported by the evidence of B. F. Harper, John Anderson, C. K. Scott, William McKeever, and Mrs. Josephine Morris. Harper states that he had known Chambers for about two years, and in the course of a conversation with him in reference to a loan that he had applied for to Chambers he replied 'that he did not know that he would remain here, and did not care about scattering his money.' This declaration of Mr. Chambers to the witness shows that at that time he had no fixed and determined purpose to change his residence, and he assigned that as a reason why he did not care to make loans of money here. Anderson testified that he had known the plaintiff for about a year, and that in a conversation with him in regard to locating in West Virginia, he asked him on the day that he was married if he was going to remain in West Virginia, to which Chambers replied 'that he did not know.' Chambers also stated in other conversations, in the latter part of August, 1895, 'that he did not intend to stay in this country; that as soon as he got his business settled up he was going to move back to Missouri.' Scott testified that in a conversation with Chambers in July, 1895, Chambers stated ...