Chambers v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 22 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 8:08-cv-176-T-17EAJ |
| Parties | PATRICK A. CHAMBERS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This case is on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. (Doc. 25).
In its original order denying Petitioner Chambers' 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus, this Court stated that the petition raised five grounds for relief, and addressed those grounds. This Court also pointed out that, in his reply, Chambers alleged that he raised six grounds, with the sixth ground on page 11(b). The Court further pointed out that there was no page 11(b) in Chambers' petition. The Court found no record of a ground six and therefore, could not address the claims raised in a "ground six."
This Court denied the petition based on the five grounds that Chambers raised in his petition. Chambers appealed and the Eleventh Circuit remanded for this Court to address Chambers' sixth ground, The remand order reads:
Petitioner appeals the district court's denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief. We issued a certificate of appealability on one issue:
Whether the district court erred in declining to address the additional [sixth] ground of relief, first mentioned in a reply brief, without sua sponte affording [petitioner] an opportunity to properly present the constitutional claim.
We consider petitioner's reference to his sixth ground of relief in his reply brief not as an attempt to raise it in the brief, but as an indication that petitioner believed that he had raised it in his 2254 petition on page 11B. The district court apparently did not consider the reference as such. If the court had construed the reference as petitioner's request for leave to amend the petition, we are satisfied that the court would have granted leave. A "court should freely give leave to amend when justice so required, and leave should not be denied absent a substantial reason. Fed. R. Cv. P. 159a); Espy v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 748, 750 (11th Cir. 1984). There was no reason such as undue delay or bad faith on petitioner's part--to deny leave here.
To the end that we may avoid having to consider this case more than once on appeal, see generally Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992)(en banc), we vacate the district court's judgment and remand the case with the instruction that the district court entertain the sixth ground for relief referred to in petitioner's reply brief.
VACATED and REMANDED, with instruction.
A review of the record demonstrates that Ground Six, as well as the other five grounds, have no merit, and that the petition must be denied.
On May 9, 2002, the State Attorney filed an Information charging Chambers with attempted murder in the second degree against victim Marcia Radway (Count One), aggravated assault with a firearm against victim Richard "Rocky" Blair (Count Two), and burglary of a dwelling while armed with a firearm (Count Three). (Exh 21: Vol. 1: R 21-22).1 On December 18, 2002, the State filed an Amended Information charging Chambers with tampering with physical evidence. (Exh 21: Vol. 1: R 25-26).
In March, 2003, the case proceeded to jury trial before the Honorable Michael Raiden, Circuit Judge. Chambers was represented by Assistant Public Defender Willie Twyford. As to Count One, the jury found Chambers guilty of aggravated assault, a lesser-included offense; on the special verdict form, the jury also found that Chambers was in actual possession of and discharged a firearm. The jury likewise found the discharge of the firearm caused great bodily harm to the victim. (Exh 21: vol. 1: R 66-69; Vol. 4: T 583-584). Chambers was found not guilty of Count Two (aggravated assault as to Richard Blair), and not guilty of Count Three (burglary of a dwelling). However, the jury found Chambers guilty of Count Four (tampering with physical evidence). (Exh 21: Vol. 1: R 69; Vol. 4: T 583-585).
On March 20, 2003, Circuit Judge Judith Flanders sentenced Chambers to a minimum mandatory 25-year sentence of imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction, and a sentence of 21.45 months imprisonment on the tampering conviction, with the counts to run consecutive. (Exh 21: Vol. 1: R 84, 90-97).
Chambers pursued a direct appeal. Tonya R. Vickers, the Assistant Public Defender assigned to represent Chambers on appeal, filed an initial brief (Exhibit 1) raising two issues:
Issue I
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A PERMISSIVE LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE MUST BE REVERSED FOR FAILURE OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT TO ALLEGE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
Issue II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING AN ENHANCED SENTENCE WHERE THE STATE PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE OF GREAT BODILY HARM.
The State filed its answer brief. (Exhibit 2). On April 28, 2004, in Case No. 2D03-1716, the Second District Court of Appeal, en banc, filed a written opinion affirming Chambers' convictions. (Exhibit 3). Chambers v. State, 880 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The mandate was issued on May 26, 2004. (Exhibit 4). Chambers sought discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court, in Case No. SC04-837. (Exhibit 5). Chambers and the State filed jurisdictional briefs. (Composite Exhibit 6). On May 23, 2005, the state supreme court filed an order denying the petition for discretionary review, stating the court declined to accept jurisdiction. (Exhibit 7). Chambers v. State, 905 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2005)[table].
On August 22, 2005, Chambers filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Exhibit 8). The State filed a response. (Exhibit 9). On September 2, 2005, in case No. 2D05-4116, the district court of appeal issued an order directing the State to file an amended response addressing the issue of "whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to argue that it was fundamental error to instruct the jury on the uncharged offense of aggravated assault while discharging a firearm resulting in great bodily injury because the penalty for this offense was not less than the penalty for the charged offense." (Exhibit 10). On July 18, 2006, the State filed an amended response. (Exhibit 11). On April 13, 2007, in Case No. 2D05-4116, the Second District Court of Appeal filed a written opinion denying the petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Exhibit 12). Chambers v. State, 975 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
Chambers sought discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court. (Exhibit 13). Jurisdictional briefs were filed by both parties. (Exhibits 14 & 15). On September 18, 2007, inCase No. SC07-1371, the court filed an order declining to accept jurisdiction. (Exhibit 16). Chambers v. State, 967 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 2007)[table].
On May 10, 2007, Chambers filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Exhibit 17). Chambers presented six grounds for relief, alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) object to the jury instruction on aggravated assault with a firearm because the essential elements for the crime were not included in the information; (2) object to the impermissive lesser-included offense of aggravated assault with a firearm constituted fundamental error; (3) file a motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to Rule 3.610, Fla. R. Crim. P., "after defendant was convicted of an offense for which he could not be convicted under the original charging document"; (4) object to the because there was insufficient evidence to support such a finding; and (5) have count 4, tampering with physical evidence, severed from the trial on counts 1, 2, and 3. On June 18, 2007, the trial court issued an order summarily denying all six claims. (Exhibit 18). Chambers appealed the adverse ruling. On December 21, 2007, in Case No. 2D07-3156, the appellate court filed a per curiam unwritten opinion affirming the lower court's denial of postconviction relief. (Exhibit 19). Chambers v. State, 970 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)[table]. The mandate was issued on January 11, 2008. (Exhibit 20).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e) as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), this court's review of the state court's factual findings must behighly deferential. Such findings are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Similarly, the state courts' resolutions of issues of law-including constitutional issues-must be accepted unless they are found to be "contrary to" clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States or involve an "unreasonable application" of such precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Indeed, it is not enough that the federal courts believe that the state court was wrong; it must be demonstrated that the state court decision was "objectively unreasonable." ki Breedlove v. Moore, 279 F.3d 952 (11th Cir. 2002).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, a Petitioner must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a Petitioner to demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and "there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. However, if a claim fails to satisfy the prejudice component, the court need not make a ruling on the performance component.
Chambers contends he was convicted of a permissive lesser included offense that was not a subset of the primary...
To continue reading
Request your trial